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The current United Nations peacekeeping mission in Kosovo is not merely assisting 
and advising a State in post-conflict peace-building, it is acting as a transitional 
international administration. UNMIK is charged with the provision of civil 
administration services and the design and development of civilian structures with 
the support of a military force, KFOR, authorised by the Security Council. 
The extensive mandate and wide powers of the international administration raise 
many legal issues, including the status ofKosovo in international law, the consent of 
the legal sovereign and the competence of the Security Council to authorise such an 
extensive mission, even pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
This thesis examines these issues, before considering the application of international 
human rights standards to the international administration in Kosovo. There are 
several possible bases for this, including human rights as obligations binding upon 
the Security Council and UNMIK by virtue of both international and domestic law. 
However, none of them clearly establishes legal obligation on the part of the 
international administration to observe international human rights standards. 
Further, the wide immunities granted to the international administration, and the 
limitations of the domestic judicial and human rights institutions, preclude persons 
obtaining an effective legal remedy. The possibility of obtaining a remedy outside 
the domestic legal systems is similarly limited. 
This thesis also considers how international human rights standards should apply in 
post-conflict situations, taking into account the possibility of derogation from 
international human rights standards in the difficult circumstances in which the 
initial steps of peace-building take place. 
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Resolution 1244 
A. Introduction 
In June 1999, following the cessation of a military campaign by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NA'fO) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the United 
Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of international civilian and military 
presences to Kosovo 1• The international civil presence is led by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and is mandated 'to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' 2• The International Security Force 
(KFOR) is to perform military functions, support UNMIK and to establish a secure 
environment within which UNMIK can operate3. 
In adopting Resolution 1244, the Security Council 'mandated the United Nations with an 
unprecedented challenge in Kosovo'4. Administration of territory by an international 
organisation, either individually or collectively, is not a novel concept. However, the 
extent of the powers granted to the international administration in Kosovo is innovative5. 
All 'legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo' is vested in UNMIK, 
including 'the administration of the judiciary'6, while KFOR is responsible for law and 
order. Together, UNMIK and KFOR undertake a wide range of functions normally 
associated with the government of a State. 
1 See Security Council Resolution 1244, I 0 June 1999 (Resolution 1244). 
2 Paragraph I 0, Resolution 1244. 
3 Paragraph 9, Resolution 1244. 
4 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 12 July 
1999 UN Doe S/19991779 (SG Report 1217/99), paragraph 120. 
5 Only a few months following the adoption of SCR 1244, the Security Council authorised the deployment of 
a mission to East Timor, with a similarly expansive mandate. The United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was authorised to establish an interim administration in East Timor 
pending the transition to independence. See Security Council Resolution 1272, 25 October 1999. 
6 UNMIK Regulation No 1999/1 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo of 25 July 1999, 
section 1.1 (Regulation 1). 
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While the UN has performed such governance functions in previOus post-conflict 
missions7, it has generally done so only with the consent of the host government or 
pursuant to a comprehensive peace agreement, neither of which are present in Kosovo. The 
extensive powers granted to the international administration in Kosovo are such that, 
although Kosovo remains legally a part of the FRY8, it is de facto an international 
territory9. It is the first example of a UN peacekeeping mission where the UN exercises 
government authority to the exclusion of the legal sovereign10. The Charter of the United 
Nations (Charter) does not include an express power to administer territory, raising the 
preliminary question as to whether the Security Council may lawfully establish UNMIK 
and KFOR. 
This requires an examination of the nature and powers of, and the legal basis for, both 
UNMIK and KFOR within the UN system, including the existence of any limits upon the 
powers of the Security Council itself. UNMIK is a peacekeeping mission operating under 
the authority of the Security Council and is a subsidiary organ of the UN. Its staff and 
personnel contributed to it by member States are officials of the UN and are subject to the 
command and control of the UN. In contrast, KFOR is a multinational peacekeeping force 
authorised by the Security Council to use force, but comprised of national contingents, 
which remain subject to national control and responsibility. 
Human rights 'have become an integral component of every UN field mission, in particular 
UN peacekeeping operations' 11 . However, progress in developing a framework for human 
7 For the purpose of this thesis, the tenn conflict will refer to the period of anned conflict (as understood in 
international law), and the tenn post-conflict to the period after the conflict. 
8 The Security Council recognised and confinned the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY in 
Resolution 1244, thereby recognising that Kosovo fonns part of the FRY. 
9 See Zimmennann & Stahn, 'Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or Sovereign State? Reflections 
on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo' (2001) 70(4) Nordic Journal of International Law 423, 
Ringelheim, 'The Legal Status of Kosovo' in Kosovo 1999-2000: The Intractable Peace, Research paper 
produced by the European University Institute, available at www.iue.it and Stahn, 'The United Nations 
Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East Timor: A First Analysis' (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 105. 
10 Resolution 1244 'transfers the exercise of State sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo in its entirety to 
UNMIK', suggesting that the FRY is not intended to exercise power in respect ofKosovo during the interim 
administration. 
11 Brand, 'Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light ofUNMIK Legislation' 
(200 1) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 461 at 465. 
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rights protection where the UN administers territory has been limited. Therefore, once the 
Security Council's competence to establish UNMIK and KFOR is confirmed, the human 
rights obligations and structures of the international administration must be considered. 
Whilst similar principles apply to both UNMIK and KFOR, their application and the nature 
of any obligations under international human rights law12 (KH:JRL) may vary due to the 
different legal basis and competencies of UNMIK and KFOR. There are several possible 
bases upon which it may be argued that IHRL applies to the actions of UNMIK and KFOR 
in Kosovo. First, IHRL may bind UNMIK as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, 
which is itself possibly bound to observe IHRL either under the Charter, as customary law 
or as part of 'UN law'. KFOR, a military force under UN auspices, may be bound by that 
part of customary IHRL that applies to peacekeeping forces. Second, IHRL may apply in 
Kosovo as part of the applicable domestic law provisions, including applyi~ directly 
through Resolution 1244 and UNMIK regulations that define the applicable law and 
standards governing the territory during the course of the international administration. 
Alternatively, IHRL may continue to apply in Kosovo by virtue of the law cf State 
succession. Finally, individual States may be bound by IHRL in relation to the actions of 
their troops or civilian personnel through a notion of extra-territorial jurisdiction, 
particularly in relation to national contingents participating in KFOR. 
Even if IHRL applies to the international administration in Kosovo, the inhabitants of 
Kosovo cannot obtain an individual judicial remedy in respect of a violation of IHRL by 
the international administration or its personnel. As the UN is not, and cannot be, a party to 
international human rights instruments, it is not subject to their regulatory and enforcement 
mechanisms. The Charter does not provide for a general right of review of Security 
Council resolutions or a right of individual petition before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Within the domestic legal system of Kosovo, individuals are precluded from 
seeking a judicial remedy due to the absence of a functioning, independent and impartial 
judicial system and the extensive immunities accorded to UNMIK and KFOR both 
institutionally and to their personnel. Other domestic human rights institutions, such as the 
12 This thesis is limited to considering the application of IHRL and does not consider international criminal 
law or the possible application of international humanitarian law to Kosovo. 
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Ombudsperson, do not provide a judicial remedy. In any event, the protection of human 
rights must be balanced against the 'enormity and multiplicity of challenges facing a 
mission' 13 . The major international human rights instruments provide for derogation from 
human rights standards in times of emergency. If the international administration is to 
comply with international human rights standards as if it was a government, it must also be 
given the same allowances even though it does not have the same formal capacity to make a 
notice of derogation from the international human rights instruments. 
B. Background to Resolution 1244 
Following World War 11, the territory of Kosovo was included as part of Yugoslavia, as an 
autonomous constituent part of Serbia, on of the Republics of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 14. Under the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY, Kosovo was 
granted the privileged status of an autonomous province. While still formally part of the 
Republic of Serbia, Kosovo had its own administration, assembly and judiciary and was 
entitled to participate in both the Serbian parliament and the Federal parliament, in which it 
had a right of veto. The rise of Serbian nationalism during the 1980s led to the Republic of 
Serbia gradually exerting greater control over institutions in Kosovo, including the police 
and security forces, the judiciary and financial institutions. Serbian authorities enacted 
discriminatory legislation directed against Kosovo Albanians in the areas of property 
ownership, education, language, public services and employment. In July 1990, the 
Republic of Serbia forced through amendments to the Serbian Constitution, effectively 
revoking the territory's autonomy and reducing its status to a level below that of a 
municipality. During this period, there was also a significant increase in human rights 
abuses perpetrated against Kosovo Albanians by Serbian and local authorities, including 
arbitrary arrests, torture and detention without trial. 
13 Strohmeyer, 'Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of Transitional Justice 
Systems in Kosovo and East Timor' (200 I) 25 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal I 07 at 121. 
14 This discussion is drawn from a number of sources. For further information see: Report of the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis (2000) and supplement, available at 
http://www.kosovocommision.org; Amnesty International Country reports available at 
http://www.amnesty.org; Campbell, The Road to Kosovo -A Balkan Diary (2000); Judah, Kosovo: War and 
Revenge, (2000); Malcolm, Kosovo ( 1998); Stahn, 'Constitution without a State? Kosovo under the United 
Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government' (200 I) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 531; 
and O'Neill, Kosovo: An unfinished peace (200 I). 
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Kosovo Albanians responded to these acts by adopting a strategy of passive, non-violent 
resistance. On 2 July 1990, before the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved, a majority of the 
Albanian delegates declared that the Albanians had the status of a nation entitled to its own 
republic. This was followed by a proclamation of a new constitution for a Kosovo republic, 
including a new assembly and presidency, on 7 September 1990. The demand for a 
republic was subsequently amended to a call for independence, which was supported by 99 
per cent of voters in a self-organised referendum on independence held in September 1991. 
In May 1992, Kosovo-wide elections were held for a new republican government and 
assembly. Doctor Rugova, the leader of the Democratic Union, was elected president and 
his party enjoyed an overwhelming majority of votes. Due to Serbian opposition, the 
elected parliament was never convened and the Rugova Government concentrated on 
maintaining an unofficial, parallel structure of administration for Kosovo. This shadow 
government was largely unsuccessful in its attempts to secure international support for 
independence for Kosovo as a separate republic. While the SFRY disintegrated over a 
period from 1991-1992, States outside the SFRY showed no inclination to recognise 
Statehood for Kosovo and, after the internationally sponsored Dayton Settlement of 1995, 
its position as part of the FRY was not contested. 
Due to both the increasingly serious human rights violations within Kosovo and the 
perceived failure of the United Nations to address their claim for self-determination, 
Kosovo Albanians turned to more violent means. In particular, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) emerged in opposition to the Serbian authorities. Initially small, 
decentralised and ill equipped for war, the KLA grew in strength, co-ordination and support 
from 1997 onwards. As the KLA became more active, the harassment of the Kosovo 
Albanian population intensified, targeting not just KLA members, but leading politicians, 
activists and civilians. Facing an expanding KLA presence, the FRY army entered Kosovo 
commenced large-scale operations with police and paramilitary units. This campaign 
targeted both the KLA and Albanian civilian populations in rural areas, resulting in the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians together with human rights 
abuses and violations of civil rights. The conflict escalated from early 1998 to March 1999, 
eventually engulfing the entire province. 
5 
Resolution 1244 
An agreement between the US Special Envoy15 and the FRY President, Slobodan 
Milosevic, resulted in a temporary cease-fire in October 1998, permitting the deployment of 
an observer mission to the territory16. However, the KLA used the cease-fire to consolidate 
and renewed military action, leading to a new cycle of hostilities. Peace negotiations were 
held in early February 1999, resulting in the proposed Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords) 17. The Rambouillet Accords would 
have granted Kosovo self-government and substantial autonomy, while remaining within 
the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Although still formally part of Serbia, Kosovo 
would have had powers and responsibilities equivalent to the two republics of the FRY 18 . 
The FRY authorities declined to sign the Rambouillet Accords and, on 24 March 1999, 
NATO commenced a bombing campaign against the FRY and its forces within Kosovo 19• 
In response, FRY military and paramilitary units attacked the Kosovo Albanian population, 
with devastating consequences20 . 
Diplomatic efforts continued during the NATO campaign, culminating m a peace plan 
formally approved by the Serbian Parliament on 3 June 1999 (Peace Plan)21 . These 
principles required the immediate and verifiable end to the violence and repression in 
15 Richard Holbrooke, representing the Contact Group for Kosovo. 
16 The agreement was never published, but its main points addressed a reduction in the number of forces and 
deployment of monitors. The Security Council affirmed the agreement by Security Council Resolution 1203, 
24 October 1998, which authorised the deployment of 2,000 civilian monitors (combined OSCE/UN mission 
known as OSCE-Kosovo Verification Mission). 
17 UN Doe S/1999/648 of7 June 1999. 
18 Chapter 1 of the Rambouillet Accords sets out a draft Constitution that provides for democratic self-
government for Kosovo, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. The 
Constitution lists the powers of the domestic institutions and the arrangements between Kosovo and the 
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. See: Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo' (1999) 75 
International Affairs 211. 
19 This thesis will not consider the legality of this action, which triggered a vigorous debate. However, see: 
Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects' (1999) 10 EJIL 1; Gowlland-Debbas, 'The 
Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance' 
(2000) 11 E!IL 361; Hen kin, 'Kosovo and the Law of 'humanitarian intervention" (1999) 93 AJIL 828; 
Duursma, 'Justifying NATO's use of force in Kosovo?' (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 287; 
and Neuhold, H, 'Collective Security after Operation Allied Force' (2000) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of 
International Law 73. 
20 The devastation inflicted upon the Kosovo Albanian population between March and June of 1999 has been 
well-documented (see for example reports by the OSCE, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
from that period). It is estimated that approximately I 0,000 people were killed, mainly Kosovo Albanians 
killed by FRY forces, and 3,000 people missing, the majority either in Serbian prisons or presumed dead. 
21 Diplomatic efforts were conducted under the auspices of the Contact Group for Kosovo and the European 
Union. 
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Kosovo; the withdrawal of FRY military, police and paramilitary forces; the deployment of 
international civil and security presences pursuant to a Security Council resolution; and the 
return of all refugees to Kosovo. The Peace Plan proposed substantial autonomy within the 
FRY for Kosovo, but did not include a mechanism to resolve the issue of the territory's 
future status22 • On 10 June 1999, the Security Council adqJted Resolution 1244, which 
implements the principles of the Peace Plan, and provides the framework for both UNMIK 
and KFOR. KFOR deployed to Kosovo on 12 June 1999, with the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the UNMIK advance team arriving a day later. 
C. Mission Mandate and Structure 
The responsibilities of the international civil presence include: promoting the establishment 
of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; performing basic civilian 
administration functions for as long as required; organising and overseeing the 
development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, 
and maintaining civil law and order23 . The UNMIK mission is complex, and requires 'an 
unprecedented form and extent of collaboration with external organizations'24• The 
Secretary-General has emphasised that 'the structure of UNMIK must ensure that all of its 
activities are carried out in an integrated manner with a clear chain of command', 
recognising that each component would be unable to 'span the wide range of complex 
activities on its ciwn'25 . The SRSG has 'overall authority to manage the mission and to 
coordinate the activities of all UN agencies and other international organizations operating 
as part ofUNMIK'26 . 
22 Unlike the mandate for UNTAET, Resolution I 244 does not provide that the territory is being prepared for 
independence, nor does the resolution refer to the right of self-determination of the people of Kosovo. 
23 Paragraph 11, Resolution 1244. 
24 Griffen & Jones, 'Building Peace through Transitional Authority: New Directions, Major Challenges', 
(2001) 7(4) International Peacekeeping 75 at 85. 
25 SG Report 12/7/99, paragraph 118. See also Wouters & Naert, 'How Effective is the European Security 
Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo' (2001) 50 ICLQ 540. 
26 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph I 0 of Security Council Resolution I 244 (1999) of 12 
June I 999, UN Doe S/1999/672 (SG Report 12/6/1999), paragraph 3. 
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The civilian component was divided into four pillars27, with civilian efforts assigned to a 
lead agency by sector. UNMIK was responsible for the provision of interim civil 
administration services, including interim police services, overseeing and conducting civil 
affairs functions and the organisation and oversight of the judicial system. The 
humanitarian affairs component, including the repatriation of refugees and the provision of 
emergency relief, was led by United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 
with the assistance of several international organisations. The mandate of UNHCR was 
fulfilled by the end of June 2000 and the humanitarian pillar disbanded, with any residual 
functions transferred to UNMIK28• Institution-building, including the conducting of 
elections, human resources capacity building, human rights monitoring and democratisation 
and governance were the responsibility of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to be performed by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). The European 
Union (EU) was responsible for rebuilding the physical, economic and social infrastructure 
of Kosovo. Following concerns that the mandates of the OSCE and UNMIK overlapped, 
resulting in duplications and omissions, a new police and justice pillar was launched on 21 
May 2001 29 • The objectives of the police and justice pillar include 'to consolidate a law 
and order structure that is responsive to peacekeeping and peace-building objectives ... and 
to establish an unbiased judicial process through initial international participation and 
reform of the judicial system .Jo. 
Resolution 1244 defined KFOR's mandate to include responsibility for: deterring renewed 
hostilities; maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire; supervising the 
withdrawal of FRY police and forces; demilitarising the KLA; establishing a secure 
environment within which the civil presence can operate and a transitional administration 
may be established; ensuring public order and safety until UNMIK can perform this task; 
supporting and co-ordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence; and 
27 SG Report 1217/99, paragraph 43 and SG Report 12/6/99, paragraphs 2-14. 
28 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo of 6 June, 2000, 
UN Doe S/2000/538 (SG Report 6/612000), paragraph 66 and Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo of 15 December 2000, UN Doe S/2000/1196 (SG Report 
15/12/2000), paragraph 51. 
29 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations [nterim Administration in Kosovo of 7 June 200 I, 
UN Doe S/2001/565 (SG Report 7/6/01), paragraph 38-9. 
30 SG Report 71610 I, paragraph 39. 
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ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence 
and other international organisations31 • KFOR remains outside the mission structure of 
UNMIK, although the SRSG cooperates and coordinates with the KFOR Commander 'to 
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive 
manner' 32 . Importantly, KFOR does not operate under the authority of the SRSG, but relies 
upon its own authority deriving from Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical 
Agreement (M'fA)33 and is the ultimate authority for security matters in Kosovo34. KFOR 
was initially organised into five multinational brigades, each assigned to a lrigade 
commander35 . The central leadership of KFOR resides in the KFOR Commander, and 
rotates among NATO countries on a biannual basis. Russian troops participating in KFOR 
operate under a special status, being under the command of their representatives at NATO 
and, in theatre, under the tactical control of the sector commanders36. 
The mission was to be implemented in a series of phase~ 7 . In its first phase, the mission 
was to restore order to the territory following the armed conflict, and to establish and 
consolidate its own authority. During this phase the interim administration would 
essentially operate as a government, with all regulatory and executive power, and 
performing all civilian administrative functions. Once basic stability was achieved, efforts 
would be directed towards the administration of social services and utilities, and the 
consolidation of the rule of law. Subsequent phases would require the interim 
administration to conduct elections for an indigenous transitional authority and to develop 
provisional institutions for self-government. UNMIK would gradually transfer its 
remaining administrative responsibilities to these institutions, subject to continued 
31 Paragraph 9, Resolution 1244. 
32 Paragraph 6, Resolution 1244. 
33 Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 10 June 1999, UN Doe S/1999/682. 
34 MTA, Article V. 
35 KFOR was restructured into four brigades in late 2002: see Report of the Security Council Mission to 
Kosovo and Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 19 December 2002, UN Doe S/2002/1376, paragraph 
30. 
36 Heksinki Agreement - Agreed Points on Russian Participation in KFOR, 18 June 1999 available at 
www.nato.int/kfor. 
37 SG Report 12/7/99, paragraphs 110-6. 
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oversight and support. A final phase will require UNMIK to oversee and facilitate a 
political process to determine the future status of the territory. 
10 
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Chapter 2 =Security Council Competence 
A preliminary legal question that arises about Resolution 1244 is whether the Security 
Council has the legal competence to authorise the extensive powers it has granted to 
UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo. This chapter considers whether the Security Council has 
the power to administer territory based on State practice and whether, in the absence of 
consent, the administration of territory must be authorised pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
Charter. If so, does the administration of territory fall within the measures available to the 
Security Council? 
A. Does the Security Council have the power to administer territory? 
The Charter does not contain an express power for the UN to administer territory, although 
the power may be implied 'by necessary implication as being essential to the performance 
of its duties .I. That a particular power is essential does not equate to the power being 
indispensable to the performance of the UN functions; rather the implied power must 
promote the efficiency of the organisation and enable the UN to function to its full capacity 
as expressed in its objects and purposes2. Provided international territorial administration 
is connected to restoring or maintaining international peace and security, the power to 
administer territory may be implied from this function of the UN3• Alternatively, the power 
to administer territory may be based upon the notion of the inherent power of the UN to 
perfonn any act related to the fulfilment of the aims of the organisation 4• 
The power to administer territory could also be based on the 'general power' theory. 
Article 24( 1) of the Charter allocates to the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
1 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations ( 1949) ICJ Reports 174 at 182-183 
(Reparatio11s for l11juries) and Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the 
Charter) (1962) ICJ Reports at 213 (Certain Expe11ses). 
2 Akande, 'The Competence of International Organisations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice' ( 1998) 9 EJIL 43 7-467 at 444 and the sources cited. 
3 See Campbell, 'The Limits of the Powers of International Organisations' (1983) 32/CLQ 523. 
4 Seyersted, 'United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems' (1961) 37 BYb!L 351 at 453-60 and Seyersted, 
United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War (1966) at 155. Compare: Montaldo, 'International Legal 
Personality and Implied Powers of International Organisations' (1970) 44 ByBIL Ill at 118-124. See also 
Akande, note 2 above, and White, 'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues' in The 
UN, Peace and Force (Pugh ed) (1997). 
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maintenance of international peace and security. In carrying out this responsibility the 
Security Council acts on behalf of member States. Proponents of the 'general power' 
theory argue that this is an express grant of a general power in addition to the specific 
powers granted in Article 24(2)5, which enables the Security Council to undertake any 
activity it considers appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
including the administration of territory. The general power to take measures not 
specifically referred to in the Charter has proved controversial and its limits are uncertain6. 
The test for an implied or general power is 'the willingness of the member States of the UN 
to acknowledge such a power within the broad competence of the Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security'7. The practice of the UN is determinative. 
Commentators consider that the scope and extent of the governance functions currently 
being performed by the UN in Kosovo and East Timor are groundbreaking, a relatively 
recent development for the organisation8. Consequently, there is no precedent for these 
missions, and hence no body of accepted UN practice that demonstrates acceptance of the 
power to administer territory. If so, it is possible that these missions do not evidence an 
existing power acknowledged by States, but rather may violate existing principles of 
international law. 
However, UN practice reveals otherwise. Wilde comments that 'the involvement of 
international organisations in varying degrees of territorial administration has a long 
5 Article 24(2) grants specific powers to the Security Council to perform the duties laid out for the Security 
Council in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971) 
ICJ Reports 341 (Namibia Advisory Opinion). 
6 Gill, 'Legal and some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to exercise its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' (1995) XXVI Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law 33 at 69. 
7 Ciobanu, 'The Power of the Security Council to Organise Peace-Keeping Operations', in United Nations 
Peace-Keeping: Legal Essays (Cassesse ed) (1978) at 24-5. See also Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International 
System' (1988) 82AJIL 705. 
8 For example: Griffin & Jones describe the mission as 'unprecedented in scope and complexity': Griffin & 
Jones, 'Building Peace through Transitional Authority: New Directions, Major Challenges' (2001) 7(4) 
International Peacekeeping 75 at 77. See also Strohmeyer, 'Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The 
UN and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 25 Fletcher Fomm of 
World Affairs Journal! 07 at I 08. 
12 
Security Council Competence 
history, stretching back to the start of the League of Nations'9. Following World War I, 
several colonies and territories of the defeated States were subject to a mandate system 
administered by the League of Nations, whereby 'advanced nations' were entrusted with 
the tutelage of the inhabitants of the former colony or territory. The League of Nations 
exercised governmental prerogatives in respect of the Free City of Danzig from 1920 to 
1939, and the Saar Territory from 1920 to 1935. The Charter provides for the International 
Trusteeship System (ITS) 'for the administration and supervision' of territories 10• It was 
contemplated that the UN itself could administer a territory pursuant to a trusteeship 
agreement. 
The UN was first authorised to exercise limited governmental powers in 1947 in relation to 
the Free Territory of Trieste 11 • The organisation performed various administrative 
functions in the Congo from 1960 to 196412, and provided overall administration and 
security in West New Guinea (West Irian) for a seven-month period from October 1962 
through April 1963 as part of the territory's transition to independence13 . In 1967, the 
General Assembly established the Council for South West Africa (later Namibia) and 
conferred on the Council authority 'to administer South West Africa until independence' 
and 'to promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for 
9 Wilde, 'From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration' 
(2001) 95 AJIL 583 at 583. See also Stahn, 'The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and 
East Timor: A First Analysis' (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 105; Wilde, 'From 
Bosnia to Kosovo and East Timor: The Changing Role of the United Nations in the Administration of 
Territory' (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 467; Verdirame, 'Compliance with 
Human Rights in UN Operations' (2002) 2(2) Human Rights Law Review 265; Chopra, Peace Maintenance: 
The evolution of international political authority ( 1999) especially Chapter 3; and Ruffert, 'The 
Administration ofKosovo and East Timor by the International Community' (2001) 50 ICLQ 613. 
10 Article 75. Under the International Trusteeship System, territories previously held by member States under 
mandates and the territories formerly held by defeated States, were allocated an administering State, Article 
77. 
11 See Wilde, note 9 at 586, although the plan for the free territory was not implemented. 
12 A main objective of United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was to provide technical assistance 
for the smooth operation of all essential services and the continued development of the economy to the 
Congolese Government. During the period where there was no clear sovereign government, ONUC carried 
out these functions with local authorities exercising de facto control in various provinces. In addition, the UN 
provided approximately 600 experts and technicians to perform the civil administration functions of departing 
Belgian administrators: See: United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review 
of United Nations Peace-keeping Third Edition ( 1996). 
13 See Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) (Indonesia-Netherlands) (1963) AJIL 493. 
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the administration of the territory until a legislative assembly is established'14• This action 
followed a General Assembly resolution15 terminating South Africa's mandate, originally 
granted pursuant to the League of Nations mandating system, and placing the territory 
under the direct responsibility of the UN16. However, while the Council introduced 
measures to protect natural resources 17 and issued travel and identity documents for 
residents of Namibia18, South Africa's continued occupation rendered the Council largely 
unable to perform administrative functions 19• 
More recently, the UN has participated in the government of a territory as a means of 
implementing a peace agreement. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC)20 was charged with the task of assisting the implementation of the Paris 
Agreements21 , intended to end the internal conflict in Cambodia. During the transitional 
period, the legal sovereignty of Cambodia resided in the Supreme National Council, which 
delegated to the UN the authority to perform various functions allocated to the UN. 
UNTAC's mandate encompassed five key areas including security arrangements and civil 
14 General Assembly Resolution 2248 of 19 May 1967. 
15 General Assembly Resolution 2145 of27 October 1966. The termination of the mandate was recognised 
by the Security Council in Security Council Resolutions 264 and 269 of 1969, which declared South Africa's 
continued occupation illegal and called for South Africa's withdrawal from the territory. The ICJ also 
endorsed the revocation of the mandate in its 1971 Advisory Opinion. 
16 The ICJ subsequently confirmed the legality of the General Assembly's actions, although it did not 
consider the extent of the General Assembly's power to administer territory. For further discussion see 
Herman, 'The Legal Status of Namibia and of the United Nations Council for Namibia' (1975) CYBiL 306. 
17 The Council enacted a Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia on 27 September 1974 (UN Doe 
A/C.l31/33), which regulated the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, including the grant of 
mining concessions and licences. The United Nations Commissioner for Namibia was granted the authority 
to enforce the provisions of the decree. 
18 Engers, 'The United Nations Travel and Identity Documents for Namibians' (1971) 65 AJIL 571. 
19See Security Council Resolutions 435 of 29 September 1978; 629 of 16 January 1989 and 632 of 16 
February 1989, implementing the peace plan; Fortna, 'United Nations Transition Assistance Group' in 
Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (Durch ed) (1993); and Blue Helmets, note 11 at 201-30. 
2
° Cambodia sources: Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (1995); Doyle, 
'Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power' in Peacebuilding as Politics (Cousens and Kumar eds) 
(2000); United Nations Department of Public Information Blue Book Series, The United Nations and 
Cambodia 1991-1995 (1995); Ratner, 'The Cambodia Settlement Agreement' (1993) 87 AJIL I; Thayer, 'The 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The Restoration of Sovereignty' in Peacekeeping and 
Peacemaking: towards effective intervention in post-Cold War conflicts (Woodhouse and Dando eds) (1998); 
and Berdal and Leifer, 'Cambodia' in The new interventionism, 1991-1994 (Mayall ed) (1996). 
21 The Paris Agreements consist of four documents: (1) Agreement on Comprehensive Political Settlement of 
the Cambodian Conflict; (2) Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity, 
Inviolability and Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia (Guarantees Agreement); (3) Declaration on the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia; and (4) Final Act of Paris Conference. 
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administration functions. UNTAC was not authorised to 'govern' Cambodia, but to 
monitor and control existing administrative systems, with the strictest level of scrutiny 
being directed at five key areas deemed likely to affect the outcome of the elections. 
UNTAC's authority was subordinate to unanimous decisions of the Supreme National 
Council in all areas other than the electoral mandate. Consequently, UNTAC's civil 
administration was effected mainly through the issue of codes of practice and management 
guidelines, was and dependent on the co-operation of the parties. Despite the qualified 
failure of UNTAC to exercise true control over the administrative processes, 'it moved 
beyond monitoring the actions of the parties to the establishment of a transitional authority 
that actually implemented directly crucial components of the mandate' 22 . In this sense, it 
was a landmark mission for the UN. 
In Western Sahara, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) was authorised to provide assistance to the administering power in 
conducting a popular consultation involving the determination of territorial status23 . Such 
assistance included the 'exercise of all necessary administration, including changing laws 
and maintaining law and order, to ensure that the consultation operated properly and was 
free and fair' 24 . Disagreements between the parties resulted in MINURSO being largely 
unable to implement its mandate, its efforts being restricted to issuing criteria for 
identification of those persons eligible to vote in the consultation. 
In the Balkans, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and Western Sirium (UNTAES) implemented the provisions of a basic agreement 
for the region. The parties requested that the Security Council establish a transitional 
administration to govern the region for a twelve-month period, which could be extended to 
two years at the request of one of the parties, and the provision of an international force. 
The transitional administration was to prepare the region for re-integration into Croatia's 
legal and constitutional system. Its main tasks included recreating a political and 
22 Doyle (1995) note 20 at 79. 
23 Durch, 'UN Temporary Executive Authority' in Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (Durch ed) (1993); 
Security Council Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991; Reports of UN Secretary-General UN Does S/22464 
( 1991 ); S/21360 ( 1990) and S/2001/613 (2001 ); and Blue Helmets (note 12) at 279-83. 
24 Wilde (2001), note 9 at 598. 
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institutional framework for the reintegration of civil administrative and public services into 
the Croatian system, and organising local elections. All executive power was vested in the 
hands of the UN transitional administrator25. The mission was successfully conducted with 
the territory reintegrated into Croatia in January 199826 . 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)27 created a single Bosnian state comprised of two 
entities, with power shared between joint institutions at the national and 'entity' level. It 
also allocated a significant role to the international community in implementing its 
provisiOns. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), an international civilian 
appointee, is responsible for coordinating international activities, including authority as the 
'interpreter of last resort of the Dayton Peace Agreement's civilian provisions and a 
capacity to establish new mechanisms (such as commissions or task forces) to help him 
execute his mandate'28 . As difficulties in implementing the DPA have become increasingly 
apparent29, the OHR gradually began 'to assert administrative authority to ensure the 
continuation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state'30 including dismissing local elected 
representatives31 , governing certain areas32 and introducing international appointees to 
ensure that domestic institutions perform their functions in accordance with the DP A33 . 
The UN was also mandated to perform administrative functions in Somalia34, including 
'the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the 
entire country'35 , and the establishment of a judiciary and police service. As part of its 
mandate, the SRSG promulgated the former Somali Penal Code of 1962 as the criminal law 
25 Basic Agreement: (1996) 35/LM 184. See also the sources cited at footnote 30 in Wilde (2001), note 9. 
26 Security Council Resolution 1145 ( 1997). 
27 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4 December 1995, and Annexes. 
28 Cousens 'Building Peace in Bosnia', in Peacebuilding as Politics (Cousens and Kumar eds) (2000) at 128. 
29 For an analysis of the implementation of the DPA, see Cousens, above, and Aolain, 'The Fractured Soul of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis' (1998) 19 MJIL 957. 
30 Wilde (2001), note 9 at 596. 
31 The OHR dismissed the elected Croat representative of the State presidency in March 2001 and banned him 
from holding public office and party offices. 
32 Following the above dismissal, the OHR exercised governance functions in relation to Herzeg-Bosna to 
prevent the Federation from collapsing. 
33 See, for example, the measures introduced in Mostar, where the OHR has asserted administrative functions 
to promote the operation of unified structures. 
34 Addis Ababa Agreement March 1993. 
35 Security Council Resolution 814 of26 March 1993, paragraph 4. 
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in force in Somalia, although commentators have questioned whether this exceeded the 
authority delegated to the SRSG by the Security Councif6• Unfortunately, implementation 
of the civilian mandate was largely overshadowed by military initiatives and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the mission37. 
Shortly after passing Resolution 1244, the Security Council authorised a similarly extensive 
mission to East Timor, 'endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East 
Timor and ... empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice'38 . The SRSG, as the transitional administrator, had the power to 
enact new laws and regulations and to amend, suspend or repeal existing ones. UNT AET 
was required to cooperate closely with the multinational force previously deployed to East 
Timor39. While an extensive mandate was granted to both missions, UNTAET may be 
distinguished from UNMIK on legal status, as East Timor was a non-self-governing 
territory while Kosovo part of the FRY, an independent State40• Following the transfer of 
power to indigenous institutions41 , the mandate of UNTAET was terminated and the 
independent State ofTimor-Leste became a member of the UN in 200242 . 
The above practice demonstrates sufficient examples of the administration of territory by 
the UN such that States accept this power as an implied or general power of the UN. 
However, all the missions discussed above, with the exception of East Timor and possibly 
Somalia, involve territorial administration with the consent of the State concerned, or at 
least the consent of the parties in de facto control of the territory to a peace agreement. 
This is consistent with traditional peacekeeping missions that are predicated upon three 
36 Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN 
Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers ( 1999) at 187. 
37 For Somalia, see Jan, 'Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace?' in Peacebuilding as Politics 
(Cousens and Kumar eds) (2000) at 53; Lewis and Mayall, 'Somalia' in The new interventionism, 1991-1994 
(Mayall ed) (1996); and Makinda, 'Somalia: Lessons from the UN Experience' in Peacekeeping and 
Peacemaking: towards effective intervention in post-Cold War conflicts (Woodhouse and Dando eds) (1998). 
38 Security Council Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999, paragraph I. 
39 Deployed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1264 of 15 September 1999. 
40 See: Rothert, 'UN Intervention in East Timor' (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 257; 
Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and 
East Timor' (2001) 95 AJIL 46; and Stahn, note 9. 
41 Resolution 1272 provided for the transfer of administrative functions from UNTAET to local democratic 
institutions. 
42 See General Assembly Resolution A/Res/57/3 of27 September 2002. 
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important principles: the consent of all the parties concerned; impartiality on the part of UN 
forces; and resort to the use of force only in self-defence. The practice of obtaining the 
consent of the parties is required for two reasons43 . Legally, consent to the presence of the 
UN mission is required by Article 2(7) of the Charter, which provides that the organisation 
must not intervene in matters that are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any State, 
although excluding enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Practically, consent is 
required to ensure the continued cooperation of the government of the host State and other 
parties to the conflict in implementing the mandate. 
During the 1990s, the UN was increasingly involved in intra-State disputes, sometimes in 
situations where governments had ceased to function44 . Humanitarian tasks, organising and 
monitoring elections and civilian administration functions have been brought within the 
ambit of peacekeeping as the UN struggled to confront the issue of 'failed States'. Helmer 
and Ratner first posed the problem of the failed State in 1992- a State utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community due to civil strife, government 
breakdown and economic privation45 . The failed State presented new challenges, including 
the collapse of State institutions, especially the police and the judiciary, and the failure of 
government and law and order. This necessitated the UN extending its tasks to include the 
re-establishment of effective government and government structures, which became known 
as post-conflict peace building46 . Where there was a failed State, the UN was required to 
43 Ann an, K 'Challenges of the New Peacekeeping' in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century 
(Otunnu and Doyle eds) (1998) at 169. 
44 The developments in peacekeeping from the end of the Cold War have produced numerous accounts. See 
for example, Greenwood, 'The United Nations as Guarantor of International peace and security: Past, present 
and future- A United Kingdom view' in The United Nations at Age Fifty- A Legal Perspective {Tomuschat 
ed) (1995); Kiihne, 'The United Nations, Fragmenting States, and the Need for Enlarged Peacekeeping' in 
The United Nations at Age Fifty- A Legal Perspective (Tomuschat ed) (1995); Boutris-Ghali, 'Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping for the New Century' in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Otunnu and 
Doyle eds) (1998) at 21; Miller, 'Recent Developments in East Timor: East Timor, Collective Action, and 
Global Order' (2000) 14 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 89; Hampson, 'Can 
Peacebuilding Work?' (1997) 30 Cornell Int'l U 701; and Lee, 'The Historical Evolution of the United 
Nations in Global Conflict: Creating, Defining and Expanding the Role of the United Nations: United Nations 
Peacekeeping: Development and Prospects' (1995) 28 Cornel/ International Lawlournal619. 
45 Helman & Ratner, 'Saving Failed States' Foreign Policy Winter 1992-93 at 3. 
46 Post-conflict peacebuilding refers to 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict': An Agenda for Peace paragraph 21, UN Doe 
S/24111 of 27 June 1992. The term was further developed in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: 
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negotiate with several combatant organisations, generally small militia groups with no 
central command47 , thus making it very difficult to obtain consent in a traditional 
peacekeeping sense and blurring the distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement48 . 
B. Chapter VII 
In the absence of clear consent, and without a detailed peace agreement, the practice is for 
the Security Council to authorise the international administration pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the Charter49 . Where consent is non-existent or doubtful, the civilian aspects of the 
mission must be supported by a security force with a clear enforcement mandate and 
authorised to use force50. In order to act under Chapter VII, the Security Council must 
determine that the situation in question constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or an act of aggression51 . As a principal organ of the UN, the Security Council must, at 
least in the first instance, determine its own competence in specific matters, including the 
circumstances that may attract its Chapter VII powers. In making this determination, the 
Security Council enjoys a wide discretion52, and has the benefit of a presumption of legality 
for such determinations a presumption that can only be rebutted by proof that the resolution 
paragraphs 47-54, UN Doe S/1995/1. See also Franck, 'A Holistic Approach to Building Peace' in 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Otunnu and Doyle eds) (1998) at 275. 
47 See Roberts, 'Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia' in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Otunnu and Doyle eds) ( 1998) at 27. 
48 See Fink, 'From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the Mandate for the Use of Force in 
Maintaining International Peace and Security' (1995) 19 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade l. 
49 Such practice is supported by the subsequent actions of the Security Council regarding East Timor, where 
the continued consent and cooperation of the Indonesian Government was doubtful. As with Resolution 
1244, both the transitional administration and the multinational security force were authorised by the Security 
Council acting pursuant to Chapter VII, following a determination that the situation represented a threat to the 
peace and security: see Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999). 
50 In An Agenda for Peace, the then Secretary-General recognised that a clear mandate and the consent, or at 
least co-operation, of the relevant parties was essential for UN peacekeeping missions. However, in The 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the then Secretary-General emphasised that where traditional 
peacekeeping forces did not, or will not, have the support of the parties, the mission should be mandated as a 
peace enforcement mission and clearly authorised to use force other than in self-defence (paragraphs 34-6). 
51 Article 39. Although the Security Council rarely invokes specific articles of the Charter, it is accepted that 
there must be a determination that the factors required for Article 39 exist. See Gill, note 6 at 39. 
52 See Gill, note 6 at 40 and Kelsen The Law of the United Nations (1950) at 733-7. 
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is ultra vires or contrary to the Charter53 . In recent years, the Security Council has adopted 
a more flexible interpretation of what may constitute a threat to the peace, including 
recognition that threats to the peace are not confined to inter-State situations but extend to 
internal situations such as civil wars and coups54. Further, the Security Council has stated 
that situations with serious humanitarian repercussions55 , support of terrorist activities56 
and production of weapons of mass destruction57 may constitute a threat to international 
peace and security. 
The deteriorating situation in Kosovo had attracted the Security Council's attention from as 
early as 199858. Subsequent resolutions confirmed that the Security Council perceived the 
situation in Kosovo to be a threat to peace and security in the region59. Resolution 1244 
confirms that this threat that was continuing and now of a sufficiently international 
character60 . The Balkans has traditionally been an area of instability, as evidenced by the 
three conflicts in the former Yugoslavia which had resulted in international intervention. 
The conflict threatened to trigger hostilities in neighbouring States, while creating a 
significant number of refugees and displaced persons, together with systematic violence 
and human rights abuses perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. Further, Resolution 1244 
was passed on the same day the NATO bombing campaign against the FRY, an 
international armed conflict, ceased. 
53 Certain Expenses at 168, Namibia Advisory Opinion and Lockerbie order, paragraph 42, discussed in 
Bowett, 'Judicial and Political Functions of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice' in The 
Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Foxed) (1997). 
54 The Security Council has acted under Chapter VII with respect to civil wars in Liberia, Angola and Somalia 
and coups in Haiti and Sierra Leone: See Blue Helmets, note 12. 
55 See, for example, Security Council Resolution 794 (1992) relating to 'the magnitude of the human tragedy 
caused by the conflict in Somalia' and Resolution 918 (1994) concerning the 'magnitude of the human 
suffering caused by the conflict' in Rwanda. 
56 The Council has taken action against Libya (Resolution 748), Sudan (Resolution 1054) and Afghanistan 
(Resolution 1267). 
57 For example, Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) in relation to Iraq. 
58 On 31 March 1998, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the FRY: Resolution 1160 (1998), 
paragraph 8. While not stating that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, this 
determination was implicit in the Council's statement that it was acting pursuant to Chapter VII. 
59 See Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) and Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), both 
'affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo ... constitutes a threat to peace and security in the 
region', again acting under Chapter VII. 
60 Resolution 1244 provides 'determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security'. 
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Resolution 1244 is not based upon a comprehensive peace agreement, but on the general 
principles set out in the Peace Plan. While Resolution 1244 requires the relevant parties to 
have regard to the Rambouillet Accords, this document has no legal force and is best 
considered a negotiation document61 . The MTA provides that the governments 'understand 
and agree' that KFOR will deploy and operate within Kosovo 'with the authority to take all 
necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo 
and to otherwise carry out its mission'62 . The parties to the MTA clearly considered that 
the international security force would be a peace enforcement force authorised by the 
Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII. Even if the MT A evidences the consent of the 
FRY to the deployment of KFOR, such consent is irrelevant, as to enable KFOR to use 
force other than in self-defence, KFOR had to have a Chapter VII mandate. In addition, as 
KFOR is essentially a coalition of member States, a Security Council resolution under 
Chapter VII was required to authorise member States to exercise delegated power to use 
force other than in self-defence63 . 
The MT A provides that part of the KFOR mission is to protect, and to provide assistance 
to, the international civil presence64 . While the MTA is primarily concerned with security 
issues, the parties clearly contemplate the deployment of the international civil mission. 
However, neither the acceptance of the Peace Plan or the execution of the MT A by the 
FRY would equate to consent by the FRY to the effective suspension of its sovereign rights 
in respect of Kosovo. Even if this did comprise consent, such consent is arguably vitiated 
as having been obtained by duress by military means due to the threat of continued aerial 
strikes and a possible ground campaign65 . The better view is that the FRY did not consent 
61 The Rambouillet Accords were never accepted by the FRY government. See characterisation of peace 
agreements in Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) at 19-32. 
62 Article 1(2). 
63 See for example, Blokker, N., 'Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security 
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the Able and Willing" (2000) 11 EJIL 541. 
64 Annex B 
65 Cerone uses this argument in the context of international humanitarian law applying to the situation in 
Kosovo, as consent would prevent the mission being characterised as an occupation for the purposes of 
international humanitarian law: Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict 
Kosovo' (2001) 12 EJIL 469. The issue of consent also arose in relation to the imposition of the Iraq-Kuwait 
boundary pursuant to Security Council Resolution 687 of3 April1991, suggesting that the Security Council 
may still act in the absence of a valid or certain consent, provided it does so pursuant to Chapter VII. 
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to the suspension of its sovereign powers in relation to Kosovo and the exercise of civilian 
functions by UNMIK. Accordingly, the Security Council was required to authorise 
UNMIK as an enforcement measure pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter. 
C. Measures available to the Security Council 
Once the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council may then either make 
recommendations or decide which measures, military or non-military, shall be taken to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Both Articles 41 and 42 confer upon 
the Security Council 'a broad discretion in deciding on the course of action and evaluating 
the appropriateness of the measures to be taken'66 . These powers are coercive against a 
culprit State or entity, and are mandatory for other member States, which are under an 
obligation to cooperate with the UN and other States in implementing the measures 
determined by the Security Council67 . 
1. Non-military measures- UNMIK 
The establishment of the international civilian presence, as distinct from a security 
presence, is not a military measure. Nor is it a provisional measure pursuant to Article 49, 
which is intended to be a short-term measure, 'without prejudice to the rights, claims, or 
positions of the parties concerned'68 . Administration of territory is not listed in Article 41. 
However, Article 41 is a non-exclusive list and is merely illustrative of possible measures 
available to the Security Council. The only requirement is that such measures do not 
involve the use of force69 . Particularly since 1990, the Security Council has demonstrated a 
tendency to utilise a variety of non-military measures under Article 41 more frequently 
66 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, (1996) 35 ILM 32 (Tadic), paragraph 31. For 
an analysis of the decision refer to King, 'Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of 
Limits on the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' (1996) I 0 Emory International 
Law Review 509. 
67 Article 27. 
68 Tadic, paragraph 33. See also Gill, note 6 at 46-7. For a contrary view see Kirgis, 'Security Council 
Governance of Post-conflict Societies: A Plea for Good Faith and Informed Decision Making' (2001) 95 AJIL 
579. 
69 Tadic, paragraph 35. 
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than those using armed force under Article 42, including the use of economic sanctions70 
and arms embargoes71 • The Security Council has established international tribunals to 
prosecute war criminals 72 and has determined the legal responsibilities of States, including 
guaranteeing the inviolability of an international boundarl3 and the invalidation of a 
repudiation of foreign debe4 . More recently, the Security Council has called on States to 
take action to restrict terrorism75 • From its actions in relation to Kosovo and East Timor, 
the Security Council perceives international administration of territory as falling within the 
measures available to it under Article 41 for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The absence of protest on the part of States to Resolution 1244 and Resolution 
1272 suggests that States generally accept this interpretation. 
Article 29 of the Charter authorises the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs 
as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions, although arguably this power 
only authorises the establishment of a subsidiary organ to perform the functions of the 
Security Council itself6. In contrast, Article 7(2) of the Charter provides that 'such 
subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the 
present Charter', thus providing a general authority to establish subsidiary organs. 
Therefore, as a principal organ of the UN, the Security Council is not limited to creating 
subsidiary institutions within its own competence77 . Instead, it is sufficient that the 
establishment of the subsidiary organ is 'an instrument for the exercise of [the Security 
Council's] own principal function of maintenance of peace and security'78 • For example, 
70 Economic sanctions were first imposed against Rhodesia in 1966 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
221 ( 1966). The most comprehensive sanctions to date are those adopted against Iraq pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 661 (1990). 
71 An arms embargo was also imposed on Rhodesia pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 216 (1965) and 
217 (1965). A more recent example is the arms and air embargo upon Libya following Libya's refusal to 
oppose terrorism and to extradite suspected bombers: see Security Council Resolution 731 (1992). 
72 See Security Council Resolutions 808 (1992) and 827 (1992) for the ICTY and 955(1994) for the ICTR. 
73 See Security Counci I Resolution 687 (1991)- guaranteeing the inviolability of the border between Iraq and 
Kuwait. 
74 Security Council Resolution 687 ( 1991) -nullifying Iraqi statements repudiating its foreign debt. 
75 For example, in Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001 ), the Security Council confirms that international 
terrorism comprises a threat to international peace and security. 
76 Sarooshi, 'The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs' (1996) 67 BYb/L 413 at 
422-423. 
77 Sarooshi, above, at 425. 
78 Tadic, paragraph 38. 
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the international criminal tribunals established by the Security Council perform a judicial 
function that the Security Council, a political body, cannot perform under the Charter. In 
Tadic, the Appeals Chamber held that to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (:U:CTY) was lawful as a necessary measure to restore and maintain 
international peace and security79 . Therefore, although the Security Council itself may not 
possess the power to perform the various executive, legislative or judicial functions 
required to administer territory, it is not precluded from establishing a subsidiary organ that 
is authorised to perform such functions. 
It is generally accepted that UN peacekeeping missions are subsidiary organs that are 
established under the authority of either the Security Council or the General Assembll0. 
In constituting a peacekeeping mission, the Secretary-General is exercising powers 
delegated to him by the Security Council under Chapter VII pursuant to the relevant 
Security Council resolution; the Secretary-General does not himself possess the authority 
under the Charter to establish UN peacekeeping forces. Resolution 1244 is consistent with 
this practice, requesting the Secretary-General to appoint the SRSG to control the 
implementation of the civil presence81 and authorising him to establish the interim 
administration82 . The Secretary-General designed the structure and role of the civilian 
presence although his reports were subject to approval by the Security Council83 . 
UNMIK is therefore a lawfully constituted subsidiary organ of the Security Council and, as 
such, remains under the authority and command of the Security Council. The Security 
Council possesses the competence to determine the membership, structure, mandate and the 
duration of existence of UNMIK84• UNMIK is established to restore and maintain 
international peace and security and is therefore subject to an important functional 
79 Tadic, paragraph 38. 
80 Sarooshi, note 76 at 437. 
81 Paragraph 6, Resolution 1244 
82 Paragraph I 0, Resolution 1244 
83 For example, SG Report 1217/99 was submitted to and approved by the Security Council. For an analysis 
of the roles of the Secretary-General and the Security Council see: Akashi, 'Managing United Nations 
Peacekeeping' in United Nations Peacekeeping in Trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia 
(Biermann and Vadset eds) (1998). 
84 Sarooshi, note 76 at 448-9. 
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limitation, as its mandate may be revoked once the Security Council determines85 that the 
threat to international peace and security has ceased or that the mission has fulfilled its 
mandate86 . The administration itself, the laws it promulgates and the institutions it creates 
are all subject to an imposed time limit87 . Furthcr, UNMIK must perform its functions for 
the purpose, and possibly even in the manner, specified in Resolution 124488 . As the 
Security Council is legally required to supervise UNMIK in performance of its mandate, if 
UNMIK is required to observe IHRL89, accountability for any violation of IHRL by 
UNMIK or its personnel resides ultimately with the Security Council. 
However, the Security Council is a political organ which does not have the practical 
capacity to micro-manage peacekeeping missions, particularly those involving the complex 
task of administering a territory. Supervision ofUNMIK by the Security Council is limited 
to a reporting requirement90 and the dispatch of Security Council missions to Kosovo to 
monitor progress and to meet with members of the international civil presence, local 
political and civil society leaders and other interested parties91 • The international 
administration must justify its actions to the Security Council and donor countries in order 
to ensure its continued mandate and, significantly, the political, financial and other 
resources it requires92 • In this sense, the international administration remains politically 
accountable to local stakeholders, and must be seen to be responding to the needs of the 
85 As with the original determination of the existence of a threat to international peace and security, it is for 
the Security Council to determine when the threat has ceased to exist and consequently, when the mission 
under Chapter VII must terminate. 
86 These events may not coincide as the Security Council may decide to terminate the mission's mandate 
earlier due to resource or other constraints. However, note the discussion in Sarooshi, note 76 at 449-45 I. 
87 Both UNMIK and KFOR were established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue until the Security 
Council determines otherwise. While this avoids having to reassess the mission's status on a regular basis, it 
also exposes the termination of the mission's mandate to a veto by one of the permanent members of the 
Security Council. 
88 Sarooshi, note 76 at 448-9. 
89 See Chapter 4, Application of IHRL to Kosovo. 
90 Paragraph 20, Resolution I 244 requires the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council at regular 
intervals on the implementation of the mandate by the international civil presence. 
91 Security Council missions have visited Kosovo on several occasions, resulting in the following mission 
reports: UN Does S/2000/363 (April 2000) S/2001/600 (June 2001) and S/200211376 (December 2002). 
92 See Caron 'The Legitimacy ofthe Collective Authority ofthe Security Council' (1993) 87 AJIL 551 at 558 
who argues that accountability is important for the Security Council to retain its legitimacy. Without 
legitimacy, the Security Council will have difficulty in building the support necessary to implement a 
resolution. 
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local population93 . The danger inherent in such macro-level supervision is that reports tend 
to emphasise the successful elements of mission implementation, while dismissing or 
failing to highlight the failures or difficulties. 
The measures that the Security Council may take if it disagrees with a decision or action of 
UNMIK are uncertain. It may, subject to the veto, revoke its mandate or issue guidance or 
instructions to the SRSG. It is arguable that the Security Council may exercise the 
delegated functions itself to substitute its own decision for that of the SRSG or UNMIK. 
However, Sarooshi argues that where the Security Council has delegated powers that it 
itself does not possess, it cannot replace the decision of the subsidiary with its own 
determination94 . For example, in creating the ICTY the Security Council established a 
subsidiary organ to perform judicial functions, a function which it cannot itself perform. 
As a result, the Security Council cannot override a judicial determination of the ICTY. The 
independence of the ICTY as a judicial body is an inherent feature of the subsidiary organ. 
As discussed above, it is not clear that the Security Council itself has the power to 
administer territory. If it may not perform governance functions itself, then the Security 
Council could not substitute its own decisions for those of UNMIK. If, however, the 
delegation of authority to the Secretary-General and UNMIK is a practical matter, the 
Security Council would retain the ultimate decision-making authority. It is also arguable 
that, like the ICTY, the creation of a subsidiary organ for governance functions requires a 
similar degree of independence from the Security Council. However, governance functions 
are not analogous to judicial functions and do not require the same degree of independence 
from the Security Council. 
The Security Council bases its decisions on political concerns, following substantial 
negotiations between its members and with interested parties. Reviewing the day-to-day 
decisions taken by UNMIK in the course of the administration is both practically and 
politically unfeasible. The Security Council is not a judicial body and thus cannot provide 
an avenue of legal redress for individuals aggrieved by acts of peacekeeping missions. The 
93 See, in relation to East Timor, Beauvais, 'Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East 
Timor' (2001) 33 NYUJ Int'l L & Po/1101. 
94 Sarooshi, note 76 at 453. 
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Security Council recogruses the difficult circumstances95 under which UNMIK is 
operating, and would be reluctant to intervene in response to allegations of systematic 
violations, unless those violations were so extreme as to generate sufficient concern 
amongst States, funding bodies and non-governmental organisations to force the Security 
Council to respond. 
2. Further delegation - the OSCE 
A distinct, but related, issue is whether the Secretary-General and/or UNMIK can further 
delegate Chapter VII powers to other entities, including international organisations outside 
the UN system96 . Under the mission structure, responsibility for civil administration is 
shared between UNMIK and the OSCE97 • There is express authorisation for this delegation 
in Resolution 1244, which refers to 'the assistance of relevant international organizations'98 
and in the approval of the mission structure by the Security Council. However, as the 
OSCE is an organisation external to the UN system, it is not within the political control of 
the Security Council and is not under a legal obligation to operate towards the same 
objectives. Therefore, while the Security Council has a general competence to delegate its 
Chapter VII powers to organs within the UN system, in order to delegate power to the 
OSCE, the Security Council must rely upon a specific competence within the Charter99 • 
Article 53 provides that the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. Neither the Charter, 
nor UN practice, have produced a defmition of a regional arrangemenr 00 . The Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the predecessor to the OSCE 10 \ had 
95 For example, the Security Council 'notes the enormity of the tasks facing UNMIK': UN Doe S/2001/600, 
paragraph 39. 
96 Sarooshi, note 36, Chapter 6. 
97 SG Report 12/6/99 and SG Report 1217/99. 
98 Paragraph I 0, Resolution 1244. 
99 Sarooshi, note 36 at 18-19. 
100 It is generally accepted that a regional agency is 'simply a more highly developed form of an 
arrangement', that possesses an 'institutional superstructure'. 
101 The discussion of the CSCE/OSCE is based on the following: McGoldrick, 'The Development of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) After the Helsinki 1992 Conference' (1993) 42 
ICLQ 411; Sapiro, 'Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transition' (1995) 89 
AJJL 631; Meyer, 'OSCE Missions of Long Duration - Evaluating a Multi functional Instrument of 
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declared its 'understanding that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter 
VIII of the Charter of the UN'102, and had stated that the CSCE is competent to undertake 
peacekeeping where certain conditions are satisfied103 . The UN has not passed a formal 
resolution acknowledging the status of the CSCE as a regional arrangement, however, 
acceptance of the CSCE' s declaration is implicit in the subsequent conduct of the UN. For 
example, the Security Council has recognised CSCE and OSCE activities in the region of 
the former Yugoslavia in several resolutions relating to the region104, and had requested 
that the OSCE undertake a key role in implementing several provisions of the DPA 105 . The 
OSCE had also been given a considerable role in managing the Kosovo crisis through the 
Kosovo Verification Mission106, which operated from 25 October 1998 to 19 March 1999. 
The practice of both organisations suggests that the OSCE is a regional arrangement for the 
purpose of Chapter VIII of the Charter. 
Article 53 permits the Security Council to utilise regional arrangements, such as the OSCE, 
for enforcement action under the authority of the Security Council. If the Security Council 
is to rely upon Article 53 to justify a delegation of its power of territorial administration to 
the OSCE, it must establish that the functions allocated to the OSCE may be characterised 
as 'enforcement action'. The critical issue is whether the term is limited to military action 
under Article 42 107• Arguably, UN practice suggests that non-military measures, 
particularly economic sanctions and arms embargoes, do not constitute enforcement action. 
However, these non-military measures may be distinguished from the administration of 
Peacekeeping' (2000) 6 (2/3) International Peacekeeping 77; Sapiro, 'The OSCE: an Essential Component of 
European Security', ASIL Insights March 1997, available at www.asil.org/insights 
102 Helsinki Declaration 1992, paragraph 25. 
103 Helsinki Declaration 1992, paragraph 20. 
104 See for example Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), paragraph 7, where the Security Council 
'expresses its support for the efforts of the OSCE for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Kosovo'. 
105 For a further discussion of the role of the OSCE in Bosnia and Kosovo, see Wouters and Naert 'How 
Effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo' (2001) 50 ICLQ 540. 
106 Established by Permanent Council Decision 263, 25 October 1998. 
107 For more detailed discussion on regional arrangements see Gray, 'Regional Arrangements and the United 
Nations Collective Security System' in The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Fox ed) ( 1997); 
Gaga, 'Use of Force Made or Authorised by the United Nations', in in The United Nations at Age Fifty- A 
Legal Perspective (Tomuschat ed) (1995); Akehurst, 'Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with 
special reference to the Organisation of American States' (1967) 42 BYb!L 175; Kelsen, 'Is the North Atlantic 
Treaty a Regional Arrangement?' (1951) 44 AJTL 162; Blokker, note 53; and Schachter, 'Authorized Uses of 
Force by the United Nations and Regional Organisations' in Law and Force in the New International Order 
(Fisler-Damrosch and Scheffer eds) {1991). 
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territory in that arms embargos and economic or diplomatic sanctions may be imposed by 
an individual state at any time, whether or not as part of a regional arrangement. 
Traditional peacekeeping is also not enforcement action in this sense, as it is based on the 
consent of the parties concerned, this may be carried out even by an individual State 108• In 
contrast, an individual State could not administer territory absent the consent of the host 
State without breaching Article 2(7) of the Charter. In this sense, where a regional 
arrangement seeks to perform functions its member States could not perform individually, 
the better view is that this constitutes enforcement action109. In addition, such action has 
the coercive element generally associated with enforcement action110. To conclude, the 
Security Council may authorise the OSCE, as a regional arrangement, to carry out 
enforcement action, in Kosovo governance functions, under its authority 11 • 
3. Use of Force- KFOR 
Turning now to KFOR, Security Council practice demonstrates that force may be used 
pursuant to Article 42 in order to execute a peacekeeping mandate or to achieve an object 
that the Security Council considers appropriate or desirable for the restoration or 
maintenance of peace and security112 • In the absence of its own military enforcement 
capacity113, the Security Council has resorted to authorising the use of force by member 
108 Akehurst, above. 
109 This view is supported by the wide interpretation currently given to the term 'enforcement measures' in 
Article 2(7), whereby any action taken by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII is regarded as an 
enforcement measure. 
110 See Gill, note 6 at 52. 
111 However, the delegation to the OSCE may be ultra vires in relation to the constituent document of the 
OSCE itself, as the Helsinki Declaration limits the peacekeeping functions of the OSCE to situations where 
the consent of the host State is obtained. 
112 See for example: Resolution 678 ( 1990) in respect of Iraq and Kuwait, authorising the force 'to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 ... and to restore international peace and security in 
the area'; Resolution 836 (1993) in respect ofBosnia, authorising 'all necessary measures, through the use of 
air power' to protect United Nations-declared safe areas the to support the United Nations Protection Force in 
the performance of its mandate; Security Council Resolution 1031 ( 1995) authorising an international security 
force to implement the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement; and Security Council Resolutions 1270 
and 1289 authorising an international security presence to assist the government and to protect civilians in 
Sierra Leone. 
113 As originally conceived, Article 43 of the Charter provided for States to enter into binding agreements 
with the Security Council for the provision of national forces as part of a United Nations force. However, 
such standing arrangements were never entered into and such agreements may be a precondition for the 
exercise of power pursuant to Article 42, although this limit is not generally accepted. See Kirgis, 'The 
Security Council's First Fifty Years' (1995) 89 AJJL 506 at 520-1, Gill note 6 at 54-5, White and Ulgen, 'The 
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States to achieve its objectives114• The effect of such resolutions is to delegate the Security 
Council's enforcement powers under Chapter VII to member States individually, 
collectively, or as part of regional organisations. Such 'franchising' is not without its own 
concerns: franchises tend to be dominated by a single State that may act to maximise 
national interests, not those of the UN, or may attempt to claim legitimacy for actions not 
contemplated by the Security Council when it gave its authorisation 115• Despite this, 
franchising is preferable to unilateral action by States. As the Charter does not confer on 
the Security Council an express power to delegate its Chapter VII powers, the power of the 
Security Council to adopt resolutions delegating enforcement powers to coalitions of 
member States is probably an implied power116 • Member States appear to consider the 
practice of utilising such resolutions as generally acceptable, even if not ideal, and debate 
has increasingly concentrated on ensuring greater UN control of, and accountability for, 
such operations 1 17• 
It is difficult to characterise precisely the nature of the delegation of powers set out in 
Resolution 1244. KFOR may use 'all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities'118, 
which, according to UN practice authorises the use of force other than in self-defence. 
However, it is not clear to which entity this power is delegated. Resolution 1244 authorises 
member States and other relevant international organisations to establish the international 
security presence, which must be 'under unified command and control'. This suggests that 
the delegation of enforcement powers is to a coalition of member States willing and able to 
participate in the mission and subject to central control, a force under UN auspices. 
However, Resolution 1244 also states that the security presence must have 'substantial 
Security Council and the Decentralised Military Option: Constitutionality and Function' {1997) NILR 378 at 
385. 
114 See Blokker, note 53 and Sarooshi, note 36, Chapters 5 and 6. 
115 Franck, 'The United Nations as Guarantor of International Peace and Security: Past, Present and Future' in 
The United Nations at Age Fifty- A Legal Perspective (Tornuschat ed) (1995) at 32. See also Quigley, 'The 
Privatization of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism' (1996) 17 MJIL 249, 
Sarooshi note 36 at 153-4. 
116 See Kirgis, note 113 at 521; Blokker, note 53 at 547, White and Ulgen, note 113 at 387; and White, note 4 
at44. 
117 For discussion of the views ofmembers and of Security Council practice leading to these conclusions, see 
Blokker, note 53. 
118 Paragraph 7, Resolution 1244. 
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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation participation'. This may indicate that the KFOR is 
essentially a NATO force, under NATO command119• NATO is a regional arrangement for 
the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Charter120, therefore the delegation of enforcement 
power by the Security Council may be authorised pursuant to Article 53. Gill asserts that 
the essential question in determining whether a force is under UN auspices is 'what the 
source or authority for the operation is and whether it is carried out with the object and 
purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security' 121 • On this test, 
KFOR is a military force authorised by the Security Council and operating under UN 
auspices 122• 
The main concern is the level of control and/or supervision that the Security Council must 
retain in respect of military forces exercising delegated Chapter VII powers. Military 
enforcement action must remain under the overall command and control of the Security 
Council, an obligation recognised both by member States and the Security Council itself123 . 
Further, general principles of delegation require that accountability for the performance of 
delegated Chapter VII functions cannot be delegated and remains with the Security 
Council124• In terms of responsibility for the actions of KFOR, there is a distinction 
between a UN force and a force authorised by the UN125 . However, even if the NATO 
leadership has the responsibility for operational control of KFOR, including the ability to 
determine the appropriate level of force used to fulfil the mandate126, this does not 
definitively determine that NATO is responsible for the actions of KFOR. Sarooshi 
119 See Wouters, & Naert, note I 05. 
120 The argument that NATO is not a regional arrangement but purely an arrangement for collective self-
defence has been overshadowed by the assumption by NATO of responsibilities in areas such as the Former 
Yugoslavia suggesting that the organisation has assumed for itself functions relating to the maintenance of 
regional peace and security. See on this issue: Kelsen, note I 07 and Akehurst, note I 07. For the contrary 
view see Stein, 'Kosovo and the International Community. The Attribution of Possible Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: The Responsibility of NATO or of its Member States?' in Kosovo and the International 
Community (Tomuschat ed) (2002) at 186-8. 
121 Gill, note 6 at 58. 
122 This is the view advanced in the MTA, which states that the international civil and security presences 
deploy under UN auspices: Article I( I). For a contrary view, see White, note 4 at 60. 
123 See Quigley, note 115; Sarooshi, note 36 at 159, White and Ulgen, note 113 at 387. 
124 See Sarooshi, note 36, Chapter I. 
125 B1okker, note 53 at 546. 
126 Although States cannot avoid their obligations under customary law, treaty law or international 
humanitarian law by acting under UN auspices: See Chapter 5, Individual State responsibility. 
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distinguishes between operational authority and overall authority, with the latter being 
more significant. Where the Security Council authorises a force, the force is under the 
political and legal authority of the Security Council, and the Security Council accepts 
primary responsibility for the acts of the force 127. However, it is possible that the Security 
Council would not be accountable where the UN has been prevented from exercising its 
supervisory role in respect of the force, or where States have acted ultra vires when 
exercising delegated Chapter VII powers and have not acted in reasonable pursuit of their 
mandate and the Security Council's objectives 128• 
This requirement imposes three conditions on the delegation of a military enforcement 
power129• First, the Security Council resolution must state a clear objective. Second, the 
Security Council must require some form of supervision over the exercise of the delegated 
power. Third, the Security Council must impose a duty to report on the member States 
exercising the delegated enforcement powers. Resolution 1244 attempts to comply with 
these requirements. As with the civil presence, KFOR is deployed for an initial 12-month 
period, to be renewed unless determined otherwise130 and the force commander report to 
the Security Council, via the Secretary-General, on a regular basis 131 . Of course, this 
reporting requirement is subject to the limitations discussed above in relation to UNMIK 
and it is unlikely that the attention of the Security Council would be drawn to incidents 
involving KFOR or its personnel unless such violations were severe and systematic. 
D. Restrictions on Chapter VII 
The ability of the Security Council to authorise the international administration is subject to 
two possible restrictions: the principle of sovereign equality and the right to self-
determination. Sovereign equality is reflected in Articles 2( 1) and 2(7) of the Charter. The 
former recognises that the UN is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of its 
members, while the latter provides that prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of a 
127 Sarooshi, note 36 at 163-4. For a discussion of whether NATO could be responsible if the force was a 
NATO force, see Stein, note 120. 
128 Sarooshi, note 36 at 165. 
129 Sarooshi, note 36 at 155-163. For a similar discussion of conditions, see White and Ulgen, note 113. 
130 Paragraph 19, Resolution 1244. 
131 Paragraph 20, Resolution 1244. 
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State other than enforcement measures pursuant to Chapter VII. Resolution 1244 'transfers 
the exercise of State sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo in its entirety to UNMIK', 
suggesting that the FRY is not intended to exercise sovereign power in respect of Kosovo 
during the interim administration 132 . 
Given the expansive interpretation of Article 39 and the willingness of the Security Council 
to act in areas traditionally within the jurisdiction of a State, authorising international 
administration as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII avoids the application of 
Article 2(7) 133 . However, modem notions of sovereignty are inappropriate to the failed or 
'pre-modem' State, which 'may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone 
pose a threat internationally, but [it] can provide a base for non-State actors who may 
represent a danger to the post-modem world" 34 . 
The principle of sovereign equality is also found m Article 78 of the Charter, which 
prohibits the UN from applying the ITS system to member States. Gordon argues that even 
the widest interpretation of the Security Council's Chapter VII powers would preclude it 
acting in direct contravention of an express provision of the Charter135 . However, 
Resolution 1244 does not consider the application of Article 78, suggesting that the 
Security Council views Article 78 as limited to the ITS system. In any event, the powers of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII are wider than the powers of the ITS and can 
override State sovereignty136. 
132 The Russian Federation and the FRY have protested against this interpretation of Resolution 1244, 
asserting that at least residual rights remain with the FRY. However, UNMIK exercises authority 
independently of the FRY and any discourse emphasises the FRY's obligation to co-operate with, as opposed 
to consent to or approve of, various measures. In addition, KFOR and UNMIK have entered into agreements 
with the FRY on matters such as economic co-operation, refugee repatriation and border controls, signalling 
the FRY's acceptance ofUNMIK's authority for Kosovo during the international administration. 
133 See Matheson, 'United Nations Governance ofPostconflict Societies' (2001) 95 AJIL 76. Contrast Kirgis, 
note 68. 
134 Cooper, 'The new liberal imperialism' The Guardian 7 April 2002. 
135 Gordon, 'Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship' ( 1995) 28 Corn ell International Law Journal 30 I. 
136 See Stahn, note 9 at 138-9. 
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Writing in 1995, Gill commented that the right to self-determination137 'precludes the 
imposition of any form of government by the United Nations on the population of a State or 
other entity' 138• Even when acting under Chapter VII, there is no legal basis for the 
imposition of a trusteeship or UN administration. Similarly, the right to self-determination 
precludes the imposition by the UN of any particular form of government upon a 
population. Although the concept of self-determination is a recognised right under 
international law, it is an evolving concept, and its extent and application, particularly in 
the post-decolonisation era, is still uncertain139 . The right to self-determination may be 
limited to internal matters, including political participation in the peacebuilding process, 
the protection of certain group rights and autonomy within the established State, but no 
right of secession. Alternatively, it could be argued that a coherent, territorially.centred 
group has the right to determine whether to remain part of the State or to choose 
independence140• If the latter view is correct, the imposition of an international 
administration without the direct consent of the population would violate the right to self-
determination 141 • 
Resolution 1244 adopts a cautious approach to self-determination. It does not implement a 
right to external self-determination, as Kosovo has not achieved independent statehood. 
However, external self-determination is still possible: one of UNMIK's tasks is to facilitate 
a political process to determine Kosovo's future status142 • This process is likely to involve 
a popular consultation143, and therefore promotes the exercise of self-determination, albeit 
137 This right is derived from Article 1 (2) of the Charter, which provides for the respect of the principle of 
equal rights and the self-determination of people, and affirmed by other Charter articles on economic, social 
and human rights (for example, Article 55). 
138 Gill, note 6 at 75. See also Herdegen, The Constitutionalization of the UN Security System' (1994) 27 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 13 5 at 156-7. 
139 See Chamey, 'Self-determination: Chechnya, Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 455; Epps, 'Self-Determination after Kosovo and East Timor' (2000) 6 ISLA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 445; and Grant, 'Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations 
Might Have Addressed Kosovo' (1999) 28 The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 9 
14
° Chamey, above. 
141 See Gordon, note 135 at 322. 
142 Paragraph 11 (e), Resolution 1244. 
143 The final status of Kosovo has not been decided - with Resolution 1244 merely providing that UNMIK 
must facilitate 'a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the 
Rambouillet Accords'. The Ramboulliet Accords provide that three years after the commencement of their 
provisions, 'an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for 
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delayed144. During the international administration, Kosovo is to have substantial 
autonomy within the FRY, which is aimed at promoting internal self-determination145 . 
However, Resolution 1244 does not recognise the Kosovo population as a people entitled to 
self-determination, referring only to human rights and minority protection. Internal self-
determination is progressed through the creation of indigenous institutions. Arguably, this 
cautious approach is warranted by the volatile nature of the conflict, for if the conflict was 
to become one relating to external self-determination, the divisive nature of the issue could 
deepen the divisions between the ethnic communities146. 
Critics of UNMIK suggest that, while the UN's intentions are benevolent, its goals are 
often unattainable and its methods questionable, tending to paternalism147. The ideology of 
compassion emphasises centralising and externalising decision-making at the expense of 
promoting indigenous participation. Referring to the concepts of occupation, protectorates 
and trusteeship which are still ideologically linked to colonialism produces fears that the 
UN provides 'benevolent colonialism' 148 . Cooper argues for a new form of liberal 
imperialism, 'one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values'149. 
States would voluntarily accept international administration for a period of time and in 
order to obtain certain benefits, including membership of various international 
organisations such as the EU. If international administrations are 'viewed as necessary to 
confidence-build and empower local voices, to provide institutional capacity building and 
Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding 
the implementation of [this] Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act': Chapter 8, Article I (3). This is in 
contrast to other missions where the legal status of the territory had been settled as part of the peace 
agreement. 
144 Epps, note 139. See also Wilde, 'International territorial administration and human rights' in The United 
Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003). 
145 Wilde above at 9. 
146 See generally Bothe & Marauhn, 'UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and 
Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration' in Kosovo and the International 
Community (Tomuschat ed) (2002) at 238-9. 
147 See Beauvais, note 93. In the context of East Timor, see Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor' 
(2000) 42(3) Surviva/27. 
148 Stahn, 'International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and 
Challenges Ahead' (2001) 61 ZaoRV 105. See also Gordon, note 135 at 926-8 and Bothe & Marauhn, note 
146 at 218. 
149 Cooper, note 134. 
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support the lengthy process of democratisation and civil society building'150, the negative 
association of colonialism is avoided. International administration should be viewed as 
part of 'a more refined concept of peacekeeping'151 . A consequence of this view is that 
international administration of territory would be consistent with promoting the right to 
self-determination, whether it is internal or external152 . However, the rights of the former 
sovereign power (in Kosovo, the FRY) where a territory is placed under international 
administration are not clear. The former sovereign may have forfeited its rights in relation 
to the territory due to gross violations of human rights; or its rights may be suspended or 
held in trust for the course of the international administration or pending a popular 
consultation 153 • In any event, the right to self-determination does not preclude the Security 
Council from authorising the administration of territory. 
15
° Chandler, 'Imperialism may be out, but aggressive wars and colonial protectorates are back' The Guardian 
14 April 2002. 
151 Bathe & Marauhun, note 146 at 220. 
152 Wilde, note 144 at I 0-12. See also Ruffert, note 9 at 626. 
153 For further discussion, see Gordon, note 135. 
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Chapter 3 .. Application of IHRL to Kosovo 
A. UN Law 
As a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, UNMIK is subject to any limits placed on 
the powers of its principal organ1• In discharging its duty under the Charter, the Security 
Council is required to act in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN. For 
present purposes, the relevant issue is whether any of these principles and purposes creates 
a legal obligation on the Security Council, and therefore UNMIK, to observe IHRL. 
Article 1(1) of the Charter provides that one of the purposes of the UN is to settle or adjust 
international disputes or situations that may lead to a breach of the peace in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law2 • As the UN is not a party to the main 
international human rights instruments, IHRL binds it if, and to the extent that, the 
principles of such treaties reflect customary international law3. However, the Security 
1 This discussion of the possible limits of the Security Council is based on the following: Akande, 'The 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there room for judicial control of decisions of the 
political organs of the UN' (1997) 46 ICLQ 309; Akande, 'The Competence of International Organisations 
and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice' (1998) 9 EJJL 437; Caron, 'The 
Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council' (1993) 87 AJIL 551; Crawford, 'The Charter 
of the UN as a Constitution' in The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Foxed) (1997); D'Angelo, 
'The Check on International Peace and Security Maintenance: The International Court of Justice and Judicial 
Review of Security Council Resolutions' (2000) 23 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 561; Franck, 'The 
'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?' (1992) 86 AJIL 519; Franck, 'The 
UN as Guarantor of International Peace and Security: Past, Present and Future' in The United Nations at Age 
Fifty- A Legal Perspective (Tomuschat ed) (1995); Gardam, 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military 
Enforcement Action' ( 1996) 17 MJIL 285; Gill, 'Legal and some Political Limitations on the Power of the 
UN Security Council to exercise its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' (1995) 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33; Gowlland-Debbas, 'Security Council Enforcement Action 
and Issues of State Responsibility' (1994) 43 ICLQ 55; Herdegen, 'The Constitutionalization of the UN 
Security System' (1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 135; Reisman, 'The Constitutional 
Crisis in the UN' (1993) 87 AJIL 83; and Watson, 'Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court' 
(1993) 34(1) HILJ 1. 
2 The general sources of international law are international treaties, international custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law, and the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations: Article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
3 The view that international customary law binds the Security Council has received judicial support: see 
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (1949) ICJ Reports 174. Records of the 
San Francisco Conference also suggest that delegates assumed that the enforcement powers of the Security 
Council were to be limited by international law. Further, where the Charter gives the Security Council the 
power to derogate from international law, the power is expressly stated. Accordingly, where such a power is 
not stated, the power to derogate does not exist. For example, the power of the Security Council to use force 
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Council is not required to conform to international law when acting under Clnpter VII. 
This recognises that the 'very notion of enforcement measures implies that the Council has 
the authority to infringe upon, restrict or suspend the rights that States normally are entitled 
to exercise'4. If the Security Council can restrict the rights of States under international 
law, it will also 'inevitably impact upon and restrict the rights of individuals both under 
public and private law'5. Consequently, the Security Council is not subject to international 
law, including IHRL, when utilising Chapter VII enforcement powers. White suggests that 
the part of IHRL that is comprised in the Charter and instruments developed or sponsored 
by the UN also binds the Security Council as part of the constitutional laws of the 
organisation, even if those principles are not accepted by States and do not form part of 
customary international law6• With respect, this view over-emphasises the constitutional 
nature of the Charter and ignores the priority given to the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security under Chapter VII. There is recognition of a legal 
obligation on the Security Council to observe essential human rights and humanitarian 
principles7. In the context of Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR must observe such fundamental 
principles. However, the difficulty remains in identifying which norms of international law 
are accepted as being peremptory in nature and, at present, the category of peremptory 
other than in self-defence in order to restore or maintain international peace and security does not relieve the 
Security Council of its obligation to respect the international humanitarian laws applicable to the conflict (the 
jus ad bello). See Akande (1997), note 1 at 317-21 and Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as 
Customary Law (1989). 
4 See Gill, note 1 at 61-2 and Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950) at 294. A textual analysis of 
Article 1(1) supports this view as only measures to bring about settlement of disputes by peaceful means are 
required to conform to principles of justice and international law. See also Article 103, which provides that 
the Charter will prevail where the obligations of member States under the Charter are in conflict with a treaty 
but not other sources of international law. 
5 Gill, note 1 at 73. 
6 White and Klaasen 'The UN and the Protection of Human Rights in Post-Conflict Situations' in The United 
Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003). 
7 Judge Lauterpacht, in the Bosnia Genocide Convention case, recognised that where a Security Council 
resolution 'began to make members of the UN accessories to genocide it ceased to be valid and binding in its 
operation against Bosnia Herzegovina and that members of the UN then became free to disregard it'. See also 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971) ICJ Reports 341, Herdegen, note I, and 
Watson, note I at 37-8. 
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norms is narrow, including the right to life, freedom from torture and genocide and the 
rights from which there can be no derogation under IHRL 8. 
Two other relevant purposes of the United Nations are the protection of human rights and 
the right to self-determination. Articles 1 (3) and 55 state that one of the purposes of the 
UN is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
arguably imposing an obligation on the UN to observe IHRL. While the UN has recognised 
that it should be guided by IHRL in all aspects of its operations9, this is a political and not a 
legal commitment, and certainly does not restrain the Security Council when acting 
pursuant to Chapter VII. In the context of the international criminal tribunals, Kirgis 
suggests that the power to create war crimes tribunals to provide justice and resolve issues 
after an armed conflict will exist 'if the conditions for applying chapter VII are met and 
principles of fundamental adjudicatory fairness are followed' 10• This suggests that the 
power is conditional upon basic procedural safeguards applying to the international 
tribunal. A similar argument could be developed in relation to governance functions. If the 
inherent feature of a democratic system of government is the ultimate accountability of the 
government to the electorate, an implied power to administer territory may be conditional 
upon basic democratic safeguards, including the obligation to comply with IHRL, applying 
to the international administration. However, not all international legal tribunals have 
incorporated procedural safeguards 11 • Post-conflict international administrations are 
necessarily non-democratic in nature and the power to administer territory is not restrained 
by a requirement for basic democratic safeguards. 
Given that States have apparently accepted the competence of the United Nations to 
administer territory, the issue is now not whether the right to self-determination precludes 
administration, but rather whether the right imposes any obligation on UNMIK in the 
conduct of the international administration. Bothe and Marauhn argue that the right to self. 
8 See Chapter 6. 
9 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), paragraph 6(e). 
1
° Kirgis, 'The Security Council's First Fifty Years' (1995) 89 AJIL 506 at 522. 
11 The UN Compensation Commission created by Security Counci I Resolution 687 (1991) lacks independence 
from the Security Council as its supervisory body consists of representatives of the Security Council acting in 
their governmental capacity. 
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determination, including the right to political participation, together with the right to 
democratic governance, is incorporated in the principle of democracy that functions as a 
limit on the power to administer territory12 . While the UN has emphasised that good 
governance principles should be incorporated into peacekeeping missions13 , there is not yet 
a recognised right to democratic governance 14• Even if the right to good or democratic 
governance did exist, there is a lack of practice establishing a clear and consistent 
application of this standard. Accordingly, the obligation to utilise principles of good 
governance is a moral or political, as opposed to a legal, obligation15 . In essence, a court 
which does not provide a fair trial is not a court16, but it is not certain that a 'government' 
which does not comply with IHRL is not a 'government'. 
B. Resolution 1244 
Resolution 1244 is a legal instrument of the UN that contains the mandate of UNMIK and 
KFOR and provides the reference for the lawfulness of their acts. Unlike other Security 
Council resolutions, Resolution 1244 does not require the implementation of a 
comprehensive peace agreement, which would encompass the consent of the governments 
of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia, together with the KLA. A peace agreement would 
12 Bothe and Marauhn, 'UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and Limitations of 
Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration' in Kosovo and the International Community 
Tomuschat (ed) (2002) at 238-9. 
13 For example, in an Agenda for Peace, the former Secretary-General stated that 'there is an obvious 
connection between the democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making-
and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order', paragraph 59. The 
current Secretary-General has asserted that good governance should be a component of UN missions as 'in 
post conflict settings, good governance can promote reconciliation and offer a path for consolidating peace': 
Annan, 'The Quiet Revolution' (1998) 4 Global Governance 123. 
14 The Charter does not refer to good or democratic governance, although several international human rights 
instruments provide for the right of a citizen to participate in government, either directly or through elected 
representatives (For example, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 of the 
ICCPR and Article 5 of the Charter of the Organisation of American States). Franck argued that there is an 
emerging right to democratic governance, yet was unable to conclude that such a right already exists in 
international law: Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' 86 AJIL 46 (1992). 
15 See also Kondoch, 'Human Rights Law and UN Peace Operations in Post-Conflict Situations' in The 
United Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 
2003). 
16 See Tadic. 
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have provided an opportunity for the parties to have a degree of political control over the 
human rights obligations in the post-conflict stage. As Bell states 17: 
The typical peace blueprint involves a central deal on democratic access to power 
(including minority rights where relevant), with a human rights framework 
including measures such as bills of rights, constitutional courts, human rights 
commissions, reforms of policing and criminal justice, and mechanisms to address 
past human rights violations. 
A peace agreement may provide little basis for human rights norms, as in Afghanistan 18, or 
may provide a comprehensive framework, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina19• In Kosovo, the 
absence of a peace agreement has resulted in the mission's human rights mandate 
remaining largely undefined and lacking guidance20 • Resolution 1244 specifically 
mandates UNMIK to protect and promote human rights21, although fails to specify how this 
objective is to be achieved. The ambiguity of its mandates, inconsistency within mandates 
and the failure to take into account practical considerations has been a constant criticism 
levelled at the Security Council that is linked to the overall success of individual missions. 
The Brahimi Report22 recommended that future Security Council resolutions should 
consider the operation of prevailing standards of IHRL and ensure that tasks undertaken by 
the United Nations are 'operationally achievablem. 
This open authorisation results in the framework for the emerging order being developed 
largely by UNMIK itself, based on ad hoc decision-making, often reactively, and 
depending on the leadership style of the SRSG24 . UNMIK also defines the limits of the 
necessary measures to be taken to achieve its mandate. The SRSG is the 'final authority of 
17 Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) at 1. 
18 See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions, UN Doe S/2001 /1154, 5 December 2001. 
19 DPA, especially Annex 10. See also Cousens 'Building Peace in Bosnia' in Peacebuilding as Politics and 
Bell, note 17, Chapter 4. 
20See Berdal, 'The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold War' (1996) 7 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 71. 
21 Paragraph 11 U) states that 'the main responsibilities of the civil presence will include ... protecting and 
promoting human rights'. A similar provision is not included in relation to KFOR. 
22 Brahimi Report, paragraph 58. 
23 Brahimi Report, paragraph 58. 
24 See Korhonen, 'International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations' (2001) 14(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 495 at 500. 
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interpretation'25 in relation to Resolution 1244 and hence his mandate. While 'the Security 
Council has clearly established the jurisdiction of UNMIK ... over the human rights 
situation in the province, in the interests of the people residing there.26, it has not 
established how this is to be achieved in practice and has not made IHRL directly 
applicable to UNMIK. 
Resolution 1244 does not similarly mandate KFOR with the protection and promotion of 
human rights. It does provide that KFOR has to support the international civil presence and 
'to operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner'. OMIK argued 
that, if UNMIK's mandate includes the protection and promotion of human rights, KFOR 
must, as a minimum, refrain from undermining that objective and must comply with 
IHRL27. UNMIK has also indicated that it considers that KFOR is obliged to observe 
IHRL in maintaining law and order until UNMIK can take responsibility for the tasl(8• 
C. UNMIK Regulations 
Resolution 1244 is the 'constitutional' instrument for Kosovo on a domestic level yet is 
silent as to the laws that apply to the international administration and in Kosovo during the 
duration of the mission. The SRSG may 'change, repeal or suspend existing laws to the 
extent necessary for the carrying out of its functions, or where the existing laws are 
incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civil administration.29. 
The SRSG may issue legislative acts, known as UNMIK regulations, to enal:ie UNMIK to 
perform its functions30. Regulation 1, the first legislative act attempts to clarify the overall 
authority of UNMIK, left vague by Resolution 1244, and defines the law applicable in 
Kosovo during the international administration31 • Regulation 1 was subsequently amended 
25 SG Report 1217/99, paragraph 44. 
26 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No 2 on Certain Aspects of UNMIK Regulation 
2000/59 Amending UNMJK Regulation No 1999124 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo 27 October 2000, 
raragraph 7. 
7 OMIK, Kosovo: Review of the Criminal Justice System October 2001 (OMIK Report 10/01) at 39. 
28 See 'Statement on the Rights of KFOR to Apprehend and Detain', Office of the Acting SRSG, UNMIK 4 
July 1999. 
29 SG Report 1217/99, paragraph 40. 
30 SG Report 1217/99, paragraph 41. 
31 Section 3, Regulation I. 
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by a separate regulation32 and a revised regulation33 and is deemed to enter into force on 10 
June 1999, the date that UNMIK deployed in Kosovo. 
It establishes three sources of law in Kosovo. The primary sources of law are UNMIK 
regulations and subsidiary instruments, such as administrative directions, and the law in 
force in Kosovo on 22 March 198934 • It was generally understood by UNMIK that this did 
not include SFRY Federal and Serbian constitutional laws, although this was not clarified 
by subsequent UNMIK regulations35 • The third source of law is the law in force in Kosovo 
after 22 March 198936• This may include laws enacted by Serbia before and after its new 
constitution in 1990, laws of the SFRY until its dissolution, as well as laws enacted by the 
FRY. Such laws are relevant only if the law prior to 22 March 1989 or UNMIK regulations 
do not cover a subject matter or situation and where the later law is not discriminatory and 
complies with international human rights standards37 • 
In terms of the direct application of international human rights standards to Kosovo, 
Regulation 1 originally provided thae8: 
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding 
public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognised human rights 
standards and shall not discriminate against any person on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, association with a national community, property birth or other status. 
32 Regulation 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo of 12 December 1999 - effectuated through 
Regulation 1999/25 -and amended by Regulation 2000/54 Amending UNMIK Regulation No 1999/1 as 
amended On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo of27 September 2000. 
33 Regulation 2000/54. 
34 Section 1(1). In its original form, Regulation I provided that the relevant date would be 24 March 1999, 
the day preceding the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign. However, the selection of this date 
was controversial. Kosovo Albanian judges and legal professionals disagreed with the selection of this date, 
claiming that the legal regime operating following the revocation of autonomy was unlawful. In protest, 
many judges and prosecutors refused to apply the applicable law. In order to resolve the deadlock, the SRSG 
promulgated Regulation 1999/24, which decreed that the key date for the applicable law would be 22 March 
1989, the day prior to the revocation of autonomy. See Lorenz, 'The Rule of Law in Kosovo: Problems and 
Prospects' (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 127 at 128 and Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction of a 
Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 95 AJIL 46. 
35 Brand, 'Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light ofUNMIK Legislation' 
(200 I) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 461-488. 
36 Section I (2), Regulation I. 
37 Section I (2), Regulation I. 
38 Section 2, Regulation I. 
43 
Application of IHRL to Kosovo 
Regulation 1999/24 restates this commitment, but elaborates upon the applicable 
international human rights standards by providing that the standards are those reflected in 
specified international human rights conventions39• These instruments include the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICC:IPR), the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1UDHR)40 . This list is not exhaustive and 
other human rights standards or instruments may be invoked pursuant to the section. 
However, Regulation 1 does not make IHRL directly applicable to Kosovo. The use of the 
words 'shall observe' does not suggest that the international instruments have direct effect 
in domestic law41 . Further, Regulation 1999/24 does not provide that either UNMIK 
regulations or the law applicable prior to 22 March 1989 must comply with IHRL. In 
practice, the two primary sources of law are preferentially applied without any review of 
their compatibility with IHRL or without any procedure for applying such standards to the 
relevant issue42 . This is based on the assumption that these laws, in particular UNMIK 
regulations are, or will be, compatible with IHRL, an assumption that has not always been 
proven accurate43 • Despite consistent calls for a thorough review of the domestic legal 
provisions against international human rights standards, a review of the criminal justice 
legislation was only concluded in February 200244 . 
The commitment of UNMIK to observe IHRL is a political commitment only. Even if 
IHRL did form part of the applicable law in Kosovo, domestic legal provisions do not 
apply to KFOR, UNMIK and their personnel. Only 'persons undertaking public duties or 
holding public office' are required to observe international human rights standards. 
39 Section 1 (3), Regulation 1999/24. 
40 The list also includes The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
41 This is in contrast to the language used in the DPA, which had the clear effect of directly incorporating 
human rights law into the law applicable in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: see Bell, note 17. 
42 OMIK, Kosovo: Review of the Criminal Justice System September 2001 -February 2002 (OMIK Report 
2/02) at 16. 
43 For example, OMIK identified UNMIK Regulation 1999/26, On the Extension of Periods of Pre-Trial 
Detention, as breaching both the European Convention and the ICCPR in that it fails to adequately allow for 
an independent and adversarial review of detention by a judicial officer. 
44 New legislation on criminal law and procedure was to be introduced in late 2002. 
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UNMIK personnel do not hold public office in the traditional sense, as they are employees 
of an international organisation and not of the State. Similarly, the duties undertaken by 
UNMIK personnel are not tasks performed for the benefit of the 'public'; they are tasks 
UNMIK is required to fulfil by virtue of its Security Council mandate. It is even more 
difficult to establish that KFOR performs public duties as its mandate is as an international 
security force, not as a national army or police force. Regulation 1 is also of an interim 
nature, it can be repealed or amended by the SRSG at any moment, thus it lacks the 
protected status of a constitutional document. 
Several other UNMIK regulations reaffirm the commitment to protecting human rights; yet 
also fail to make such provisions directly applicable to the international administration45 . 
Regulation 2000/4746 provides that UNMIK personnel must respect the applicable law and 
UNMIK regulations in the fulfilment of their mandate under Resolution 1244, and must 
refrain from any action or activity incompatible with that mandate47 . It is unclear whether 
IHRL forms part of the applicable law. Similarly, 'all KFOR personnel shall respect the 
laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo and regulations issued by the SRSG insofar as 
they do not conflict with the fulfilment of the mandate given to KFOR' under Resolution 
124448 . The KFOR Commander is the fmal authority en the interpretation of the mandate 
and determines when KFOR personnel are required to respect the applicable law49 . 
Apart from Regulation 1, the most significant development for the protection of human 
rights was the promulgation of the Constitutional Frameworl2° in May 2001. This 
document outlines the creation and powers of provisional institutions of self-govemment51 
and provides that the provisional institutions shall 'observe and ensure internationally 
45 For example, the Municipal Law Regulation 2000/45 On Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo of 
11 August 2000 includes a commitment to observe international human rights standards as a basic principle of 
the administration of the municipalities. 
46 Regulation 2000/47 On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR, UNMIK and their Personnel in 
Kosovo of 18 August 2000 (Regulation 2000/47). 
47 Section 3.5, Regulation 2000/47. 
48 Section 2.2, Regulation 2000/47. 
49 MTA, Article V. 
50 Regulation 2001/9 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government of 15 May 2001 
(Constitutional Framework). 
51 The provisional institutions include the Assembly, President of Kosovo, the Government, the Courts and 
other bodies and institutions set forth in the Constitutional Framework- Section 1.5. 
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recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms '52 • Again, an extensive list of 
international human rights instruments is set out in the regulation, including the European 
Convention and the ICCPR53 . The provisions of these international instruments are now 
clearly directly applicable in Kosovo54 but only to the provisional institutions, and not to 
UNMIK, KFOR and their personnel. Interestingly, the Constitutional Framework also 
provides that 'All persons in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination on any ground and 
in full equality, human rights and fundamental freedoms'55 • This provision does not 
specify which entity is responsible for securing the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
to the people of Kosovo and supports an argument that both the international administration 
and the provisional institutions are required to secure those rights. However, this obligation 
would arise only from the date of promulgation of the Constitutional Framework56. 
D. SOFA's and Participation Agreements 
Traditionally the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), entered into by the UN and the 
government of the host country, sets out the extent to which peacekeeping forces are to 
comply with the laws of the host country and the immunities and privileges of the UN and 
its personnel within the host country. The model UN SOF~7 requires the peacekeeping 
mission and its personnel to respect and observe all local laws and regulations, with the 
SRSG or the force commander to take all appropriate measures to ensure the observance of 
such laws, yet does not include a commitment to observe IHRL 58 • In any event, neither the 
UN nor KFOR have entered into a SOFA with the FRY Government relating to their 
52 Section 3.2, Constitutional Framework. 
53 The list is identical to that set out in Regulation 1999/24, with the exception of the inclusion of the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention 
for the Protection of Minorities and the exclusion of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
54 Section 3.3, Constitutional Framework. 
55 Section 3.1, Constitutional Framework. 
56 For a discussion of the Constitutional Framework, refer to Stahn, 'Constitution Without a State? Kosovo 
Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government' (2001) 14(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 531 and Brand, note 35 at 473-4. 
57 Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doe No A 45/594 of 9 October 1990. 
58 The model NATO SOFA is similarly worded: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces 
Agreement, TIAS 2846, 4 UST 1792 of 23 August 1953, Article VII. For a discussion of the immunity 
accorded to international peace keepers under these model SOFAs, refer to Amnesty International, 
International Criminal Court: US efforts to obtain immunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, AI Index IOR 40/025/2002, August 2002. 
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activities in Kosovo59. The model participation agreement between the UN and States 
contributing forces provides only that troops 'shall observe the principles of and respect the 
general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel', in 
particular the Geneva Conventions60 . It does not contain a commitment to observe IHRL. 
The terms of the MTA are also relevant to KFOR's human rights obligations, as this is the 
closest agreement to a SOFA. The KFOR Commander has61 : 
the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary 
and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the international security 
force (KFOR), the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the 
responsibilities inherent in this Military Technical Agreement and the Peace 
Settlement which it supports. 
This authority is not restricted to those actions that comply with IHRL. Most significantly, 
the MTA provides that the KFOR Force Commander is 'the final authority regarding 
interpretation of this agreement [the MTA] and the security aspects of the peace settlement 
it supports' and 'his determinations are binding on all Parties and persons,(j2• Arguably, it 
is for the KFOR Commander to determine if and to what extent IHRL applies to KFOR. 
All States participating in KFOR have rules of engagement that provide the parameters 
within which the peacekeeping personnel may use force. These documents are operational 
guidelines based on international law, particularly international humanitarian law, and 
reflect such principles as proportionality and distinction, not IHRL. The armed forces of 
individual States are also subject to national regulations governing conduct of operations, 
which may also include provisions relating to IHRL 63 • The Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations also issues all military and civilian personnel with guidelines for conduct of 
peacekeeping missions64 . The code of conduct is not legally binding, but requires that all 
personnel must respect the human rights of all individuals concerned, and provides that 
59 This is due to concerns that entering into a SOFA would confirm FRY sovereignty and result in a Kosovo 
Albanian political backlash. 
60 Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment 
to United Nations, paragraph 28. 
61 Annex 2, paragraph 2, MT A. 
62 Article V, MTA. 
63 For example, British peacekeepers are subject to the Armed Forces Act 2001. See Chapter 4. 
64 UN DPKO Ten Rules of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, see Kondoch, note 15 at 17. 
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peacekeepers should not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological arose 
or exploitation of the local population or other UN personnel. 
E. Succession to international treaties 
Certain international human rights instruments may apply directly to Kosovo pursuant to 
the law relating to State succession65 to international treaties. In relation to successor 
States66, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties67 (VCSS) 
adopts the universal automatic succession theory68 that provides that international treaty 
rights and obligations continue to apply to the successor State without modification69 . This 
general rule will not apply where the States have otherwise agreed or where it appears from 
the treaty or otherwise that the application of the treaty in respect of the successor State 
would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change 
the conditions of its operation70 . 
Although the VCSS is based on an International Law Commission drafe 1, it is not a 
codification of the existing customary law principles 72 • Mullerson suggests that the VCSS 
contains 'more clauses pertaining to the progressive development of existing customary law 
65 
'the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory': 
Article 2(b) VCSS 
66 International law distinguishes between successor States, which are considered 'new' States and continuing 
States, which are a continuation of the State and remain bound by the obligations of their predecessor state. 
See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law ( 1979) 
67 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978). 
68 There are two major theories of State succession to international treaties for successor States. The contrary, 
clean slate theory, asserts that the State has ceased to exist and that the rights and obligations of the 
extinguished State are without a subject, and therefore do not bind the successor State. See generally: 
O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (1956); Beato, 'Newly Independent and Separating States' 
Succession to Treaties: Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet 
Union' (1994) 9 Am UJ Int 'l L & Policy 525; Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition (1997) Chapter 17; and 
Williamson and Osbom 'A US Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the 
Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia' (1993) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 261. 
69 Article 34(1) VCSS. 
70 Article 34(2) VCSS. 
71 ILM (1978) 1488. Despite requiring only fifteen ratifications, it did not come into force until 6 November 
1996. 
72 See Aust Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), Chapter 22 and Williams, 'The Treaty Obligations of 
the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in 
Force?' (1994) 23 DenvJ Int'l L & Policy I. 
48 
Application of IHRL to Kosovo 
than to its codification' 73 . However, recent State practice indicates that the interest of 
preserving the stability of international relations will encourage States to adopt a principle 
of continuity in the future, suggesting that the VCSS increasingly represents accepted 
principles74 . For example, the Guidelines adopted by the European Community on 
recognition of former European States link recognition to the acceptance by new States of 
certain treaty obligations75 . Similarly, the United States took the position that the former 
Soviet States continued to be bound by treaties relating to nuclear weapons, even though 
Russia was considered the continuing State to the USSR and its treaty obligations76 . 
There is growing evidence of the emergence of an accepted principle in relation to 
succession to multilateral human rights and humanitarian law treaties. Mullerson asserts 
that such instruments 'encompass not only reciprocal commitments of States but also rights 
and freedoms of the individuals within their jurisdiction. In a sense these rights and 
freedoms constitute "acquired rights" which the new State is not at liberty to remove.n. 
These rights attach to the individuals within a specific territory, not to the sovereign power 
itself and continue to bind the entity exercising sovereign power in respect of that territory, 
including a successor State. To permit successor States to elect not to participate in such 
international human rights treaties would result in the population of the successor State 
ceasing to enjoy the protections previously afforded to them78 • 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) considers that the rights in the 
ICCPR attach to the individuals within the territory and that 'such protection devolves with 
the territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding ... State succession'79. In the 
Bosnia Genocide Case80 , the ICJ was faced with the question of whether the FRY was a 
73 Mullerson, 'The Continuity and Succession of States, By Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia' 
(1993) ICLQ 473 at 473. 
74 See Beemelmans, 'State Succession in International Law: Remarks on Recent Theory and Statepraxis' 
(1997) 15 BU Int 'I LJ 71 
75 EPC Press Release 128/91 (16 December 1991). Discussed in Mullerson, note 72 at 489. 
76 See Williamson & Osbom, note 68. However, the US entered into separate negotiations with each former 
Soviet State regarding the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
77 Mullerson, note 73 at 490. 
78 See Mullerson, note 73 and Shaw. note 68. 
79 General Comment no 26(61 ); ILM (1995) 839. 
80 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) ( 1996) ICJ Reports. 
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party to the Genocide Convention in accordance with principles of State succession. The 
ICJ concluded that the FRY was a party, but based this conclusion on the FRY 
Government's declaration of its intention to remain bound by the international treaties to 
which the SFRY had been a part.1 1• In a separate opinion and after a thorough analysis of 
the underlying principles, Judge Weeramantry concluded that there is 'a principle of 
contemporary international law that there is automatic state succession to so vital a human 
rights convention as the Genocide Convention'. To find otherwise would be to create a gap 
in the system of human rights protection82 . 
There is so far only limited authority for the principle of automatic succession to human 
rights instruments and, while the area is under consideration, the level of authority is 
insufficient to support a principle of customary law. The better view is that the principles 
in such instruments bind successor States as the principles themselves represent accepted 
principles of customary law83• This view is consistent with the opinion of the ICJ in the 
Bosnia Genocide Case, which recognised that the Genocide Convention is of an erga 
omnes nature and that its application is not determined by the structure of an individual 
state84 . This distinction is significant: if the human rights instruments are binding as 
customary law only, the State party is not subject to the reporting or monitoring obligations 
imposed by treaty bodies. 
The SFRY began to disintegrate during the early 1990s, following declarations of 
independence by four of its constituent republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The two remaining constituent republics, Serbia and Montenegro, 
formed the FRY. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Arbitration 
Commission (Badinter Commission) was formed to consider the various issues arising 
81 Paragraphs I 7 and 23. 
82 Page 4- I I of separate opinion. See also the separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, who found that there 
would be an implied unilateral undertaking by each party to the Convention to treat successor States as 
continuing the status and obligations of the predecessor state, paragraph 23. 
83 See Aust, note 2 I . 
84 See Grant, 'Territorial Status, Recognition and Statehood: Some Aspects of the Genocide Case' (1997) 33 
Stan J Int 'I L 305 at 307-8. 
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from the disintegration of the SFRY85 . In its first opinion, the Badinter Commission 
indicated that the SFRY was in the process of disintegrating into its constituent elements86. 
On 4 July 1992, it concluded that the process of dissolution of the SFRY was complete, that 
the SFRY no longer existed and that the former national territory and population of the 
SFRY were entirely under the sovereign authority of the new States87. 
The Badinter Commission rejected the FRY Government's claim to the continuing State to 
the SFRY88 , stating that the FRY 'cannot be considered as the sole successor to the former 
state' 89 • Instead, the FRY was regarded as a rew successor State to the SFRY, along with 
the other former republics, and would have to apply for membership in its own right of the 
UN90, the CSCE and other international organisations. The SFRY was a party to a number 
of important international human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, although it was not a 
party to Optional Protocol 1 to the ICCPR. 
The dissolution of the SFRY occurred prior to the entry into force of the VCSS, and thus 
questions of succession were subject to customary international law. The SFRY had been a 
party to the 1978 ILC Convention, and the four new States all deposited notices of 
succession to it. The Badinter Commission considered that the VCSS applied to the 
disintegration of the SFRY, and that the settlement of the issues of succession arising from 
85 In a Declaration of 27 August 1991, the European Community and its Member States announced that they 
were convening a peace conference that would bring together the Federal Presidency and Government of 
Yugoslavia, the Presidents of the six Republics and representatives of the EC and Member States. An 
arbitration procedure would be provided as part of the Conference to which the parties could submit their 
differences. 
86 Opinion No 1, 29 November 1991, Reported in 1991 ILM 162, at 163 
87 Opinion No 8, 4 July 1992, Reported in 1992 31 ILM at 199-202. 
88 The FRY claimed to be the continuing State of the SFRY, entitled to the continued membership of the 
SFRY in the UN and the CSCE, an argument rejected by the other former republics. 
89 Opinion No 9, 4 July 1992, Reported in 1992 31 ILM 203. 
90 The issue of continued membership of international organisations and succession to treaty obligations is 
different. However, the UN Security Council in the preamble to Security Council Resolution 757 noted that 
the claim of the FRY to the continued membership of the SFRY 'has not been generally accepted'. In 1992, 
the UN General Assembly determined that the FRY could not continue the membership of the SFRY; that it 
should apply for membership; and that it could not participate in the working of the General Assembly. 
General Aseembly Resolutions 4711,47/229 and 48/88. See also Security Council Resolutions 757,777, 821 
and I 074. For a discussion, see Blum, 'UN Membership of the 'New' Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?' 
(1992) 86 AJJL 830. The FRY subsequently applied, and was admitted, as a member of the UN in its own 
right: General Assembly Resolution 55/12 of I November 2000 UN Doe A/RES/55/12. See also the 
recommendation of the Security Council at UN Doe A/55/535 
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the SFRY would be reached by drawing upon the provisions of the VCSSJ1• The former 
republics accepted this view. The Badinter Commission considered that, pursuant to 
Article 34(1), the successor States to the SFRY, including the FRY, were responsible for 
implementing the international human rights obligations of the SFRY. It recognised that 
'the peremptory norms of international law, in particular those concerning respect for 
human rights and the rights of peoples and minorities, were binding on all the parties to the 
succession' 92 • Being a monist system, no action on the part of the FRY government would 
be required to import the norms into FRY domestic law. 
The FRY, based on its claim to be the continuing state of the SFRY, issued a formal 
declaration stating that the FRY 'shall strictly abide by the commitments that the SFRY 
assumed internationally'93 . It was not certain whether these obligations include the 
acceptance by the FRY of international human rights monitoring. Interestingly, the Office 
of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR) list of signatories and 
ratifications to human rights instruments contains no entry for the FRY. Instead, the entry 
is under 'Yugoslavia' with a date of 12 March 2001 being recorded as the date of 
ratification of the ICCPR, achieved through succession and a date of 6 September 2001 for 
the Optional Protocol, but not through succession. Separate entries are included for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FRYOM)94 . The UNHRC has requested special reports from Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the FRY relating to issues including allegations of ethnic cleansing, 
arbitrary detention, and torture, stating in its request that 'all the peoples within the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia are entitled to the guarantees of the Covenant'95 • All three States 
appeared before the UNHRC without questioning its competence. In its comments on the 
91 Note 89 at 203 
92 29 November 1991, at 163. 
93 Formal FRY declaration of27 April 1992. 
94 UNHCHR - Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 21 August 
2002, available at http://www.un.org/humanrights. 
95 CCPR/C/SR.1178/ Add.l. at 2-3. 
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three reports submitted, the UNHRC emphasised the continued application of the ICCPR to 
the people within the former territory of the SFRY96 . 
If the emerging principle of automatic succession for human rights treaties is accepted, all 
inhabitants within the territory of the FRY, including Kosovo, are entitled to the protection 
of the ICCPR. Alternatively, the FRY has accepted the international obligations of its 
predecessor State by its participation in the arbitration process established by the Badinter 
Commission. At least up until 10 June 1999, the date the international administration 
commenced, the FRY was obliged to secure to the inhabitants of Kosovo the rights 
contained in the ICCPR. While the FRY Government had declared martial law in Kosovo 
in 1989, it had not filed a formal derogation notice as required by the ICCPR and its human 
rights obligations remained. 
Kosovo remains legally part of the territory of the FRY during the course of the 
international administration. Accordingly, its inhabitants continue to enjoy the protection 
of their human rights under the ICCPR during the international administration. The FRY 
Government is, at least prima facie, responsible for securing ICCPR rights to individuals 
within the territory. However Resolution 1244, the assumption of legislative and executive 
power by UNMIK in Regulation 1 and the presence of the international administration 
effectively prevent the FRY Government from securing ICCPR rights and from meeting its 
international obligations. This raises the question of whether the FRY Government could 
be held ultimately accountable for this failure, even though it lacks control of the territory 
and actors concerned. 
Authority for 'residual' responsibility in such circumstances may be drawn from the 
admissibility decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Ila~cu and 
Others v Moldova and the Russian Federation97. Part of the territory of the Republic of 
Moldova, a strip of land on the left bank of the river Dniester called Transdniestria, is 
subject to a secessionist movement, the self-proclaimed Moldovan Republic of 
96 Croatia UN Doe CCPR/C/87, FRY CCPR/C/88 and Bosnia and Herzegovina UN Doe CCPR/C/89. 
97 Admissibility Decision, Application No 48787/99 of 4 July 2001. 
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Transdniestria (MRT)98 . From 2 to 4 June 1992, individuals claiming to represent the 
MR T authorities arrested the applicants. The applicants were detained and tried by a bench 
of three judges appointed by the MRT authorities for several offences under the criminal 
code of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. On being found guilty, the first 
applicant was sentenced to death, and the remaining applicants sentenced to imprisonment. 
The conditions endured during their arrest, detention, trial and eventual imprisonment were 
alleged to fall beneath the minimum standards required by the European Convention. 
The President of the Republic of Moldova decreed that the applicants' conviction and 
imprisonment was unlawful, as the court that convicted the applicants was unconstitutional. 
The Deputy Procurator-General of the Republic of Moldova ordered a criminal 
investigation concerning the judges, prosecutors and others involved in the prosecution and 
conviction of the applicants. The Supreme Court of Moldova examined the judgment of 
the 'Supreme Court of the MRT' of its own motion, quashing the conviction on the basis 
that it was unconstitutional and ordered a fresh investigation into the allegations. The 
Supreme Court of Moldova dismissed an order for the applicants' detention pending trial 
and ordered their release. The authorities of the MRT took no action in response. 
Upon their eventual release by the authorities of the MRT99, the applicants claimed against 
the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Government of the Russian 
Federation100 • The applicants alleged violations of various provisions of the European 
Convention, including Articles 5 (unlawful detention), 2 (unlawful sentence to death- first 
applicant only) and 6 (absence of a fair trial in the Supreme Court of the MRT) 101 • The 
applicants alleged that the Moldovan authorities were responsible for the violations, since 
they had not acted to end them. 
98 The following is a summary of the facts as set out in the Admissibility Decision. 
99 See judgment for details of eventual arrest. 
100 The applicants argued that the responsibility of the Russian Federation was engaged by virtue of the of the 
alleged actions of Russian troops in assisting the authorities of the MRT. Further, the applicants considered 
that the Russian Federation, through its troops and influence over the MRT, exercised de facto control of the 
territory. This issue is discussed in Chapter 5. 
101 At 12-13. 
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In response, the Moldovan Government relied on its reservation to the European 
Convention that102 : 
The Republic of Moldova declares that it will be unable to guarantee compliance 
with the provisions of the Convention in respect of omissions and acts committed 
by the organs of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic within the territory 
actually controlled by such organs, until the conflict in the region is finally 
definitively resolved. 
The Moldovan Government maintained that its State organs did not control the territory 
known as Transdniestria, where the acts complained of had been committed, and that de 
facto the applicants did not come under the jurisdiction of the Moldovan authorities. The 
State's agreement to be bound by the European Convention was on the basis that it did not 
recognise the Court's jurisdiction for acts committed by persons and bodies not under its 
authority and where the territory in question, although de jure part of its territory, was not 
under its control. The limited cooperation by the Republic of Moldova with the MRT 
authorities did not mean that it controlled the territory103 . The ECHR dismissed the 
preliminary objections of the Moldovan Government to its jurisdiction based on the 
purported reservation to the European Convention104, as the declaration in question 'is of 
general scope, unlimited as to the provisions of the Convention but limited in space and 
time' 105. It was therefore invalid. However, the Court left for the merits the issue of 
whether Moldova's responsibility could be engaged where it did not control the territory 
concerned 106. 
The situation is analogous to that of the FRY in Kosovo. Legally, Kosovo is within the 
jurisdiction of the FRY which is required to secure to the inhabitants of Kosovo the full 
range of ICCPR rights. However, the FRY does not have actual control over the territory, 
the international actors operating within it or exercise any authority in respect of the 
inhabitants of the territory. Yet, were the inhabitants of Kosovo to allege violations of 
102 At 11. 
103 The Government's arguments are summarised at pages 14-15 of the Court's judgment. 
104 At 21-22. 
105 At 20. 
106 See page 21. 
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human rights by UNMIK or KFOR within Kosovo, such actions may engage the 
responsibility of the FRY under the ICCPR. Of course, the FRY is not currently a party to 
the European Convention, nor was the SFRY a party, and the FRY cannot be required to 
secure rights under the European Convention system, nor can individuals bring complaints 
before the ECHR. However, the FRY has lodged an application to join the Council of 
Europe, which will require the FRY to accede to the European Convention as part of its 
membership requirements. It will be interesting to see whether it attempts to lodge a 
reservation in respect of that part of its territory that is under international administration. 
The nature of the consent of the FRY to the international administration is relevant to the 
possible residual responsibility of the FRY for violations of human rights in Kosovo. As 
outlined above107, the FRY accepted the Peace Plan that proposed the deployment of the 
international civil and security presences. Setting aside the issue of whether the consent 
was obtained by duress, it is still uncertain as to whether the FRY consented to the extent of 
the authority to be exercised by the international administration. It is certainly arguable 
that the FRY did not consent to the effective transfer of all public authority or to its total 
exclusion from legislative and executive functions within the territory. If the FRY is 
considered to have consented and to have agreed to suspend its own sovereign rights for the 
duration of the international administration, does the act of suspending sovereign rights also 
suspend its obligations to secure human rights? If rights attach to the territory and its 
inhabitants, the FRY, even by consenting to the international administration, cannot 
suspend its international obligations. If the FRY cannot suspend its obligations, is it 
possible for the FRY to transfer its obligations to the international administration, a transfer 
that may be implicit in the Peace Plan and Resolution 1244? 
The respondents in Ilascu asserted that the limited cooperation with the separatist 
movement did not equate to control of the organisation 108 • It would be interesting to see 
whether the FRY would raise similar arguments that its cooperation with the international 
administration on issues such as border control, refugee return, trade and detainees does not 
107 See Chapter 1, Resolution 1244. 
108 At 15. 
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engage its responsibility. If the responsibility of the FRY were engaged, what would be the 
nature of its obligations? Would its obligations be proportionate to the amount of control 
(if any) it exercises in relation to Kosovo109? Is its duty limited to protesting against 
violations by the international administration? Alternatively, is the FRY required to 
monitor the performance of the international administration and to take action to prevent 
violations? Is the FRY required to compel the international administration to take steps to 
secure the human rights of the inhabitants of Kosovo? The FRY government initially 
protested the lack of any opportunity to review, discuss or be informed of the activities of 
the international administration 110, although there was little response. Following the 
change in the FRY government on 5 October 2000111 , relations between the FRY and 
UNMIK improved, culminating in the signature of a Common Document by the SRSG and 
the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia in his capacity as the Special Representative of 
President Kostunica to Kosovo. The Common Document has two purposes: to provide a 
list of measures taken by UNMIK to assist the Kosovo Serb community and to provide a 
solid basis for a cooperative relationship with the authorities of the FRY, including the 
establishment of a High-ranking Working Group as official forum for dialogue and 
cooperation112. This group has resulted in several agreements between the FRY and 
UNMIK113 . However, it is understood by UNMIK that it has no obligations or vertical 
connections to the FRY, and that such measures are examples of cooperation on regional 
issues only114• 
The international administration exercises public authority and traditional sovereign rights 
in relation to the territory of Kosovo and its inhabitants. Kosovo is not a state, and 
therefore the international administration cannot be considered a successor state to the 
109 A similar argument based on proportionate responsibility was rejected by the ECHR in Bankovic. See 
Chapter 5. 
110 See the Memorandum by the Government of Yugoslavia on the Implementation of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Yugoslav Daily Survey No. 2710 (5 December 1999). 
111 International Crisis Group Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica 's Victory, 10 October 2000. 
112 SG Report 15/1102, paragraphs 16 and 17. 
113 For example, a Protocol on Police Cooperation with the Governments of Serbia and the FRY signed on 31 
May 2002 aimed at organised crime and terrorism and the Agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
between UNMIK and the FRY signed on 3 April 2002. 
114 See discussion by Brand, note 35 at 463. 
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FRY, therefore the law of state succession will not apply. However, administration of 
territory by an international organisation, particularly where the international organisation 
exercises functions normally exercised by organs of the State, could be considered a change 
of government. Accepting that the protection of human rights law attaches to territory, and 
the population of a territory, such protection should continue notwithstanding a change in 
the entity that exercises authority over the territory and the individuals. International 
human rights obligations would then continue to bind the international administration for 
the benefit of the inhabitants of the administered territory. Applying this argument to 
Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR in administering the territory, are required to secure for the 
inhabitants of Kosovo those international human rights obligations applicable in the FRY 
proper. While this obligation may exist in law, the difficulty lies in enforcing it against the 
international administration. As noted above, the SFRY was not a party to the Optional 
Protocol, and therefore the right of individual complaint to the UNHRC is not available. 
Nor is the FRY currently a party to the European Convention, so an individual cannot bring 
an application before the ECHR. 
If the UN, its member States or NATO member States are bound by the ICCPR in relation 
to their activities in Kosovo, the question thus becomes what happens to the reporting 
obligations of the FRY? The ICCPR will apply to people in Kosovo as part of the FRY due 
to the emerging principle of automatic succession to human rights instruments. Yet the 
FRY is not exercising sovereign powers in respect of those individuals during the 
international administration, therefore it cannot violate the human rights of those 
individuals. If UNMIK or KFOR act in a way incompatible with their (the people of 
Kosovo) rights, does the FRY have either a right or a duty to complain? These people are 
FRY nationals: that would be a sufficient basis for the FRY to bring an inter-State 
complaint against the member States of NATO or the UN, at least in relation to grievous 
violations of IHRL. It is also possible that the UNHRC would recognise Kosovo as being 
analogous to a sub-State component of the FRY and request a report directly from the 
authorities responsible for administration of that component. However, this is not the 
practice of the UNHRC even in relation to federal States and there is no mechanism by 
which the UNHRC may force a sub-State entity to comply with the request or the 
obligation to respect IHRL. 
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The people of Kosovo may also utilise any domestic remedies available through the FRY to 
challenge or obtain redress for violations of convention rights by the international 
administration. This would require domestic FRY courts being willing to assert jurisdiction 
over the international administration based on the argument that the act of administering the 
territory signals acceptance of that jurisdiction. It is highly unlikely that the UN or the 
States participating in KFOR would accept such an argument. Neither the UN nor NATO 
considered the direct applicability of the ICCPR to Kosovo. Resolution 1244 and 
Regulation 1 do not clarify whether human rights instruments binding over the FRY 
automatically apply in Kosovo. Regulation 1 does not specify whether the former 
Yugoslav or Serbian constitutional provisions and institutional arrangements, including any 
right of review, continue to apply, although the general understanding was that the 
applicable body of law excluded constitutional arrangements115. Further, the immunities of 
UNMIK set out in Regulation 2000/47 apply to the domestic courts of Kosovo only and do 
not specifically exclude the jurisdiction of the FRY courts. The absence of any SOFA with 
the FRY Government leaves the application of FRY domestic legal provisions and 
structures to the international administration uncertain. 
To the extent that IHRL imposes obligations on the international administration, the actual 
rationalisation may not matter if the human rights are protected. However, it appears that 
whatever the legal basis for the application of IHRL to people within Kosovo, there is no 
right of individual action. 
115 Brand, note 35. 
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If it can be established that UNMIK and/or KFOR are obliged to comply with IHRL, the 
next issue is whether there is an enforceable individual right of review. Under IHRL, 
States are required to ensure that victims of violations have a right to a real and effective 
remedy, which is generally equated to a right to judicial review of the alleged action, 
together with a right to compensation. However, the prospects for judicial review of the 
acts of UNMIK and KFOR are bleak, both within the UN system and the domestic Kosovo 
legal system. Regulatory mechanisms designed to provide individual remedies for 
violations of international human rights law do not apply to international organisations. 
The contracting States to the various international instruments did not undertake to secure 
the protection of human rights of persons throughout the world and their accountability for 
such actions is limited by the notion of extra-territorial jurisdiction. The catalogue of rights 
in Regulation 1 'can only be seen as a declaratory political commitment to a high standard 
of human rights, yet without putting the practice to the test of local judicial remedies or 
international supervision through international human rights bodies' 1• This chapter 
considers the various limitations on securing a right of judicial review for individuals 
within Kosovo. 
A. Review within the UN system 
Although the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN2, it is not a 'constitutional court' 
in the sense found in many domestic legal systems3. The ICJ does not have a general 
mandate to review the exercise of power by either the Security Council or its subsidiary 
1 Brand, 'Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of UNMIK Legislation' 
(2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 461-488 at 476. 
2 Article 92, Charter. 
3 See: Alvarez 'Judging the Security Council' (1996) 90 A/JL I; Akande, "The International Court of Justice 
and the Security Council: Is there room for judicial control of decisions of the political organs of the United 
Nations" (1997) 46 ICLQ 309; Gowlland-Debbas, 'The Relationship between the International Court of 
Justice and the Security Council in the light of the Lockerbie case' (1994) 88 AIJL 643; Crawford, 'The 
Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution' in The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Fox ed) 
(1997); Herdegen, 'The Constitutionalization of the UN Security System' (1994) 27 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 135; Macdonald, 'Changing Relations between the International Court of Justice and the 
Security Council of the United Nations' (1993) CYbiL 1; Roberts, 'Second-guessing the Security Council: 
The International Court of Justice and its Powers of Judicial Review' (1995) 7 Pace International Law 
Review 281; and Watson 'Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court' (1993) 34(1) HIU I. 
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organs4• For the ICJ to review the creation, mandate or performance of the UNMIK or 
KFOR the issue must arise as part of a contentious claim brought by a member State5. 
Even if an opportunity to review the legality of the actions of the Security Council or its 
subsidiary organs arose as part of an inter-State dispute, it is not certain that the ICJ would 
consider the matter justicable. Decisions of the ICJ are not binding on States (other than 
the States that are parties to the dispute) or international organisations, such as NATO and 
the UN6, and must be referred to the Security Council for enforcement action. For an ICJ 
decision to effectively invalidate a decision or act of the Security Council, 'states would 
have to give the Court's decision more persuasive force than the law requires' 7. 
The General Assembly and the Security Council may request an advisory opinion on any 
legal question from the ICJ8• While the Security Council has only requested an advisory 
opinion on one occasion9, there is potential for the development of the ICJ's advisory 
jurisdiction10• UNMIK, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, may itself be 
competent to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on legal questions arising within the 
scope of its activities 11 . It is unlikely to do so when the allegation is that its own actions are 
4 See Bowett, 'Judicial and Political Functions of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice' 
in The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Fox ed) ( 1997); D 'Angelo, 'The Check on International 
Peace and Security Maintenance: The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review of Security Council 
Resolutions' (2000) 23 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 561; and Franck, 'The 'Powers of Appreciation': 
Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?' (1992) 86 AJIL 519. 
5 For example, the legality of Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 was indirectly challenged in the 
inter-state proceedings instituted by Libya in the ICJ against the United States and the United Kingdom: 
Lockerbie Aerial Incident Case. See also: Gowlland-Debbas (1994) note 3; Martenczuk, 'The Security 
Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?' (1999) 10 EJIL 517; 
and McWhinney, 'The International Court as Emerging Constitutional Court and the Co-ordinate UN 
Institutions (Especially the Security Council): Implications of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie' ( 1992) CYbiL 
261. 
6 The UN cannot be a respondent. 
7 Alvarez, note 3 at 5. 
8 Article 96(1 ), Charter. 
9 Arguably, Article 12 of the Charter would preclude the General Assembly from taking such action in 
relation to a matter of international peace and security which is already the subject of debate in, or action by, 
the Security Council, although consider the recent advisory opinion sought by the World Health Organisation 
relating to nuclear weapons. The Security Council has requested an advisory opinion on only one occasion, in 
relation to Namibia. 
10 See: Alvarez, note 3 at 8-9, who points to the request by the General Assembly and the WHO in relation to 
nuclear weapons; Akande, 'The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice' (1998) 9 EJIL 437; and Reisman, 'The Constitutional Crisis in the United 
Nations' (1993) 87 AJIL 83 at 92. 
11 Article 96(2), Charter. 
61 
Individual judicial remedy 
m violation of international law. Advisory opmwns are not binding upon either the 
Security Council or subsidiary organs, although an advisory opinion is likely to be highly 
persuasive 12 . 
The UNHRC IS also not suited to ensure the accountability of the international 
administration, as the primary mechanism of ensuring accountability is a system of human 
rights reporting. States are required to submit reports to the UNHRC on a regular basis, 
detailing the measures adopted to give effect to the ICCPR rights, the progress made on the 
enjoyment of ICCPR rights by the national population and any difficulties encountered by 
the State in procuring ICCPR rights 13 . The UNHRC must consider reports submitted to it 
by States, and may transmit its comments on the reports to the State concerned, or relevart 
specialised UN agencies as appropriate 14• Such reporting requirements only extend to State 
parties, not the UN itself, its subsidiary organs or forces under UN auspices. The UNHRC 
may receive a communication from individual victims alleging violations of ICCPR rights 
by State Parties only if the offending State is a party to Optional Protocol! to the ICCPR15 . 
UNCHR has established a Special Rapporteur in relation to human rights in the former 
Yugoslav republics, who has been seized with matters relating to the human rights situation 
in Kosovo 16• However, the Special Rapporteur's recommendations do not bind the 
international administration, nor can he accept or process complaints from individuals. 
If the Charter is considered a delegation of powers from member States to the Security 
Council, rendering the Security Council accountable to the General Assembly as the body 
representative of member States, the General Assembly may be competent to review 
persistent and substantial violations of IHRL by UNMIK17. This would require member 
12 Article 96, Charter. 
13 Article 40, ICCPR. Article 41 also provides for inter-State complaints were both States had accepted the 
jurisdiction of the UNHRC to receive such complaints. The UNHRC may also request reports from 
individual States. 
14 Article 40(4), ICCPR 
15 Article I, First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
16 Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Republic ofCroatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
17 However, both these principles are not universally accepted: see the discussion in Sarooshi, 'The United 
Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its 
Chapter VII Powers' (1999) at 25-32. 
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States to determine that the Security Council or UNMIK had violated the Charter or other 
peremptory norms 18. Given the uncertain Charter basis of KFOR, it is not certain whether 
the General Assembly has similar powers in relation to KFOR. Alternatively, the General 
Assembly has a residual capacity to make recommendations to restore international peace 
and security, particularly where the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act19. 
However, given the clear wording of Article 12 of the Charter20, review by the General 
Assembly where the Security Council has acted would be highly controversial and would 
be of a political, not legal, nature. In addition the General Assembly is limited to making 
recommendations, it does not have enforcement powers21 • 
A recent trend has seen the commissioning of internal reports and independent inquiries by 
the Secretariat or other UN organs relating to the actions of the UN in situations involving 
alleged human rights abuses. For example, the Secretary-General commissioned an inquiry 
into the fall of the UN safe area of Srebrenica in Bosnia22 and the failure of UN troops to 
prevent and stop the systematic slaughter of 800,000 people during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda23 . However, while these reports expose problems within peacekeeping missions, 
they do not provide for an individual remedy for persons affected. Instead, they are 
directed at improving and reforming peacekeeping itself. Individual State governments 
have also commissioned independent reports, the most recent of which was commissioned 
by the Netherlands government in relation to the role of Dutch troops in the United Nations 
Protection Force at Srebrenica24 . The government dramatically resigned following negative 
18 Gill, 'Legal and some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to exercise its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' (1995) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33 
at 124-5. 
19 See Certain Expenses at 151 and The Uniting for Peace Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly in 
1950 (Resolution 3 77(V)), discussed in White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the maintenance 
of international peace and security (1993), part 2. 
20 Article 12(1) provides that the General Assembly must not make any recommendation in relation to a 
dispute or situation in respect of which the Security Council is exercising its powers under the Charter. 
21 Articles 10-14, Charter. 
22 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, 15 
November 1999, UN Doe A/54/549. 
23 Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United 
Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda 15 December 1999. 
24 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Srebrenica: A 'Safe' Area, April 2002, available at 
www.srebrenica.nl/em/a index.htm 
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findings, demonstrating that such reports may have important political, if not legal, 
consequences25 . 
B. The Courts 
In mature human rights systems, rights are ordinarily enforced in courts of law within the 
judicial system. Upon its arrival in Kosovo, UNMIK was faced with a situation in which 
little of the resources of the previous legal system, either material or human, remained. 
Court buildings had been destroyed or damaged and there was a serious shortage of 
essential legal materials, from copies of legal texts and statute books, to the basic paper and 
stationary supplies needed to run a judicial system26. Due to politically and ethnically 
motivated appointments, removals and training, only 30 of 756 judges and prosecutors 
formerly serving in Kosovo were Kosovo Albanian27 . Crime, both organised and revenge-
motivated violence, was escalating in the law and order vacuum. Accordingly, it was 
recognised that it was vital to the long-term success of the mission that UNMIK quickly 
develop a functioning judiciary in Kosovo28 . The difficulties facing the interim 
administration in establishing a judicial system upon arrival in Kosovo have been well 
documented29 . 
Responsibility for rebuilding the justice system was shared between the OSCE and 
UNMIK. One of the first actions of the SRSG was to establish an emergency justice 
system to focus exclusively on providing hearings to criminal defendants detained by 
KFOR, while UNMIK concentrated on establishing a permanent judicial system30. By 
March 2000, the SRSG had appointed in excess of 400 judges and prosecutors to service a 
permanent judicial system, largely based on the previous administration of the autonomous 
25 Finn, 'Dutch Government Quits After Report on Serb Massacre', Washington Post, 17 April 2002. 
26 SG Report 121711999; OMIK, Emergency Measures for legal systems, 7 November 1999 (OMIK Report 
1) and OMIK, The Development of the Kosovo Judicial System (1 0 June through 15 December 1 999), 17 
December 1999 (OMIK Report 2). 
27 See Strohmeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in 
Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 95 AJIL 46 at 49. 
28 This is a consistent theme in the reports of the Secretary-General. For example: SG Report 1217/99, 
paragraph 66. 
29 See Betts, Carlson & Gisvold, 'The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the lessons 
learned in efforts to establish a judiciary and rule of law' (2001) 22 MJIL 371; Lorenz, F.M. 'The Rule of 
Law in Kosovo: Problems and Prospects' (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 127; and Strohmeyer, note 27. 
30 See OMIK Reports I and 2. 
64 
Individual judicial remedy 
province of Kosovo31 • There is significant evidence that the Kosovo judicial service is not 
independent or impartial and remains unable to ensure that 'normal' standards of justice 
can be attained, particularly in relation to war and ethnically motivated crimes and political 
violence32 • Minority groups are significantly underrepresented in the judiciary, and there is 
a widespread perception that Kosovo Albanian judges and prosecutors are unable to 
distance themselves from the recent armed conflict to provide impartial justice to Serb 
defendants or victims33 . Cases against Kosovo Serb defendants suggest that prosecutors and 
investigating judges may be pursuing or not preventing malicious prosecutions based on the 
ethnicity of the defendants34• There are also concerns that prosecution cases against 
Kosovo Albanian defendants have been dropped and investigations conducted without due 
diligence either through incompetence or ethnic bias. 
Reviews of the judicial system argue that the most conspicuous indication that external 
pressures affect judges is the unusually high rate of releases from detention of persons 
arrested by KFOR and UNMIK police35 . There is evidence that decisions to release 
detainees are often the result of interference with the judiciary. Of particular concern is the 
situation of former KLA members or supporters, who reportedly approach judges and 
obtain the release of detainees. Observers note that accused persons with affiliation to the 
KLA are rarely held in detention for long, if at all. Participants in the criminal justice 
system are often subjected to threats and intimidation, intended to encourage the individual 
to cease participating in the system or to influence the individual's legal decisions, 
particularly those involving prominent personalities or people with affiliation to the KLA. 
31 The three-tiered structure comprises approximately 18 Municipal Courts, five District Courts, and a 
Supreme Court, together with Minor Offence Courts. See OMIK, A Review of the Criminal Judicial System -
February to July 2000 (OMIK Report 7/00). 
32 There were a number of initial independent reviews of the justice system including: The Human Rights Bar 
Committee of England and Wales Kosova 2000: Justice, Not Revenge 16 February 2000; Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights A Fragile Peace: Threats to Justice in Kosovo October 1999; Amnesty International 
Recommendations to UNMIK on the judicial system February 2000; International Crisis Group, Kosovo 
Report Card 28 August 2000. 
33 See various OMIK reports on the criminal justice system. See also: Smith, 'Rule of Law is Elusive in 
Kosovo' Washington Post 29 July 2001 and Wood, 'Amnesty and UN staff accuse Kosovo war crimes 
tribunal of ethnic bias' The Guardian 20 June 200 I. 
34 In some instances, Kosovo Albanian prosecutors and investigating judges have continued prosecutions of 
Kosovo Serbs for genocide where the charge was inflated and not supported by the evidence. 
35 OMIK Report 7/00, Section 6. 
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The OSCE provided examples of intimidation of the judiciary in all five District Courts in 
trials for serious offences, including murder. Evidence supports the assertion that threats 
and intimidation are also affecting the decision by judges and prosecutors to initiate or to 
. . . . 36 
contmue mvestlgatwns . 
While the appointment of international judges to courts throughout Kosovo37 has helped to 
prevent ethnically or politically biased judgements, the limited number of international 
judges led to an unequal treatment of defendants. Further, the requirement of majority 
verdicts restricted the influence of the international judge38. In December 2000, the SRSG 
introduced a system for allocating international judges and prosecutors to cases where the 
appointment is necessary to ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the 
proper administration of justice39. While a positive step, the absence of any objective 
criteria or policy for the consideration of petitions for international panels causes 
monitoring bodies concern. Further, an application may only be made prior to the trial 
commencing, or before an appellate review has commenced. As bias or misconduct may 
arise during trial, this provision may unduly restrict the effectiveness of the regulation40. 
Regulation 2001/2 also extends the scope of cases in which an international prosocutor may 
intervene to prevent prosecutions being avoided or abandoned due to bias41. 
The judicial system also lacks the institutional and functional independence and the 
competence to challenge the international administration in its legislative and executive 
36 As above. 
37 The SRSG appointed international judges, first to the Mitrovica District Court, and later to courts 
throughout Kosovo. International judges and prosecutors may "select and take responsibility for new and 
pending criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the court". See Regulation 2000/6 On the Appointment and 
Removal from Office of International Judges and Prosecutors 15 February 2000, which permitted the 
appointment of an international judge and prosecutor to the District Court in Mitrovica and was extended to 
the entire territory by Regulation 2000/34 Amending Regulation 200016 On the Appointment and Removal 
from Office of International Judges and Prosecutors 29 May 2000. 
38 District Court panels comprise two professional judges (of which the international judge is one) and three 
lay-judges. For analysis, see OMIK Report 7/00 at 69-70. 
39 Regulation 2000/64 On Assignment of International Judges and Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue 15 
December 2000. See also UNMIK Press Release International Judges have 'dramatically reduced' chance of 
bias in Kosovo 20 October 2000. 
40 See the discussion of Regulation 2000/64 in OMIK, Kosovo - A Review of the Criminal Justice System 
119100- 28/2/0I (OMIK Report 2/01) at Section 8.1 and the examples provided. 
41 Regulation 200112 Amending Regulation 2000/6, as amended, On the Appointment and Removal from 
Office of International Judges and Prosecutors. 
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functions. Regulation 1 vests the administration of the judiciary in the SRSG. Despite 
establishing several advisory commissions, the SRSG retains the ultimate power to make 
judicial appointments and, until recently, power in relation to the discipline of international 
and local judicial staff. There is also evidence that legislative enactrnents by UNMIK have 
changed the legal status of criminal cases pending before a court42 • 
Apart from the practical problems outlined above, applying the international human rights 
standards and associated case law directly in domestic courts has proved problematic, even 
in the more mature human rights States. In determining the applicable law, courts in 
Kosovo may request clarification from the SRSG in connection with the implementation of 
the relevant regulation43 • The SRSG has confirmed that Regulation 1 applies to judges and 
that judges must not apply any provisions of the domestic law that are inconsistent with 
IHRL, which takes precedence over domestic law, yct there is little guidance as to how this 
is to be achieved in practice44 • In Kosovo, most lawyers and judges are not familiar with a 
system where human rights law is applied directly and, as a continental code system, the 
use of legal precedent is unknown45 • Lawyers and the judiciary do not refer to IHRL in 
legal argument or judgments, thus limiting the effect of such standards in domestic law.46 
The presence of so many sources of law creates confusion amongst the judiciary and 
lawyers and the judiciary as to which law applies and which law would take precedence in 
the case of conflict47 . There is no central guiding body, such as a human rights chamber or 
constitutional court, to provide guidance on the compatibility of domestic legislation 
(including UNMIK regulations) with IHRL48 . UNMIK regulations and the existing law 
were not immediately subject to comprehensive review for compatibility with IHRL and 
the police and judiciary had to attempt to apply existing law in accordance with the human 
rights obligations imposed by Regulation 1. There is no consultation process by the SRSG 
42 See the extensive discussion of the issue in OMIK Report 2/01, Section 3 and in OMIK Report 7/00 at 58. 
43 Section 2, Regulation 1999/24. 
44 Letter to the President of the Belgrade Bar Association dated 14 June 2000 from the SRSG. 
45 OMIK Report 7/00 at 18. 
46 OMIK Report 7/00 at 17-18. 
47 OMIK Report 7/00 at 15. 
48 In comparison, the European Convention and other human rights instruments are directly applicable in 
Bosnia and both the Human Rights Chamber and the Constitutional Court issue guidelines on the application 
of IHRL: Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Articles II( 1 ), (2) and (7). 
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prior to promulgation of a new regulation and there is a lengthy delay both in publishing in 
English and in translating regulations into Albanian and Serbian, despite most regulations 
being effective on promulgation49 • Neither judges or lawyers can be expected to implement 
legislation that is applicable but not known or accessible to them. 
C. Privileges and lmmunities of UNMIK and KFOR 
In considering the availability of a legal remedy, it is necessary to consider the privileges 
and immunities of UNMIK and KFOR and their personnel. As there is no SOFA, the 
privileges and immunities of the international administration are set out in Regulation 
2000/47. Although the regulation was promulgated on 18 August 2000, it has retrospective 
application and is deemed to commence on 10 June 1999, the date of Resolution 1244. 
UNMIK has institutional immunity and its property, funds and assets are immune from any 
legal process50 • Senior UNMIK personnel51 are immune from local jurisdiction in respect 
of criminal or civil act performed or committed by them in Kosovo52 . Other UNMIK 
personnel are immune in respect of words spoken and all acts performed in an official 
capacity53 , and cannot be subjected to any form of arrest or detention by local authorities54 • 
As UNMIK is defined to include all four components of the civil presence and the 
international organisation responsible for each component55 , the OSCE, the EU and their 
personnel enjoy the same protection. An important restriction on this immunity is the 
power of the Secretary-General to waive the immunity of UNMIK personnel where, in his 
opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and could be waived without 
prejudice to the interests of UNMIK56 • For members of the OSCE and EU, any waiver of 
immunity is to be carried out in consultation with the heads of those components 57 . 
49 OMIK Report 2/02 at 16-17. 
50 Section 3.1, Regulation 2000/47 
51 This includes the SRSG, his five deputies and 'other high ranking officials as may be decided from time to 
time' by the SRSG. 
52 Section 3.2, Regulation 2000/47 
53 Section 3.3, Regulation 2000/47 
54 Section 3.4, Regulation 2000/47 
55 Section I, Regulation 2000/4 7. See Chapter 1 for details of the pillars. 
56 Section 6.1, Regulation 2000/4 7. The Secretary-General has waived the immunity of UNMIK civilian 
police on several occasions. However, OMIK was concerned that, even with the waiver, none of the charges 
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As an institution, KFOR is also immune from local jurisdiction58. As international KFOR 
personnel are immune from prosecution before courts in Kosovo in respect of any 
administrative, civil or criminal act committed by them in Kosovo59, its military personnel 
are largely excluded from the domestic legal regime. International KFOR personnel are 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective sending States and cannot be 
arrested or detained other than by persons acting on behalf of the sending State60 . Locally 
recruited personnel are immune with respect to tasks carried out exclusively related to their 
services to KFOR61 • Any request to waive the immunity of KFOR personnel must be 
referred to the commander of the national element of the individual troops62 • 
While these rules are consistent with those generally found in peacekeeping missions63 , 
they effectively preclude the decisions and actions of UNMIK and KFOR from judicial 
review in Kosovo64 • This is inconsistent with principles of accountability expected of 
public servants in peacetime and both the Ombudsperson65 and the OSCE66 have held that 
were properly investigated, the accused individuals escaped criminal responsibility and most were repatriated: 
OMIK Report 2/02 at 40-41. Amnesty International has also questioned UNMIK's commitment to 
prosecuting civilian police after an Austrian officer accused of torture and ill-treatment of suspects fled 
Kosovo with the assistance of other personnel and with the knowledge of the Austrian government: News 
Release Amnesty International 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo): No impunity for the international 
community' 18 June 2002 EUR 70/005/2002. See also: Lynch, 'Austria is said to aid flight of suspect: UN 
Officials Assail Thwarting of Probe' The Washington Post 6 March 2002. 
57 Section 6.1, Regulation 2000/47. 
58 Section 2.1, Regulation 2000/47. 
59 Section 2.4, Regulation 2000/47. 
60 Section 2.4, Regulation 2000/47. 
61 Section 2.4, Regulation 2000/47. 
62 Section 6.3, Regulation 2000/47. 
63 The immunities of the UN are contained in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities ofthe 
UN 1946 and, more generally, Article I 05 of the Charter. The immunities in UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 are 
without prejudice to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by UNMIK under the Charter and the General 
Convention: Section 9, Regulation 2000/47. 
64 For example, a Kosovo Albanian woman who contested in the Municipal Court an administrative act issued 
by Kacanik Municipality and the former UNMIK Department of Education and Science. UNMIK relied on 
its institutional immunity under Regulation 2000/47. Despite the Municipal Court finding that the immunity 
did not apply and making an award in favour of the applicant, UNMIK refused to enforce the judgement, 
again claiming that the act had been subject to the privileges and immunities ofUNMIK. See Ombudsperson 
Institution in Kosovo Report Registration Number 122/0 I Elife Murseli against UNMIK, I 0 December 200 I, 
which concluded that UNMIK's failure to execute the judgement violated Article 6 of the Convention. 
65 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No I On the compatibility with recognized 
international standards of UNMIK Regulation No 2000147 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR 
and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo 18 August 2000, paragraph 23. 
66 OMIK Report 2/02 at 38-9. 
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Regulation 2000/47 is incompatible with IHRL. The Ombudsperson argued that 'no 
democratic state operating under the rule of law accords itself total immunity from any 
administrative, civil or criminal responsibility. Such blanket lack of accountability paves 
the way for immunity of the state'67 . 
Violations of the applicable law by KFOR personnel are resolved through recourse to the 
courts or other disciplinary procedures of the sending State pursuant to its domestic 
legislation68 . There are several concerns regarding military investigations and prosecutions. 
First, they are not public investigations and prosecutions and cannot be easily monitored. 
Second, there is no legal obligation on the sending State to proceed with investigations, 
prosecutions or sentencing as the UN and the host State have no power to compel the State 
government to initiate or continue prosecutions. Refusal to submit troops to domestic 
jurisdiction also signals a lack of faith in the judicial system established and administered 
by the international civil presence. While such refusal may be justified in relation to 
criminal prosecutions against individual personnel, it should not extend to all legal process, 
including civil claims and judicial review of KFOR detentions. The greatest concern with 
military investigation is that it removes the proceedings from Kosovo, leaving the victim 
with no remedy and unable to participate in the proceedings. 
Regulation 2000/47 creates a dichotomous legal regime whereby KFOR is governed by a 
different legal regime to UNMIK. When faced with an identical threat of aggression, 
KFOR troops, by virtue of their robust rules of engagement, may take more aggressive 
action than UNMIK police69 . Any failure to comply with the rules of engagement by that 
KFOR soldier would be subject to prosecution before the military courts of the sending 
67 Ombudpserson Special Report I, note 65, paragraph 23 
68 To illustrate, British troops within a KFOR unit operate under a statutory disciplinary framework (based on 
the Armed Forces Act 2001), which applies wherever in the world they are based, whether in times of peace 
or conflict. When British soldiers killed two civilians in Pristina, they were investigated and prosecuted by 
the army's legal service in Britain, in consultation with local UNMIK prosecutors. See Wood, 'Kosovo's 
love affair with Nato keeps tempers down' The Guardian 4 December 2000 and 'Paratroopers charged with 
Kosovo killing' The Guardian 4 December 2000. 
69 Provided the soldier's action can be characterised as an act in furtherance of KFOR's mandate, it is not a 
breach of a domestic law provision. In contrast, the UNMIK police officer must obey all domestic legal 
provisions, including IHRL, and must refrain from taking any action or activity incompatible with such 
provisions: Regulation 2000/47. 
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State, while UNMIK civilian police may be subject to local jurisdiction following a waiver 
of immunity by the Secretary-General. A victim's access to a remedy, and ultimately the 
degree of accountability, is thus dependent on whether UNMIK police or KFOR troops 
perform the act, a position that is unsatisfactory and does nothing to promote certainty or 
accountability. 
Traditional immunities are necessary for the effective exercise of the organisation's 
functions and by the need for the organisation 'to perform its tasks independently and free 
from interferences' 70 from any member State or the government of a host State. Disputes 
that 'might affect the exercise of an international organisation's essential prerogatives 
remain outside the reach of national courts'71 • This is a legitimate objective to ensure the 
effective operation of the UN72 • Alternatively, other applicable rules, such as a constitutive 
treaty, headquarters agreement or SOFA, provide for the resolution of disputes other than 
by recourse to national courts 73 • However, the role of international organisations is now 
changing and international organisations are increasingly assuming control of individuals as 
part of their functions. The traditional assumption that States are regulated while 
international organisations regulate is no longer appropriate74 • In Kosovo, UNMIK is not 
mandated to monitor or assist the government, it is the surrogate government and 'the 
underlying purpose of the grant of immunity does not apply as there is no need for a 
government to be protected against itself 75 • 
Where the act in question does not relate to the essential prerogatives of the United Nations 
and there are no alternative means of dispute resolution, it may be appropriate to restrict the 
70 Shaw International Law (1997) at 925. 
71 Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, 'International Organisations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To Restrict or to 
Bypass', (2002) 51 ICLQ 1 at 5. 
72 See Waite and Kennedy v Germany Reports 1999-I. 
73 Gaillaid, & Pingel-Lenuzza note 71. 
74 Wilde,'Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor' 
(2001) 7 JLSA J Jnt'l & Comp L 455 at 457. Wilde uses a similar argument where UNHCR operates 
development camps for refugees, so that the exercise of certain powers within the territory of those camps is 
equivalent to de facto sovereignty and should be subject to IHRL: Wilde, 'Why and How UNHCR 
Governance of 'Development' Refugee Camps Should be Subject to International Human Rights Law' (1998) 
I Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 107. See also Verdirame, 'Compliance with Human 
Rights in UN Operations' (2002) 2(2) Human Rights Law Review 265. 
75 Ombudsperson Special Repmt No I, note 65 paragraph 23. 
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scope of immunity from jurisdiction76 . The Constitutional Court of Bosnia has recently 
considered the immunity accorded to the OHR, an international official with governance 
functions77• The Constitutional Court analysed the role being performed by the OHR and 
previous instances of territorial administration where sovereign States had been placed 
under international supervision. It commented that the foreign authorities acting in these 
States on behalf of the international community substituted themselves for domestic 
authorities and the laws passed by these international authorities were often passed in the 
name of the States under supervision78 • The Constitutional Court continued79: 
Such situation amounts to a sort of functional duality: an authority of one legal 
system intervenes in another legal system, thus making its functions dual. The 
same holds for the High Representative: he has been vested with special powers by 
the international community and his mandate is of an international character. 
Due to this functional duality, where the OHR substitutes himself for the national 
authorities, the law enacted is in the nature of a national law and is subject to review by the 
Constitutional Court. 
The same interpretation could apply to the immunity of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo, 
providing the courts with the competence to review legislative and executive acts of the 
international administration as the surrogate government of Kosovo80. However, the 
76 Gaillaid & Pingel-Lenuzza, note 71. See Beer and Regan v Germany, where the ECHR noted that provided 
the immunity of the international organisation has a legitimate goal, the means used were proportionate to the 
goal sought and the immunity did not restrict access to the courts 'in such a way or to such an extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired' the ECHR will not find a violation of Article 6. Judgment of 18 
February 1999, Case No 28934/95, paragraph 25. 
77 See Case U/9/00 Request for evaluation of constitutionality of the Law on State Border Service 
(Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Judgment of 3 November 2000, available at 
http://ustavnisud.ba.home/en/index.html. The Court was asked to review the constitutionality of the Law on 
the State Border Service, imposed by the OHR pursuant to the powers vested in the OHR by Annex I 0 to the 
DPA. The DPA provides that the OHR is the final authority in theatre to interpret his mandate and is immune 
from legal process. In its initial admissibility decision, the Constitutional Court had to consider its 
competence to review the legislation 
78 At paragraph 5. 
79 At paragraph 5. 
80 Wilde, 'The Complex Role of the Legal Advisor when International Organizations Administer Territory' 
(200 I) ASIL Proceedings 251. Stahn also draws on a concept of functional duality to distinguish between 
categories of laws passed by UNMIK: see Stahn, 'The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo 
and East Timor: A First Analysis' (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 105 at 145-8 and 
Wilde, 'International territorial administration and human rights' in The United Nations, Human Rights and 
Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003) at 21-6. 
72 
Individual judicial remedy 
absence of a constitutional framework in Kosovo restricts the opportunity for judicial 
review81 • The dual character of such acts is also more readily apparent in relation to 
UNMIK, which has assumed legislative and executive powers82 . The Office of the Legal 
Adviser in Kosovo (OLA) has recognised two distinctive functions of UNMIK in Kosovo; 
the first as a peacekeeping mission and the second as an interim administration. The OLA 
argued that UNMIK privileges and immunities should only cover its peacekeeping 
functions and not its capacity as an interim administrator. OMIK has rejected this 
suggested limitation, as this requires individuals to identify the capacity in which they 
make individual decisions, which is difficult practicallt3. 
However, while KFOR does not perform legislative acts, it does undertake several 
functions commonly associated with the executive, especially in the area of criminal 
justice, and is more politicised than a regular military force. There appears to be no legal 
justification for adopting a separate approach for KFOR, where KFOR also performs 
'government' acts. The main justification is practical: the UN relies upon States to 
voluntarily contribute troops for peacekeeping missions84 • As States tend to be reluctant to 
contribute troops, the UN has agreed to favourable conditions on the use of such troops, 
including the immunity extended to their military personnel. States are concerned as to the 
quality of justice dispensed by foreign courts and the desire to avoid troops being subjected 
to show trials in foreign jurisdictions. It is important not to underestimate the significance 
of this concern. The United States government justified its decision not to ratify the Rome 
81 In Bosnia, the DP A included a Constitution document for Bosnia and Herzegovina that had immediate 
effect and established the Constitutional Court. In Kosovo, it was not until the promulgation of the 
Constitutional Framework that the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court on Constitutional Framework 
Matters was established. In any event, it is doubtful that the new Court has jurisdiction in relation to 
legislative acts of the SRSG: see Chapter 12, Constitutional Framework and Stahn, note 80. 
82 Ruffert also relies upon the dual nature of the legal system in Kosovo: Ruffert, 'The Administration of 
Kosovo and East Timor by the International Community' (2001) 50 JCLQ 613 at 626-7. 
83 OMIK Report 2/02 at 38-9. 
84 While the Security Council can authorise the use of force, its cannot compel states to take military action, 
nor can it require participating states to undertake military action in a manner, or using a level of force, that is 
not acceptable to participating states. 
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Statute due to a number of serious objections to the International Criminal Court (ICC)85 . 
These objections included86: 
the lack of adequate checks and balances on powers ofthe [ICC's] prosecutors; the 
dilution of the UN Security Council's authority over international criminal 
prosecutions; and the lack of any effective mechanism to prevent politicized 
prosecutions of any American service members and officials. 
Upon the coming into force of the Rome Statute, the United States was concerned that its 
military personnel would be subject to prosecution before the ICC. It vetoed a Security 
Council resolution extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and threatened to withdraw its personnel from Bosnia87 . In 
addition, the United States would not participate in future peacekeeping missions where its 
troops were exposed to the risk of prosecution. A political compromise was reached so that 
'if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
not a party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations 
established or authorised operation' the ICC shall not 'commence or proceed with 
investigation or prosecution of such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise,s8• 
As a result, the mandate of UNMIBH was extended89. Even this did not meet the United 
States Government's concerns as it approached other governments requesting them to sign 
agreements not to surrender or transfer United States nationals to the ICC90. The United 
States exerted 'extreme pressure'91 on States, in some cases threatening to withdraw United 
States military assistance. Given these concerns, it is unlikely that national governments or 
force commanders would waive the wide immunity conferred on their personnel as part of a 
85 The British Government faced similar concerns: See for example Norton-Taylor, 'Forces fear war crimes 
threat' The Guardian 7 March 2001 and 'Tories urge block on war crimes court' The Guardian 8 March 
2001. 
86 Bradley, 'ASIL Insights: US Not to Ratify ICC Treaty', May 2002. 
87 See UN Press Release SC/7437 of 30 June 2002. 
88 Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) paragraph I. The prohibition is for an initial 12-month period, 
commencing I July 2002, but is renewable by the Security Council for further 12-month periods for as long as 
the Security Council considers necessary (paragraph 2). 
89 Security Council Resolution 1423 (2002). 
90 Press Release Amnesty International 'ICC: No to US campaign against international justice', 3 September 
2002, IOR 30/007/2002. 
91 As above. 
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peacekeeping force. Thus, any breach of the applicable law committed by KFOR personnel 
must continue to be resolved through recourse to the disciplinary procedures of the sending 
State. 
D. Ombudsperson lnsmution 
The Ombudsperson is the primary domestic institution designed to enhance the protection 
of human rights in Kosovo. UNMIK Regulation 2000/3892 establishes the Ombudsperson 
institution, sets out its powers and functions and represents a political compromise between 
the UN, the OSCE and KFOR>3. Despite the importance of the Ombudsperson institution 
in the scheme of rights protection in Kosovo, the first Ombudsperson did not assume his 
functions until the second year of the international administration's presence94 . The 
Ombudsperson's mandate is to95 : 
promote and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and legal entities and 
ensure that all persons are able to exercise effectively the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms safeguarded by international human rights standards, in 
particular the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Further, the Ombudsperson is 'to provide accessible and timely mechanisms for the review 
and redress of actions constituting the abuse of authority by the interim civil 
administration' 96 • The Ombudsperson has jurisdiction to receive and investigate 
complaints from any person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights violations and 
alleged abuses of authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging domestic 
institution, particularly severe or systematic violations and those founded on 
discrimination97 . The institution is thus a hybrid of a human rights commission and a 
92 Regulation 2000/38 On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson in Kosovo, 30 June 2000 (Regulation 
2000/38). 
93 See discussion by Brand, note I at 482. 
94 The current Ombudsperson, Marek Nowicki, was appointed in July 2000: see UNMIK Press Release 289, 
dated 12 July 2000. 
95 Section 1.1, Regulation 2000/38. 
96 Section 1.2, Regulation 2000/38. 
97 Section 3.1, Regulation 2000/38. 
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traditional ombudsperson98 • Regulation 2000/38 does not specify which actions will 
constitute an abuse of authority, or which body is to determine whether an abuse of 
authority has occurred. Jurisdiction is limited to the territory of Kosovo and to cases 
occurring after 30 June 2000, the date the relevant UNMIK regulation entered into force 
and excludes disputes between the international administration and its staff. 99 
The Ombudsperson does not have automatic jurisdiction in respect of the international 
security presence100• The power of the Ombudsperson to receive and investigate 
complaints against KFOR personnel was a particularly contentious issue during the 
negotiation of the draft regulation. While KFOR command in Kosovo agreed in principle 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson, NATO headquarters reversed this 
decision 101 • The political compromise insisted upon by NATO command is that the 
Ombudsperson may enter into an agreement with the KFOR Force Commander in order to 
deal with cases involving KFOR102 • However, no such agreement has been entered into. 
A critical limitation of the Ombudsperson institution is the absence of enforcement powers. 
The institution is not a judicial body. It can receive complaints, monitor, investigate, offer 
good offices, take preventative steps, make recommendations and advise on matters 
relating to its functions, and must take all necessary actions to address complaints103 • The 
Ombudsperson may also 'provide advice and make recommendations to any person or 
entity concerning the compatibility of domestic laws and regulations with recognized 
international standards.I 04 . Where the Ombudsperson intervenes directly with the relevant 
authorities, the authority must respond within a reasonable time. However, where the 
relevant authority fails or refuses to comply with the measures proposed by the 
Ombudsperson, the Ombudsperson is limited to drawing the matter to the attention of the 
98 See Reif, 'Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good 
Governance and Human Rights Protection' (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal I. 
99 Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5, Regulation 2000/38. 
100 Section 3.4, Regulation 2000/38. 
101 See Brand, note I at 483. 
102 This is reflected in Section 3.4, Regulation 2000/38. See also Brand, note I. 
103 The powers of the Ombudsperson are set out in Section 4, Regulation 2000/38. 
104 Section 4.3, Regulation 2000/38. 
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SRSG and to issuing a public statement105 . Other ombudsperson institutions in pos~ 
conflict societies have not had such limited powers. For example, the ombudsperson 
appointed by the EU to scrutinise the European Union Administration Mission for Mostar 
(JE1U AM) could make recommendations to the administrator and, in the case of 
disagreement, refer matters to the EU Council106 . Unlike the Human Rights Ombudsperson 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Ombudsperson in Kosovo does not have an option to refer 
matters to a human rights chamber107. 
The independence of the institution from the international administration is 'important for 
effectiveness.1os and the Ombudsperson is intended to act independently from UNMIK and 
the interim administration109. Despite this, the Ombudsperson is an international official 
appointed by the SRSG for a two-year term, although this power of appointment may be 
transferred to domestic elected institutions110. The SRSG may remove the Ombudsperson 
from office where the SRSG considers that the Ombudsperson has failed in the execution of 
his or her functions, or has been placed in a position incompatible with the due exercise of 
his or her functions 111 • On a practical basis, the independence and significance of the 
institution is affected by the funding arrangements. Dependent on funds from international 
donors, the institution relies on funds from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget for its 
continued operation 112 • 
Since its establishment, the Ombudsperson has initiated several investigations concerning 
alleged violations of human rights standards, of which the majority of complaints relate to 
property. The Ombudsperson has also issued several special reports concerning the legality 
of UNMIK regulations, and has found that certain regulations are incompatible with human 
rights standards. For example, the Ombudsperson has declared Regulation 2000/47 
105 See sections 4.9 to 4.12, Regulation 2000/38. 
106 See discussion of EUAM in Korhonen, 'International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations' (200 1) 14(3) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 495 at 519-22. 
107 DP A, Annex 6. 
108 Reif, note 98 at 24. 
109 Section 2, Regulation 2000/38. 
110 Section 6, Regulation 2000/38. See also Section 20 on the transfer to elected authorities. 
111 Section 8, Regulation 2000/38. 
112 Section 18, Regulation 2000/38. 
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incompatible with recognised international human rights standards113 and has concluded 
that UNMIK regulations relating to the applicable law do not comply with the provisions of 
Resolution 1244114• Similarly, the Ombudsperson also considered that the regime for 
controlling property transfers set out in UNMIK Regulation 2001/17115 was incompatible 
with recognised international human rights standards 116• The response of the SRSG to the 
recommendations in each report has generally been disappointing. Even with a more 
powerful mandate and wider powers 'an Ombudsman cannot make up for inexistent or 
fledgling justice system, for the accountability of police and security forces, and for 
providing effective legal remedies to citizens' 117• At best, the Ombudsperson institution 
provides 'an important independent and corrective voice within Kosovo'118• 
E. Other domestic HR institutions 
Several other bodies have been assigned a role in protecting and promoting human rights in 
Kosovo. OMIK is a distinct component within the framework of UNMIK, and was 
assigned the lead role in matters relating to capacity building and human rights 
monitoring 119 . OMIK has the main responsibility for the monitoring, protection and 
promotion of human rights pursuant to an agreement with the UN 120 and Regulation 
2000/15 121 . OMIK regularly reviews, and issues periodic reports relating to, human rights 
concerns in the justice system, yet has complained of obstruction to its monitoring abilities, 
including denial of access to detention centre lists, detainees, court files and juvenile trials. 
113 Ombudsperson Special Report 1, note 65. 
1 14 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No 2 on Certain Aspects of UNMIK Regulation 
2000159,20 May 2001, paragraph 14. 
115 Regulation 2001/17 On the Registration of Contracts for the Sale of Real Property in Specific 
Geographical Areas of Kosovo, 22 August 2001. 
1 16 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo Special Report No 5 on Certain Aspects of UNMIK Regulation 
2001/17, 29 October 2001. 
117 Brand, 'Effective human rights protection when the UN becomes the state: lessons from UNMIK' in The 
United Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 
2003) at 23. See also Egmez v Cyprus Reports 2000-XII, which provides that a complaint to an 
ombudsperson is not in principle a remedy to be exhausted: paragraph 66. 
118 Brand, above at 24 
1 19 SG Report 12/7/99. 
120 Letter of Agreement dated 19 July 1999 between the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations of the UN and the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. 
121 Regulation 2000115 On the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Justice - pursuant to this 
regulation an agreement was reached between the Administrative Department of Justice and the OSCE that 
the OSCE is responsible for the independent monitoring of the judicial system and correctional service. 
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This significantly affects the ability of OMIK to monitor cases122 . OMIK is also 
responsible for one of the Administrative Departments, the Department of Democratic 
Governance and Civil Society. Despite limited powers and resources, the Department 
provides advice to other Departments and the Interim Administration Council on 
democratic governance and human rights issues. 
The nature of the relationship between OMIK, the SRSG and UNMIK is not clear. OMIK 
is 'a separate organisation, with its own staff, rule and procedures, reporting mechanism, 
distinct needs for visibility, organisational culture and corporate identity' 123 . OMIK tends 
to focus its efforts on the monitoring and reporting aspects of its mandate, rather than 
becoming involved in individual cases. It also tends to emphasise inter-ethnic violence, 
human rights violations committed by unknown individuals and the criminal justice system. 
This emphasis overshadows the need to ensure accountability of 'State' actors, in this case 
UNMIK and KFOR. While OMIK has on one occasion declared a UNMIK regulation to 
be unlawful, its monitoring role is not a substitute for a right of judicial review. 
UNHCR monitors the human rights situation of ethnic minorities, while the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights maintains a presence and issues periodic reports on 
the human rights situation in Kosovo. The SRSG has also established a Human Rights 
Advisor's Office. However, the role of such bodies is to monitor the human rights situation 
and to issue reports. These bodies are not judicial in nature, and have no power to compel 
the interim administration to take or to avoid inappropriate actions or to provide a remedy 
to individuals. 
122 OMIK Report 2/02. 
123 Brand, note I at 485. 
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Chapter 5 " lndividua~ State responsibility 
This chapter considers the prospect of individuals within Kosovo obtaining a legal remedy 
against the member States of the United Nations or those States with national contingents 
participating in KFOR1• The UN, NATO and the OSCE are not parties to international 
human rights instruments and are thus not subject to international systems of human rights 
protection which permit the right of individual petition. However, the majority of the 
member States of the United Nations are parties to the ICCPR and several are Contracting 
States under the European Convention. Thus, subject to the acceptance by those States of 
the right to individual petition, individuals may bring complaints against States either for 
the actions of UNMIK or for the actions of national troops in KFOR. 
A. Jurisdiction- does it have an extra-territorial application? 
Both the ICCPR and the European Convention contain a jurisdictional clause limiting their 
application. Article 1 of the European Convention states that the contracting States 'shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of 
this Convention'2 . Similarly, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides that each State party 
'undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Convention'. State parties recognise the 
competence of the UNHRC to 'receive and consider communications from individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any 
of the rights set forth in the Covenant'3• 
Before examining the application of these instruments to the international administration in 
Kosovo, it is necessary to consider the interpretation given to the concept of jurisdiction in 
relation to these specific human rights instruments. In interpreting Article 1 of the 
European Convention, the ECHR is required to have regard principles of international law, 
including the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT). 
1 Part of this chapter contains material from Williams and Shah, 'Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 
Other Contracting States' (2002) 6 EHRLR 775. 
2 Emphasis added. 
3 Article I of Optional Protocol I to the ICCPR. 
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The VCL T requrres the ECHR to adopt a teleological interpretation of the European 
Convention, one that seeks to realise the European Convention's object and purpose4 . The 
ECHR has stated this object and purpose to be, in general terms, the effective protection of 
individual human rights5. The ECHR must also consider any subsequent State practice in 
the application of the treatl. 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR is based on the notion that jurisdiction in international law 
is primarily territorial, the exercise of legal authority, actual or purported, over persons 
owing some form of allegiance to the State or who has been brought within that State's 
territory. State obligations under the European Convention are in general limited to 
securing convention rights to those individuals within its sovereign territory so that the 
European Convention would extend to those individuals within the territory of the 
participating European States. However, the ECHR does recognise that the Article 1 
obligation to secure European Convention rights is not limited to acts or individuals within 
the territory of the Contracting State. 
The ECHR interprets 'jurisdiction' to have an extra-territorial application in exceptional 
circumstances. Its jurisprudence relating to extra-territorial jurisdiction may be separated 
into two lines of authority. The first line of authority is based upon the decision ofSoering 
v United Kingdom 7. The applicant argued that his extradition from the United Kingdom to 
the United States would expose the applicant to treatment by the United States authorities 
that would be incompatible with Article 3 of the European Convention8• The ECHR held 
that the applicant was within the territory of the United Kingdom and subject to the 
complete and overall control of the United Kingdom authorities. The United Kingdom 
Government was required to ensure that any individual within their jurisdiction was not 
subjected to a violation of their European Convention rights following a decision of the 
United Kingdom authorities. This included making a decision leading to a 'real risk' of a 
violation of treatment incompatible with European Convention standards, even where the 
4 Article 31, VCLT. 
5 Golder v United Kingdom (1975) Series A, no 18. 
6 Article 32. VCL T. 
7 (1989) Series A, no 161. 
8 Paragraph 82. 
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actual inhumane and degrading treatment would result from the acts of another State9• This 
principle has been upheld by the ECHR in several judgments relating to extradition of 
individuals from the territory of a European Convention State10• 
The second line of authority relates to the effective control by a State of an area outside its 
national territory. The ECHR stated the relevant principle in Loizidou v Turkey 
(Preliminary Objections) 11 : 
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a 
Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action -
whether lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective control of an area outside its 
national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it 
be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration. 
Individuals are within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State where its officials exercise 
effective control over those individuals in a manner that is comparable to the control that is 
exercised by the State over individuals within its own territory. On the facts of Loizidou, 
the ECHR held that acts committed against individuals within a part of northern Cyprus 
subject to Turkish control were capable of falling within Turkish jurisdiction12 • The ECHR 
dismissed the respondent government's assertion that the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus was the sovereign State in Northern Cyprus, and that the exercise of pul:iic 
authority was not imputable to Turkey13 . In the merits phase of the case14, the ECHR held 
that the interference with the applicant's access to her property in northern Cyprus was 'a 
9 Paragraph 91. 
1
° For example, Chahal v United Kingdom, Application Number 22414/93 Admissibility Decision of 1 
September 1994 and Reports-1996-V, and D v United Kingdom, Application Number 30240/96, Reports 
1997-III. 
11 (1995) Series A, no 310, paragraph 62. 
12 Paragraph 64. 
13 Paragraph 58. 
14 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) Reports 1996-VI. 
82 
Individual State responsibility 
matter which falls within Turkey's 'jurisdiction' within the meaning of Article 1 and is thus 
imputable to Turkey' 15 . 
The ECHR in Loizidou relied upon its previous decision in Drozd and Janousek v France 
and Spain 16, a case concerning Andorra, which did not form part of either Spain or France 
despite the influence of those countries in the administration of the territory17• The 
international arrangements were such that neither France nor Spain had individual 
jurisdiction to act on behalf of the Principality in relation to the international relations of 
the Principality18 • Hence, the European Convention did not apply to the Principality. 
However, the ECHR recognised that19: 
The term "jurisdiction" is not limited to the national territory of the High 
Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of acts of their 
authorities producing effects outside their own territory. 
The applicant asserted that the respondent governments had responsibility for the 
administration of justice in Andorra by virtue of French and Spanish judges sitting as 
members of Andorran courts. The ECHR concluded that these judges did not sit in the 
capacity of French or Spanish judges and the Andorran courts exercised their functions 
independently of the French and Spanish govemments20. The ECHR in Lozidou clarified 
that the State would be responsible for the extra-territorial actions of State agents only 
where they were comparable to a situation of effective control. 
Issues of extra-territorial jurisdiction have been raised in subsequent applications to the 
ECHR yet have not altered the test as set out in Lozidou. The ECHR left the issue of 
jurisdiction to the merits stage of the proceedings in the decisions of Jssa21 and Ilascu22 , as 
15 Paragraph 57. 
16 (1992) Series A, no 240. 
17 This 'control' included the legislative and executive powers of the Co-Princes, one the President of the 
French Republic and the other the Bishop of Urge! in the Spanish province of Lleida. 
18 Paragraphs 88-90. 
19 Paragraph 91. 
20 Paragraph 96. 
21 Is sa and Others v Turkey Application Number 31821/96 Admissibility Decision of 30 May 2000. 
22 Ilascu and Others v Moldova and the Russian Federation Application no 48787/99 Admissibility Decision 
of 4 July 2001. 
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the issue was too closely linked to the merits of the individual cases. In Issa, the applicants 
claimed that there was a violation of the European Convention by Turkish military forces 
operating in northern Iraq. The respondent government disputed the facts, and if the ECHR 
finds that there was a case to answer on the facts, Turkey will have to decide whether to 
raise an objection based on whether or not the applicant was within its jurisdiction. 
Similarly, in Ilascu, the applicants asserted that the actions of Russian Federation troops 
stationed in the Republic of Moldova in supporting a separatist movement engaged the 
responsibility of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation denied all involvement in 
the acts complained about and the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction was not considered 
at the admissibility stage. 
Xhavara and others v Italy and Albanic?J concerned the deliberate striking of an Albanian 
vessel by an Italian naval vessel in international waters off the coast of Italy. However, the 
issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction was not raised as the written agreement between the 
two States implied that jurisdiction on vessels was shared. In Ocalan24, the applicant was 
arrested in Kenya and removed by Turkish officials to Turkey, where he was detained and 
tried. The Turkish government denied the facts supporting the applicant's claim and did 
not raise an objection based on jurisdiction. However, the case of abduction of a State's 
own national may be distinguished from the exercise of control over non-nationals, as the 
State's legal authority arises by virtue of the applicant's nationality. 
The ECHR has found that participation by a State in the defence of proceedings against it in 
another State is not without more an exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction25 . The ECHR 
stated that 'the fact that the United Kingdom Government raised the defence of sovereign 
immunity before the Irish courts, where the applicant had decided to sue, does not suffice to 
bring him within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom within the meaning of Article 1 of 
the Convention'26. The applicant's complaint under Article 6 against the United Kingdom 
23 Application no 39473/98 Decision of 11 January 2001. 
24 Ocalan v Turkey, Application no 46221/99, Admissibility Decision of 14 December 2000. 
25 McElhinney v Ireland and the United Kingdom Application No 31253/96, Admissibility Decision of 9 
February 2000. 
26 Paragraph 2(b). 
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was considered incompatible with the European Convention and declared inadmissible27• 
The ECHR has recently reconsidered the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus and the 
findings in Loizidou28. The Turkish Government objected to the admissibility of the claim 
and invited the ECHR to reconsider its decision in Loizidou. However, the ECHR 
confirmed the principle of exceptional extra-territorial jurisdiction as set out inLoizidou29 . 
The ECHR has subsequently confirmed that the 'overall control' exercised by Turkey over 
the border zone in Cyprus was such that the arrest and alleged ill-treatment of an applicant 
in the border area were imputable to Turkel0• 
The ECHR recently considered the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction in the context of 
military action undertaken by an international organisation in its admissibility decision in 
Bankovic31 • The facts of Bankovic arose during the NATO air strikes against the FRY, 
commenced on 24 March 1999. On 23 April, NATO launched an attack targeting the main 
television and radio facilities of Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS), which killed 16 and 
seriously injured another 16 RTS employees. One of the survivors of the attack, together 
with relatives of four of the deceased, commenced proceedings against all NATO member 
States that were also parties to the European Convention. The applicants alleged that the 
NATO bombing of the R TS facilities was a violation of Articles 2 (the right to life) and 10 
(freedom of expression) and that there was no effective remedy as required by Article 13. 
The respondents disputed the admissibility of the claim, their primary objection that the 
victims were not 'within the jurisdiction' of the respondent States within the meaning of 
Article 1 and that the application was incompatible with the provisions of the European 
27 Paragraph 2(b). The complaint alleging a violation against the Irish Government was declared admissible. 
28 Cyprus v Turkey Application No 25781194, Judgment I 0 May 2001. 
29 Above, paragraphs 7 5-7. 
30 Andreou Papi v Turkey Application No 16094/90, Admissibility Decision of 26 September 2002. The 
ECHR relied upon its previous decisions in Chrysostomos v Turkey and Loizidou. It is interesting that the 
ECHR did not refer to its decision in Bankovic, as the notion of overall control of the border area relied upon 
in Andreou is similar to the concept of overall control of the air space argued by the applicant in Bankovic 
(see below). 
31 Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States Application No 52207/99 Admissibility 
Decision of 12 December 2001. 
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Convention32. The respondent States contended that the term jurisdiction had an ordinary 
and well-established meaning in public international law, the assertion or exercise of legal 
authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form of allegiance to that State or 
who is or has been brought within that State's territory. The respondent States did not 
exercise such legal authority in relation to the applicants. The respondents also arg.ted that 
the actions of NATO, and international organisation, could not be imputed to its member 
States, even if the European Convention applied. 
The applicants advanced a notion of jurisdiction that was an adaptation of the 'effective 
control' test established in Loizidou. According to the applicant's notion of jurisdiction, the 
extent of a State's positive obligation under Article 1 of the European Convention to secure 
European Convention rights is proportionate to the level of control in fact exercised. This 
submission was based on the latest Cyprus v Turkei3 decision, where it was held that the 
Turkish forces 'having effective overall control over northern Cyprus ... Turkey's 
jurisdiction must be considered to extend to securing the entire range of substantive rights 
set out in the Convention'34 . However, where the respondent State has a lesser degree of 
control, the State is only required to secure the convention rights within their control in the 
situation in question. In the alternative, the applicants argued that NATO's control over 
FRY airspace was nearly as complete as Turkey's control over the territory of Northern 
Cyprus. This control, although limited, gave rise to a similarly limited positive obligation 
to secure European Convention rights. As an additional argument, the applicants also 
relied on the principle in Soering, arguing that the impugned act was the extra-territorial 
effect of prior decisions taken on the territory of the respondent State or States to launch the 
air strike and the selection of the target. 
In its decision, the ECHR restated the principle in Lozidou, accepting that acts of States 
performed or having effect outside their territory can, in exceptional circumstances, lead to 
that State exercising jurisdiction. However, such exceptional circumstances arise only 
32 Observations of the United Kingdom Regarding the Admissibility of the Application, paragraphs 19-21 
(these observations were unanimously adopted by the remaining respondent States). 
33 Note 28. 
34 Paragraph 77 (emphasis added). 
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where the State has effective control of the territory and thus can exercise public powers 
normally exercised by a governrnent35 . The actions complained of in Bankovic did not 
constitute such exceptional circumstances and the ECHR declared the complaint 
inadmissible36. In particular, the ECHR rejected the notion of proportionate obligation 
advanced by the applicant. This submission was37: 
tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a 
Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its 
consequences felt, is therefore brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the 
purpose of Article I of the Convention. 
In the ECHR's opinion, the text of Article 1 did not support such an approach. Further, the 
submission equates jurisdiction with the question of whether an individual is a victim of an 
act imputable to a contracting State. In fact, these are two separate questions38• The ECHR 
rejected the applicant's argument as to air space for the same reasons39 and agreed with the 
respondent governments that the decision in Soering was not relevant 'given the 
fundamental differences between that case and the present'40 • 
The ECHR considered that State practice in the application of the European Convention 
also supported this interpretation of Article 1. States have not recognised, and have 
consistently denied, that military actions incur extra-territorial responsibility. Despite 
numerous military missions, no State has indicated its belief tl1at its acts abroad affected 
persons within its jurisdiction, so making a derogation notice under Article 15. States have 
only filed Article 15 notices regarding measures derogating from European Convention 
obligations in relation to internal situations, and not in relation to activities of their troops 
or agents participating in activities outside the territory of the State. In fact, the ECHR has 
stated that the European Convention should be read as a whole and that Article 15 itself 
should be read subject to the jurisdictional limit in Article 1. The applicants had argued 
35 Paragraph 70. 
36 Paragraph 85. 
37 Paragraph 75. 
38 Paragraph 75. 
39 Paragraph 76. 
40 Paragraph 77. 
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that Article 15(2) of the European Convention41 would be rendered meaningless if the 
Convention did not apply to extra-territorial wars or emergencies42 . This may have 
implications for States contemplating filing notices of derogation in relation to their troops 
serving in peacekeeping missions43 • 
Finally, the ECHR held that the primarily territorial notion of jurisdiction is confirmed by 
an examination of the travaux preparatoires of the European Convention44• The drafters 
had replaced the original reference to 'all persons residing within their territories' with the 
current reference to 'persons within their jurisdiction'. This amendment addressed the 
concern that the term 'residing' was too restrictive. The European Convention was 
intended to apply to all 'individuals, who on the territory of any one of our States, may 
have had reason to complain that [their] rights have been violated.45• The European 
Convention was not intended to extend the protection of the European Convention to 
individuals anywhere in the world who are affected by the actions of the contracting 
parties. 
This interpretation IS consistent with the inclusion of Article 56 of the European 
Convention. Generally, treaties are silent as to their territorial scope. Article 29 of the 
VCL T states that unless a contrary intention appears in the treaty or can be otherwise 
established, a treaty is binding on a party in respect of its entire territory, thus reflecting the 
customary law principle that jurisdiction is primarily territorial. Article 56 of the European 
Convention provides that a State may extend the protection of the European Convention to 
all or any of the territories for whose international relations the State is responsible, 
41 Article 15(2) provides that no derogation may be made from Article 2 is permitted even in times of war or 
public emergency, other than in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war. 
42 This issue had been raised in Romero de Ibanez & Rojas v United Kingdom, which concerned the sinking of 
the General Belgrano by the United Kingdom during the Falklands War. However, the application was held 
inadmissible on the basis that it had not been filed within the six-month period: Application Number 
58692/00, Admissibility Decision of 19 July 2001. See 'UK sued over Belgrano sinking', BBC News, 29 
June 2000. 
43 See Chapter 6. 
44 The ECHR may consider the preparatory works to confirm the interpretation resulting from the application 
of Article 31 or when the interpretation resulting from the application of Article 31 leaves the meaning of 
ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable: Article 32 VCL T 
45 Comment by the representative to Belgium, on 25 August 1950, quoted at paragraph 20 of the Bankovic 
decision. 
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although the European Convention is to apply 'with due regard ... to local requirements'. 
This article confirms that the European Convention was never intended to apply 
automatically to territories beyond the immediate territory of the Contracting Parties. 
Instead, the European Convention would only apply to colonies following such election, 
and presumably only where it was feasible that the Convention rights could be protected by 
that State46 • However, the ECHR has clearly indicated that it, and not the individual state, 
remains the final determiner of State jurisdiction and, in making its determination, the 
ECHR will adopt an international, and not a national, view47 . 
The applicants in Bankovic had maintained that a refusal by the ECHR to accept that the 
applicants fell within the jurisdiction of the European Convention would defeat the ordre 
public of the European Convention as a system for the protection of human rights and 
would leave a vacuum in the system of human rights protection48 . The ECHR held that the 
European Convention was a 'constitutional instrument of European public order for the 
protection of individual human beings and its role, as set out in Article 19 of the European 
Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting 
Parties'49 . The European Convention is intended to operate in 'an essentially regional 
context' and the desirability of avoiding a gap in human rights protection has only been 
relied upon to establish jurisdiction 'when the territory in question was one that, but for the 
specific circumstances, would normally be covered by the Convention'50 . Thus, the ECHR 
had previously found that the inhabitants of northern Cyprus had been excluded from the 
rights and protections that they had previously enjoyed by virtue of Turkey's effective 
control of the territory51 . This concern was irrelevant in the present situation, as the FRY 
was not, and had never been, a party to the European Convention. 
46 For elaboration of this argument see Lush, 'The Territorial Application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Recent Case Law' (1993) 42 ICLQ 897. 
47 For example, in Amuur v France, the Court held that individuals detained by the French Government within 
Paris-Orly airport were within French territory, despite the area being designated an international zone by 
French law: Reports 1996-III. 
48 Paragraph 79. 
49 Paragraph 80, emphasis in original. 
50 Paragraph 80. 
51 Cyprus v Turkey note 32. 
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The UNHRC has had fewer occasions to consider the extra-territorial application of the 
ICCPR, although its decisions relating to the interpretation of State responsibility under the 
ICCPR are authoritative. In Delia Saldias de Lopez v Urugua)f2, the UNHRC found that 
the respondent government violated its obligations under the ICCPR when its security 
forces abducted and tortured a Uruguayan citizen then living in Argentina. The UNHRC 
reasoned that 'it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 
of the Covenant so as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the 
territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.s3. 
However, this decision relates to violations by a State of the ICCPR rights of its own 
national, even though such violations occurred partly on the territory of another State. It is 
not general authority for the proposition that the ICCPR has extra-territorial applicatiorf4. 
The most vehement supporter of extra-territorial application for the ICCPR is Meron, who 
argued that Article 2(1) of the ICCPR has an extra-territorial effects. The pertinent 
provisions of the ICCPR will apply to the treatment of persons under the authority and 
power of State forces outside the national territory of that State. Referring to the leading 
study of the legislative history of the ICCPR56, Meron concluded that Article 2(1) should be 
read so that each State party would have assumed the obligations to secure ICCPR rights 
both to individuals within its territory and those subject to its jurisdictions7• 
The UNHRC has consistently held that the ICCPR can have such extra-territorial 
application58 . The UNHRC expressed concern for the failure of Iraq to address the events 
in occupied Kuwait in its report to the UNHRC, emphasising 'Iraq's clear responsibility 
52 Communication No 5211979 (29 July 1981 ), UN Doe CCPR/C/OP/1. 
53 Paragraph 88. 
54 Compare the view taken by Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict 
Kosovo' (2001) 12 EJ/L 469 at 475-6. 
55 See Meron, 'Extra-territoriality of Human Rights Treaties' (1995) 89 AJIL 78. 
56 This was conducted by Professor Buergenthal, 'To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and 
Permissible Derogations' in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 72 
(Louis Hen kin ed 1981 ). 
57 Meron, note 54 at 79. 
58 General Comment on Article 27, UN Doe CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.5, paragraph 4 (1994). See also General 
Comment on Article 41, UN Doe CCPR/C/21/Rev.I!Add.6 at 4, paragraph 12 (1994), where the UNHRC 
commented that 'the intention of the Covenant is that the rights contained therein should be ensured to all 
those under a State's jurisdiction'. 
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under international law for the observance of human rights during its occupation of that 
country' 59 • The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Kuwait under 
Iraqi occupation relied on UNHRC practice to assert that Iraq was responsible for 
complying with its obligations under the ICCPR, regardless of the nationality of the victims 
or whether the victims' State was a party to the ICCPR. He stated that a 'State party 
remains bound by the Covenant if it occupies the territory of another State and exercises 
there de facto State power'60 • 
Extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 2(1) is not limited to the actions of a State's 
armed forces, but extends to civilian agents and officials exercising power. Meron argued 
that61 : 
Where agents of the state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and 
authority (jurisdiction or de facto jurisdiction) over persons outside national 
territory, the presumption should be that the state's obligation to respect the 
pertinent human rights continues. That presumption could be rebutted only when 
the nature and the content of a particular right or treaty language suggest 
otherwise. 
In Haiti, the United States forces exercised 'effective power'; therefore Meron concluded 
that the United States must respect its obligations under the ICCPR. 
As stated above, the case law of the UNHRC differs from that of the ECHR in that, as a 
general proposition, the UNHRC is more willing to fmd that a State is responsible under 
the ICCPR for the extra-territorial acts of its officials. However, it is submitted that the 
appropriate test for the ICCPR is the same as that provided by the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR. A State should only be responsible under the ICCPR where such power amounts to 
effective control. Even if Article 2( 1) is interpreted as requiring States to secure rights to 
people both within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, the ordinary and 
59 Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN GAOR, 46th Session, Supp No 40, paragraph 652, UN Doe 
A/46/40 ( 1991 ). 
60 Waiter Kiilin, Report on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation, UN Doe 
E/CN .411992/26, paragraphs 58-59. 
61 Paragraph 81. 
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established meaning of jurisdiction in international law is territorial. Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction is on an exceptional basis only. A State's responsibility will be engaged in 
relation to extra-territorial acts only where the State exercises effective control over persons 
outside its national territory. Unlike the European Convention, the ICCPR is not 
geographically limited, and is intended to have a wider application as a universal human 
rights instrument. Despite this, it is still necessary to consider State practice to consider 
whether States have intended to accept such obligations. As with the European 
Convention, States have not filed notices of derogation for the acts of their armed forces 
participating in operations outside the territory of the State, suggesting that States have not 
accepted such an obligation. For example, while the United Kingdom Government has 
indicated that its international personnel participating in KFOR 'will have regard to 
international human rights standards', it considers that Resolution 1244 determines 
KFOR's mandate and obligations, along with the MTA, decisions of the North Atlantic 
Council and national regulations62 . 
The Inter-Arnerican Commission on Human Rights has also considered the question the 
extra-territorial jurisdiction of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
In Coard et al v United States63 , the Commission was asked to examine allegations that 
United States forces in Grenada had violated international human rights norms in violation 
of the United States' obligations under the American Declaration. The Commission found 
that the phrase 'subject to its jurisdiction' 'may, under given circumstances, refer to 
conduct with an extra-territorial locus where the person concerned is present in the territory 
of one State, but subject to the control of another State, usually through the acts of the 
latter's agents abroad'64 • The test is 'not the victim's nationality or presence within a 
particular geographic area, but [on] whether, under the specific circumstances, the State 
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.65. 
62 See response to Parliamentary Questions by Lord Lester [HL4602 and HL4603], 22 July 2002. 
63 Case I 0.951, Report No I 09/99, 29 September 1999 
64 Paragraph 37. 
65 Paragraph 37. 
92 
Individual State responsibility 
The Commission determined that the United States forces were bound by human rights 
law66 during their activities in Grenada, and were within the jurisdiction of the United 
States for the purpose of the Declaration. The American Declaration lacks a comparable 
jurisdiction clause to either the ICCPR or the European Convention, and this decision is not 
determinative in relation to the jurisdiction of those convention systems. In any event, it is 
again submitted that the appropriate test is that the 'authority and control' exercised must 
be equivalent to the 'effective control' required by the ECHR. On this basis, the United 
States would be required to secure minimum human rights standards to the detainees held 
in its naval bases and detention centres in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba67 . 
B. Imputing responsibility to individual States 
States have transferred certain powers in the area of peace and security to an international 
organisation, the UN and it is the UN, not individual States, which is accountable for 
violations of human rights obligations. Finding jurisdiction for actions against individual 
States in such circumstances would require the 'lifting of the organisational veil.68 and 
acceptance of the principle that States may be held individually responsible for the actions 
of international organisations to which they have delegated powers. While the Charter does 
not expressly preclude concurrent or secondary liability of member States, this is not 
conclusive that such liability exists69• 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR and the former Commission provides some support for the 
view that individual States may be held liable for breaches of convention rights by 
international organisations. In Hess v United Kingdom70 , the Commission held that the 
administration of the Spandau prison was outside the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom as 
the administration of the prison was at all times under the joint authority of the four powers, 
66 The Commission also considered that the forces were simultaneously bound by international humanitarian 
law. 
67 See Amnesty International Press Release, USA: the legal limbo of the Guantimamo detainees continues, 10 
January 2003. 
68 See Mole, 'Who Guards the Guards- The Rule of Law in Kosovo' (2001) 3 EHRLR 280-299, especially 
287. 
69 See, in the commercial context, Amerasinghe, 'Liability to Third Parties of Member States ofTnternational 
Organisations: Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent' (1991) 85 AJIL 259 
70 Application No 6231/73 2 D&R 72 
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and could not be divided into separate jurisdictions 71 • However, the Commission did 
suggest that a State 'is under certain circumstances responsible under the Convention for 
the actions of its authorities outside its territory'72 . Individual State responsibility may also 
have been engaged if the international agreement had been entered into after the European 
Convention came into force for that State 73 • 
The Commission has rejected jurisdiction in respect of a complaint made against the 
European Community, as the EC is not a party to the European Convention74 . The 
Commission also refused to recognise jurisdiction for a complaint against the member 
States of the EC acting jointly or against individual member States. Arguably, the decision 
was reached on the ground that the action complained of was an act of an organ of the EC 
relating to another organ of the EC. It was not an act of States jointly or individually. In M 
v German/5, the Commission indicated that the transfer of powers to an international 
organisation does not necessarily exclude a State's responsibility under the European 
Convention and will be compatible with the European Convention provided within that 
organisation fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection. 
Three recent ECHR decisions have raised similar issues. In TI. v United Kingdom 76, the 
ECHR held that States could not avoid their responsibility under the European Convention 
by entering into an international treaty in relation to the field of activity protected by the 
European Convention. Similarly, the ECHR has hel<:f7 that 'where states establish 
international organisations in order to pursue or strengthen their co-operation in certain 
fields of activities', it would be 'incompatible with the purpose and object of the 
Convention' if States were absolved from their responsibility under the Convention for the 
field of activity in question. Further, the European Convention does not preclude the 
transfer of competences to an international organisation, provided the European Convention 
71 Paragraph 73. 
72 Paragraph 72. 
73 Paragraph 73. 
74 CFDT v the European Communities 13 DR 231 
75 13258/87 64 DR 138 
76 Application No 43844/98, Reports 2000-III. 
77 Waite and Kennedy v Germany and Beer and Regan v Germany Case No 28934/95, Judgment of 18 
February 1999, Reports 1999-l. 
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rights continue to be secured and that member States' responsibilities continue after the 
transfer 78 . 
In Loizidou, the Turkish Government objected to the application on the ground that the acts 
and omissions complained of where imputable to the TRNC, a separate and independent 
administration. However, the ECHR did not fmd it necessary to determine whether Turkey 
actually exercises control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the TRNC as it 
was obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus 
that Turkey exercised overall effective controt19• The Turkish Government raised the same 
objections in the Cyprus v Turkey case. In the latter decision, the applicant submitted 
that80: 
A Contracting State to the Convention could not, by way of delegation of powers 
to a subordinate and unlawful administration, avoid its responsibility for breaches 
of the Convention, indeed of international law in general. To hold otherwise 
would, in the present context of northern Cyprus, give rise to a grave lacuna in the 
system of human rights protection and, indeed, render the Convention system there 
inoperative. 
The ECHR held that, g1ven the effective control of the territory, the government's 
responsibility was not confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials, 'but must also be 
engaged by virtue of the local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish military 
and other support' 81 • In Bankovic, the respondent governments objected to the imputation 
of the actions of NATO to the individual member States. As the ECHR had already held 
the application inadmissible on other grounds, it did not consider the objections raised on 
this basis82 . 
The UNHRC has held that it may only consider complaints that arise from claims under the 
jurisdiction of a State party, and not from an international organisation. It held a complaint 
78 Matthews v United Kingdom, Application No 24833/94, Reports 1999-1. 
79 Merits decision, note 14, paragraph 56. 
80 Paragraph 71. 
81 Paragraph 77. 
82 Bankovic, paragraph 82. 
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against the Netherlands regarding the recruitment practices of the European Patent Office 
(JEJPO) to be inadmissible83 . The complainant argued that the EPO exercised public 
authority in the Netherlands as the State was a party to both the ICCPR and the European 
Patent Convention, and the government was obliged to ensure that the EPO's recruitment 
policies met the standards set out in the ICCPR. The UNHRC stated that the claim related 
to 'recruitment policies of an international organization, which cannot, in any way, be 
construed as coming within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands'84• This suggests that the 
UNHRC would not entertain a complaint against an individual member State arising from 
the civilian activities of UNMIK. However, the UNHRC has expressed concern regarding 
the behaviour of Belgian soldiers operating under the auspices of UNSOM II. In that 
instance, Belgium recognised the application of the ICCPR to the actions of its forces 
serving as part of the peacekeeping mission and commenced investigations into the 
allegations85 . 
Even if extra-territorial acts could be imputed to individual member States severally, it is 
probable that any attempt to bring a complaint against an individual State would be subject 
to the Monetary Gold principle developed by the ICJ86. Applying this principle, the ECHR 
could not decide the merits of the application as to do so may determine the rights and 
obligations of States that are members of the international organisation but are not 
contracting parties to the European Convention or parties to the application in question. 
This argument was raised by the respondent governments in Bankovic, but was not 
considered by the ECHR87 • While this may not prove to be a convincing argument for the 
ECHR in relation to the European Convention, it is likely to preclude consideration of 
matters by the UNHRC, as the Charter has a wider membership than the European 
Convention. 
83 H. v.d.P v Tire Netherlands 
84 Paragraph 3 .2. 
85 UN doe ICCPRJC/79/Add 99 
86 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, ( 1954) ICJ Reports at 19 as applied in East Timor (1995) ICJ 
Reports at 90. 
87 Bankovic, paragraph 84. 
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C. Application fo Kosovo 
The above analysis suggests that a State may be responsible under its own human rights 
obligations in respect of its treatment of persons outside its national territory where such 
individuals are under the effective control of that State, either through its armed forces or 
through a subordinate local administration. The legality of the State's presence or the 
consent of the State in whose territory the violation occurs is irrelevant. Therefore, the 
lawfulness of the mission's presence in Kosovo pursuant to Resolution 1244, or with the 
consent of the FRY, is irrelevant in considering the responsibility of member States88 • In 
determining whether member States are responsible for actions of the international 
administration in Kosovo, two key issues arise. First, does the level of control exercised by 
the international administration satisfy the 'effective control' test? Second, are the actions 
of UNMIK and/or KFOR as part of the international administration imputable to individual 
member States? 
Examining the first 1ssue, KFOR, as the security presence, and UNMIK, as the civil 
administration presence, together exercise overall effective control in Kosovo. The 
international administration is the only legitimate authority in Kosovo89• The level of 
control exercised by KFOR and UNMIK together satisfies the test of effective control. 
Even considering KFOR and UNMIK separately, the effective control test is satisfied. 
While KFOR is not charged with civil administration functions, it is responsible for law 
and order, requiring it to provide security and some policing functions. KFOR therefore 
exercises public authority in Kosovo. UNMIK is mandated to provide basic civil 
administration functions, including administering the judicial system, policing functions, 
and legislative and executive functions. It exercises public authority and performs those 
functions normally exercised by the State. 
The varying nature of the functions allocated to each KFOR contingent is relevant in this 
context. Resolution 1244 limits KFOR's mandate to that of a security force. The 
responsibilities of the different KFOR contingents vary according to the region in which 
88 See Cerone, note 54 at 478. 
89 SG Report 1217/99 paragraph 35. 
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they are deployed and the attitude of their sending State toward peacekeeping obligations. 
In some regions KFOR acts as a civilian police force, runs prisons, detains suspects and 
conducts criminal investigations. In other areas, KFOR functions only as a support to 
UNMIK police. Relying on the ECHR's decision inlssa, Cerone argues that the different 
responsibilities of the various KFOR contingents do not preclude direct State 
responsibility90. The effective control test does not require overall control of the entire 
territory of Kosovo. Instead, it is enough if the State forces exercise control vis-a-vis the 
individual alleging a violation of his or her rights or effective control in at least a defined 
area. Cerone also argues that the State's level of obligation should be tied to the degree of 
actual control exercised by that State over individuals91 • However, this notion of 
proportionate obligations was expressly rejected by the ECHR in Bankovic, although that 
decision may have been due to the extreme circumstances alleged to constitute control (that 
there was control of the air space through which the missiles travelled), rather than 
rejection of the notion itself. 
It is arguable that the test in Loizidou would be satisfied where a KFOR contingent 
exercised effective control in relation to an area, such as a particular district or a KFOR run 
prison. For example, from mid-2000 KFOR developed a practice of detaining persons 
based on its mandate under Resolution 1244 to ensure public safety and order. KFOR 
detention orders operate outside the domestic judicial system. As part of this practice, 
individuals were detained at Camp Bondsteel, the US KFOR base92 • OMIK considered that 
this practice violated Article 5 of the European Convention93 . The different activities do 
not preclude responsibility; it just requires a consideration of whether the tasks conducted 
by various contingents in that area satisfy the test of effective control. 
The difficulty lies in imputing the actions of UNMIK and KFOR to the individual member 
States and to show that the State itself exercises 'effective control'. Applying the principles 
outlined above to UNMIK, only certain member States are both parties to the European 
9
° Cerone, note 54 at 479 
91 As above, at 480 
92 Other KFOR contingents take detainees to Camp Bondsteel and hand them over to US KFOR. 
93 OMIK Report 7/00 at 25. 
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Convention and to the Charter. For those States, obligations under the Charter predate their 
obligations under the European Convention, as membership of the United Nations occurred 
prior to the ratification of the European Convention. Accordingly, the transfer of powers to 
the United Nations was not subject to the requirement that European Convention rights be 
protected. Further, Article 103 of the Charte"r suggests that a State's obligations under the 
Charter prevail over later treaty obligations, such as the European Convention. 
Direct State responsibility for acts of UNMIK is problematic. While the extent of control 
exercised by UNMIK itself would be sufficient to invoke extra-territorial responsibility, 
such control cannot be imputed to individual member States. UNMIK is a subsidiary organ 
of the Security Council. Civilian personnel are employees, or representatives, of the UN, 
not of individual national governments. The acts of UNMIK are the acts of the UN, and 
not of its individual member States. In this sense, international personnel are analogous to 
the French and Spanish judges in the Drozd case, and act independently of their national 
governments. It is unlikely that member States of the UN would be individually 
responsible for acts of UNMIK and its personnel. 
Establishing responsibility for States participating in KFOR is more feasible. Participating 
States argue that each national contingent is an integral part of KFOR and that the 
contingent does not represent or act on behalf of its sending State. Units report to a 
common KFOR commander. However, the KFOR commander has limited control over the 
national contingents, with national governments retaining significant operational control. 
All contingents have adopted their own rules of engagement and orders given by KFOR 
command are referred to the defence departments of national governments for approval94 . 
As discussed in Chapter 4, troops remain subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their 
sending States. For political and operational reasons, participating States retain significant 
control of troops within national contingents and it may be possible to 'lift the 
organisational veil' in these circumstances. The main consequence of maintaining such 
94 See O'Neill, Kosovo: An unfinished peace (200 I) at 43-4. 
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operational control is that the States must be responsible for the actions of their troops that 
violate IHRL95 • 
States that retain significant authority over civilian police units may also be responsible for 
their actions in violation of international human rights standards based on these arguments. 
Similarly, actions by staff of the OSCE may engage State responsibility as staff are 
seconded to the organisation by member States, and are not 'employees' of the international 
organisation. The decision in Bankovic has left this possibility open. 
95 For a discussion of whether such responsibility would be direct, concurrent or secondary and joint or 
several, see: Stein, 'Kosovo and the International Community. The Attribution of Possible Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: The Responsibility of NATO or of its Member States?' in Kosovo and the International 
Community (Tomuschat ed) (2002). 
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A. Derogation 
Ultimately, success in post-conflict situations is related to a society's ability to make the 
transition from a state of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil order, the 
re-emergence of civil society, and the establishment of participatory political institutions'1• 
The most important objective of post-conflict governance is to prevent the re-emergence of 
the conflict. Expectations of what UNMIK and KFOR can achieve in the application of 
IHRL must be based on a realistic appraisal of the difficulties of operating within post-
conflict societies2• The Convention and the ICCPR contain provisions that allow the 
suspension of certain human rights obligations in the extraordinary circumstances of war or 
public emergencl. The conditions facing the international administration upon arrival in 
Kosovo4 were similar to situations in which a State could declare a state of public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation5. The Security Council, UNMIK, KFOR and 
participating States should have 'expected, articulated and accepted that there would be 
some derogation of human rights standards'6. 
Derogating States are required to inform the Secretary-General of the relevant body of the 
existence of the emergency and the nature of the derogating measures adopted. As with 
IHRL itself, such notice requirements are not directly applicable to the UN as it is not a 
party to the relevant instruments. UNMIK and KFOR could not file a formal derogation 
1 Hampson, 'Can Peacebuilding Work?' (1997) 30 Cornell Int'l L/701 at 716. See also Bratt, 'Assessing the 
Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations' in The United Nations, Peace and Force, edited Michael Pugh, 
London 1997. 
2 Kelly, 'The UN, Security and Human Rights: Achieving the Winning Balance' in The United Nations, 
Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003). 
3 Article 15, European Convention and Article 9, ICCPR. 
4 For example, the absence of law and order mechanisms, the total collapse of State institutions, and the 
security situation, including reverse-ethnic cleansing: See SG Report 12/7/1999. 
5 The ECHR has stated that this term refers to 'an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects 
the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is 
composed': Lawless v Ireland Series A No 3 (1961) (Lawless}, paragraph 28. The threat of terrorist activities 
and low-level violence can amount to a public emergency: Askoy v Turkey, Reports 1996-IV; Sakik and 
Others v Turkey Reports 1998-YIT; and Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, Series A No 258-B 
(1993) (Brannigan). Compare: Greece v United Kingdom No 176156,2 YB 176 (1958) Corn Rep. 
6 Kelly, note 2 at 25. 
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notice. However, the notice requirement does apply to member States in relation to 
responsibility of their troops for violation of IHRL while serving with KFOR. It is unlikely 
that States would have filed individual notices; as to do so is tacit acknowledgement of the 
extra-territorial application of their international human rights obligations7. In any event, 
the ECHR may permit a State to rely on conditions that would support derogation under 
Article 15 even where a derogation notice has not been filed8. 
Both the ICCPR and the Convention provide that derogation IS not permitted from 
fundamental rights9• Measures derogating from other rights must be strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation: they must be necessary to meet the emergency and existing 
mechanisms must be inadequate10• In addition, the measures adopted must be proportionate 
to the emergency''. In assessing whether the derogating measures are strictly required, the 
ECHR will allow the State a margin of appreciation12 . The ECHR accepts that the 'national 
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on 
the presence of such emergency and the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avoid 
it' 13 • This has resulted in a limittrl review of derogation measures by the ECHR; provided 
the State is not shown to have exceeded its margin of appreciation, the derogating measures 
7 See Chapter 5. 
8 Brogan and Others v United Kingdom, (1998) Series A, no 145-B (Brogan) paragraph 48. 
9 These include: the right to life, other than in respect of deaths arising from lawful acts of war, prohibition on 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, prohibition against slavery and prohibition against retrospective 
criminal offences and punishments. The ICCPR also prohibits derogations from the prohibition against 
imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation, the right to recognition before the law and the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
10 Lawless, paragraph 36; Ireland v United Kingdom Series A No 25 (1978) paragraph 212; and Brannigan 
paragraphs 56-59. 
11 Lawless paragraph 36; Ireland v United Kingdom paragraph 212; and Brannigan paragraphs 61-65. 
12 Ireland v United Kingdom paragraphs 207 and 214; Brannigan paragraph 57. 
13 Ireland v United Kingdom, paragraph 207. 
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will satisfy Article 15(2)14 • The UNHRC and the Inter-American Court and Commission 
have adopted a more proactive stance 15. 
At least in the context of executive detention orders, UNMIK did publicly acknowledge 
that 'Kosovo falls within this category of a public emergency given the security situation 
and the need for an international military force to maintain peace and order' 16• UNMIK 
adopted a number of regulations that do not comply with IHRL, but which were justified by 
UNMIK by security concerns17• In addition, UNMIK adopted a policy of executive 
detention orders18 and KFOR a practice ofKFOR holds19, both of which operate outside the 
judicial system and in violation of 'normal' IHRL standards20• In response to criticism that 
extra-judicial detention does not comply with IHRL, UNMIK relied upon the extreme 
conditions in Kosovo, stating thaf 1: 
UNMIK's mandate was adopted under Chapter VII, which means that the situation 
calls for extraordinary means and force can be used to carry out the mandate. Any 
deprivation of liberty by an Executive Order is temporary and extraordinary, and 
its objective is the effective and impartial administration of justice. 
14 For further discussion refer to: Higgins 'Derogations under Human Rights Treaties' (1976-7) 48 BYblL 
281; Hartman, 'Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies' (1981) 22 HIU 1; Iyer, 
'States of Emergency - Moderating their Effects on Human Rights' (1999) 22 Dalhousie Law Journal 125; 
Macdonald, 'Derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights' (1997) 36 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 225; and Warbrick, 'The European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Prevention ofTerrorism' (1983) 32/CLQ 82. 
15 Consider: Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights) Inter-Am Ct HR Series A No 8 (1987) and General Comment No 29 States of Emergency 
(Article 4) UN Doe CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.ll. 
16 See UNMIK legal paper 'Security and the Rule of Law in Kosovo', 12 January 2000 page 5. 
17 For example, Regulation 1999/2 provides for the temporary detention or restriction of the freedom of 
movement of individuals who may pose a threat to public peace and order. Regulation 1999/26 also allows 
for continued detention without a mechanism allowing the detainee to challenge the lawfulness of an order for 
continued detention, in violation of article 5. See OMIK Report 6 Extension of Custody Time Limits and the 
Rights of Detainees: The Unlawfulness of Regulation 1999/26 of 29 April 2000 and also Ombudsperson 
Special Report 3 The Conformity of Deprivations of Liberty under 'Executive Orders ' with Recognised 
International Standards, paragraph 25. 
18 See OMIK Report 10/01 at 33. 
19 KFOR holds are justified by KFOR's general mandate for law and order under Resolution 1244. OMIK 
Report 1 0/01 at 3 7 quoting letter from KFOR Commander to OSCE Head of Mission dated 6 September 
2001. 
20 Ombudsperson Institute in Kosovo Special Report No 3 (note 17). See also Special Report No 4 On the 
Establishment of a Detention Review Commission for Extra-judicial Detentions Based on Executive Orders. 
21 UNMIK Press Briefing 2 July 2001, Statement on the Ombudsperson 's Report. 
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Given the difficulties in establishing an impartial and functioning judiciary and the margin 
of appreciation extended to States, these restrictions may have been warranted as 
emergency measures22 . Examining these measures within a derogation framework23 would 
have been more appropriate than expecting the international administration to operate 
within a full range of IHRL obligations. 
States of emergency are temporary in nature24• This does not necessarily mean that the 
state of emergency must be brief5. If the State can provide evidence that it reasonably 
believes that the threat continues to exist, even if some of the emergency measures have 
been modified, it will be difficult to establish that the measures are no longer strictly 
required26 . In Kosovo, the international administration has 'made quite notable progress in 
stabilising the [security] situation and starting to re-build peaceful societies. The most 
central achievement is the dramatic decrease in violence and the fact that despite lingering 
tensions and occasional outbreaks new full-scale conflict has thus far been avoided'27 . In 
his report of 13 March 2001, the Secretary-General stated that 'the emergency phase is 
largely over'28 . OMIK asserted that as soon as the judicial system was established, the state 
of emergency ceased. UNMIK and KFOR were then required to comply with a full range 
of Convention rights, particularly in relation to detention and fair trial procedures. 
However, in a post-conflict situation, it is common for periods of relative stability to be 
22 For a contrary view see Stahn, 'The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East Timor: 
A First Analysis' (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 105at 166-7. 
23 There have been several studies of minimum human rights standards in a state of emergency. See: 
Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments concerning situations known 
as State of Siege or Emergency (E/CN.4/Sub.2!1982115); Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Conflict: The 
International System for Protecting Human Rights during States of Emergency (1994); Chowdhury, Rule of 
Law in State of Emergency: The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights in a State of Emergency ( 1989); 
and Lillich, 'The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency' (1985) 79 AJIL 
1073. 
24 This derives from the requirement in Article 15 that the measures be strictly required. 
25 Oraa, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (1992) at 30. 
26 Brannigan, paragraphs 47 and 51; Ireland v United Kingdom paragraph 213; Marshal/ v United Kingdom, 
Application No. 41571198, Admissibility Decision of 10 July 200 I page 8 of electronic version. 
27 Korhonen, 'International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations' (2001) 14(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 495 at 497-8. 
28 SG Report 13/3/01, paragraph 62. 
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interrupted by sudden outbursts of violence and conflict, which can rapidly escalate and 
require decisive and immediate action by security forces. Strohmeyer comments that29 : 
The rapidly available capacity to maintain law and order is of pivotal importance 
in this context and an inability to react swiftly to crime and public unrest, coupled 
with the failure to detain and convict suspected criminals promptly and fairly, can 
quickly erode the public's confidence in a mission. 
The international administration faces several challenges including the security situation in 
both the divided city of Mitrovica, which continues to be 'a flashpoint for ethnically related 
violence '30, and the Presevo Valley 1. The initial law and order vacuum also permitted 
organised crime and terrorist groups to flourish within Kosovo, which 'have the capacity to 
destabilze political and economic institutions and affect inter-ethnic relations'32 and have 
required a strong response33 • Requiring the international administration to issue a fresh 
notice of derogation and to re-introduce emergency powers on each of these occasions 
would hinder the restoration of peace. One of the major criticisms of the international 
administration is that it did not adopt a strong stance, particularly in relation to crimes 
against minority groups and organised groups seeking to exploit the security and political 
vacuum34• This may have been avoided if a derogation framework had been adopted. 
There is a tension between the security aspects of Resolution 1244 and the long-term 
mandate of the mission, which emphasises the development of local institutions and peace-
building activities and requires considerable indigenous consultation and participation, 
together with decentralised and democratic administration. As the situation stabilises, 
29 Strohmeyer, 'Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of Transitional Justice 
Systems in Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 25 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal 107 at 120. 
30 SG Report 6/6/00 paragraph 23. From early 2000, Mitrovica has been the scene of outbreaks of violence 
between ethnic groups, which have required the intervention of UNMIK police and KFOR. For example, a 
humanitarian shuttle bus carrying Kosovo Serbs was attacked in February, leaving eight people dead and 20 
to 30 people seriously injured. See SG Report 3/3/00, paragraph 20-21, SG Report 15/1102, paragraph 23 and 
SG Report 1717/02, paragraph 44. 
31 This area borders FYROM and was the subject of tension during the recent conflict in Macedonia, with 
some 82,000 refugees crossed the border into Kosovo: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Interim Administration in Kosovo of 2 October 200 I, UN Doe S/200 I /926, paragraph 43 (SG Report 
2/10/01), paragraph 12. 
32 SG Report 1511/02, paragraph 26. 
33 The SRSG has promulgated three regulations relating to organised crime and authorised the establishment 
of specialised units within the Police and Justice Pillar. See SG Report 2110/01, paragraph 48 and SG Report 
1511/02, paragraph 26. 
34 See O'Neill, Kosovo: An unfinished peace (2001) at 46-8. 
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centralised power should gradually be devolved by the emergency regime to indigenous 
institutions, with appropriate protection for human rights35. The international 
administration has provided for this phased transition although there have been difficulties 
in implementing the phases in practice36• Regular review of the emergency measures is one 
of the most effective safeguards against abuse37, and the international administration should 
be required to continuously monitor the emergency and to justify the need for the measures 
adopted. One alternative is to create an ad hoc mechanism within the mission structure of 
each mission. 
B. Is the application of IHRL desirable? 
It is difficult to characterise the nature of the obligations of UNMIK and KFOR under 
IHRL pursuant to which legal responsibility is State-based. IHRL, both customary and 
treaty-based, regulates the relationship between the State and the individuals subject to the 
jurisdiction (including control) of that State. The State has both a negative obligation not to 
infringe the rights of persons within its jurisdiction and a positive obligation to ensure that 
State systems comply with IHRL and to provide a real and effective remedy where they do 
not38• Under traditional concepts of State responsibility, if a State violates or fails to meet 
an obligation arising from a treaty or a rule of customary international law it incurs 
responsibility, unless it can rely upon grounds precluding the wrongfulness of its conduct39 . 
IHRL is not concerned with the relationship between individuals and international 
organisations such as the UN. This reflects the traditional assumption that States and 
international organisations perform inherently different functions: States are regulated, 
while international organisations regulate or monitor the conduct of States40 . Preparing 
35 Beauvais, 'Benevolent Depotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor' (2001) 33 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Policy 1101. 
36 For example, there have been differences of opinion as to the amount of responsibility given to the 
provisional institutions of self-government under the Constitutional Framework and the timing of a decision 
on the ultimate status of Kosovo. UNMIK's position is that the provisional institutions must satisfy key 
standards in relation to rights protection before any decision as to the status is made. See SG Report 9110/02, 
paragraph 2 and the Report of the Security Council Mission to Kosovo and Belgrade of 19 December 2002. 
37 Brannigan, paragraphs at 62-65 and Lawless, paragraph 66. 
38 See Marckx v Belgium (1979) Series A No 31, paragraph 31. 
39 See ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
40 See Wilde, 'Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor' 
(200 1) 7 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 455 
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acceptable principles of State responsibility has been difficult enough, yet such principles 
do not have to regulate 'the convoluted structures of mandates and delegations as those 
behind the international administrations'41 . Traditional principles of responsibility are not 
appropriate or relevant to a collective security organ such as the Security Council, UNMIK 
or KFOR42 . What would be the consequences of engaging the responsibility of these 
organs: to cease the activity and restore the situation prevailing prior to the wrongful 
activity, or to pay compensation to victims43? 
IHRL provides that an individual should have access to an effective remedy, generally 
equated with a right to judicial process and, if a violation is established, the payment of 
compensation. However, an individual right to a legal remedy may not be appropriate 
where the violations complained of are systematic or entrenched and require political not 
legal action44. For example, the experience of the ECHR in relation to Turkey and 
Northern Ireland suggests that the Convention system may be ineffective where the 
narrowly defined individual dispute masks 'a politically charged and often long-standing 
larger dispute - which may have a much larger human rights dimension>'~5 . Judicial 
decision-making methods are limited to the facts relevant to the individual dispute and may 
not provide a comprehensive analysis of the political context. Political decision-making 
mechanisms may be better suited to such issues. 
In Kosovo, the international administration is faced with rebuilding the structure of a 
society and is faced with complex and difficult decisions, often with only political 
solutions. The situation arose precisely because the legal system has proved incapable of 
resolving these political issues in the past. Exposing the international administration to 
41 Korhonen, note 27 at 527. 
42 See Gowlland-Debbas, 'Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility' (1994) 43 
ICLQ 55. 
43 Gill, 'Legal and some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to exercise its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' ( 1995) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33 
at 108. 
44 In the context of derogation, see Gross, 'Once More unto the Breach': The Systematic Failure of Applying 
the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies' (1998) 23 Yale Journal of 
International Law 437. 
45 White, 'Tackling Political Disputes Through Individual Applications' (1998) 1 EHRLR 61 at 61-2. See 
also Quigley, 'Israel's forty-five year emergency: Are there time limits to derogations from Human Rights 
obligations?' (1994) 15 MJIL 491. 
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numerous legal claims based on similar violations is unlikely to resolve such issues. For 
example, the main source of complaints to the Ombudsperson has been property disputes, 
as KFOR and UNMIK seize property to return it to pre-conflict owners or to accommodate 
returning refugees46 . Underlying this policy47 is the priority accorded to refugee return and 
the protection of ethnic minorities under Resolution 124448 . In order to achieve its policy 
of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, UNMIK is aware that encouraging Kosovo Serbs to participate in 
the political process is one of the mission's greatest challenges49 • The grant by a court of a 
legal remedy to an individual in relation to a property claim in this context would not 
address the underlying policy issues and may serve to aggravate existing tensions. On a 
practical level, the UN is already struggling from a shortage of financial resources and 
simply does not have the financial resources to pay compensation to individuals for 
individual violations. The prospect of such claims could prevent or deter the organisation 
from offering assistance to post-conflict societies in the future. 
The absence of judicial review and/or an individual remedy IS not restricted to the 
administration of territory by the UN. The UN system is not a constitutional structure that 
provides for judicial review in the manner expected in domestic democracies50• The 
international criminal tribunals operate within a legal vacuum, lacking an external legal 
review mechanism and actions of other UN actors are not subject to judicial review. IHL 
does not provide for a judicial tribunal with automatic jurisdiction in respect of violations, 
nor does it provide for a right of individual petition. Similarly, international criminal law is 
primarily designed to punish those individuals found guilty of serious crimes51 . Although 
the ICC may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying reparations to, or 
in respect of, victims, this does not amount to a right on the part of individual victims to 
46 See Ombudsperson Special Report I, paragraph 29. 
47 UNMIK established a Housing and Property Directorate to process housing claims and to provide 
accommodation to returning refugees. 
48 See Ward, 'The failure to protect minorities in Post-War Kosovo' (2000) Helsinki Monitor no 1 at 37 and 
White, 'Reconstructing Kosovo: The Ethnic Dimension' in Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International 
Cooperative Security (Spillman and Krause eds) (2000). 
49 See various reports of the Secretary-General, which emphasise the importance of engaging all minorities 
and the divisive nature of property law disputes. For example, SG Report 16/9/99 at paragraph 7. 
50 Tadic, paragraph 11. 
51 These crimes are specified in the relevant statute and include genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and crimes of aggression. See Articles 5 to 8, Rome Statute and Articles 2 to 5, ICTY Statute. 
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petition the ICC for, or to receive, a remedy2• Accountability lies in the political sphere: 
the legitimacy of the UN system depends not on judicial determinations but on the 
acceptance of States and the wider international community. It also contains an element of 
faith: faith that the UN will uphold the international standards it establishes, preaches and 
promotes. 
C. Conclusions 
The international administration is criticised for failing to adhere to international human 
rights standards when exercising governance functions, as because if the UN expects States 
to adhere to such principles, it must do so when it acts as a government. Such analysis 
presupposes that the international administration of territory is democratic in nature, an 
assumption that is not correct. International administrations are by definition transitional, 
and are not accountable to the local population through either the political incentive of re-
election, or legally by virtue of citizen rights and State duties. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
both UNMIK and KFOR are measures to restore international peace and security 
established pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter. They exercise powers delegated by the 
Security Council. 
Chapter 3 has demonstrated that, while the UN has made a commitment to observing IHRL 
in all aspects of its activities, this commitment is political or moral in nature, and is not 
legally binding. IHRL does not apply directly to the acts of either KFOR or UNMIK in 
Kosovo, either by virtue of the Charter, Resolution 1244 or UNMIK regulations. Even if 
IHRL did apply, the prospect of an individual obtaining a judicial remedy, such as 
compensation, in respect of any violation is limited due to the wide immunities granted to 
UNMIK and KFOR, the absence of a functioning and independent judiciary and the 
difficulties in obtaining judicial review in the international system. Accountability is likely 
to be achieved through political, rather than legal, means. Responsibility ultimately lies 
52 Article 75, Rome Statute. The Rome Statute provides for the establishment of a trust fund for this purpose. 
The ICTY Statute does not contain a similar provision, only providing for the ICTY to order the return of any 
property and proceeds obtained through criminal activities: Article 24. For a discussion of reparations in the 
context of the ICC, see Shelton, 'Reparations for Victims of International Crimes' in International Crimes, 
Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (Shelton ed) (2000). 
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with the UN. It is one of its principal organs, the Security Council, which has establshed 
UNMIK and authorised the powers exercised by KFOR. 
There is some prospect for an independent judicial remedy through the application of the 
laws of State succession, the developing principle of extra-territorial responsibility and the 
notion of functional duality. The former may result in the direct or concurrent 
responsibility of the FRY and the UN for the actions of the international administration in 
Kosovo which violate IHRL. Extra-territorial responsibility leads to individual member 
States being held responsible for the extra-territorial acts of their agents, and is more likely 
to be incurred in relation to the States participating in KFOR that retain significant 
command and control in relation to their national contingents. Functional duality requires 
the courts in Kosovo to distinguish between the functions of UNMIK and KFOR that are 
international in nature, and those that are the acts of the surrogate government in Kosovo. 
The courts must then be willing to recognise that the traditional immunities of international 
organisations do not apply in respect of the latter. However, all three possibilities are not 
widely accepted, either by States or the UN, and their application would require a 
significant development, either judicially through the ECHR, or politically. Why should an 
international administration comply with an inherently regional convention as the European 
Convention, although contracting States participating in KFOR may be required to comply 
with the European Convention? 
In considering the application of IHRL to post-conflict situations such as Kosovo, it is 
necessary to determine whether extending the protection of IHRL is appropriate. It is 
similarly unrealistic to expect an international administration in a post-conflict situation to 
comply with the entire range of rights protected by IHRL. Adopting such ambitious 
standards as a measure of mission success is conducive to perceived failure and threatens 
the credibility of the UN as a guarantor of human rights. In relation to future international 
administrations, the Security Council should recognise the extreme nature of post-conflict 
situations and indicate that such mission will, at least initially, operate in accordance with 
the minimum standards of human rights applicable in a state of emergency. This will 
redirect the emphasis to an examination of what are realistic expectations for the 
international administration in the post-conflict context and lead to more comprehensive 
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and attainable mandates, with a clear human rights component. The jurisprudence of the 
ECHR and the UNHRC in relation to derogation will provide important guidance in a post-
conflict human rights framework. This may necessitate recognising that the political 
decisions facing the international administration are not always suited to a judicial remedy. 
The threat of State withdrawal from international peace enforcement missions such as 
KFOR is significant. Any reduction in the level of immunity extended to military 
personnel or the extension of the notion of extra-territorial jurisdiction to peacekeeping 
forces could have serious consequences for international collective military action. In 
addition to weakening the capacity of the UN to respond to threats to international peace 
and security, withdrawal of troops from collective actions could result in a greater 
willingness on the part of States to take unilateral action outside the UN system. If the 
State was, or had the support of, a permanent member of the Security Council, it is unlikely 
that the Security Council could prevent or even regulate unilateral action. Ultimately, 
while clear responsibility of military forces may be a desirable objective, does this warrant 
risking the existing level of control exercised by the Security Council, or the arguably 
greater risk that no action may be taken at all? 
The relative success of the missions in Kosovo and East Timor is likely to lead to the 
deployment of similarly extensive missions in the future. Before doing so, the UN, its 
member States and the wider international community should consider the potential 
application of IHRL in such situations and produce clear guidelines for its application. 
This should avoid a repetition of the confusion and uncertainty that has surrounded the 
activities of the international administration in Kosovo. 
111 
Bibliography 
Akande, D., 'The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there room 
for judicial control of decisions of the political organs of the United Nations' ( 1997) 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 309 
Akande, D., 'The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice' (1998) 9 European Journal of 
International Law 437 
Akashi, Y., 'Managing United Nations Peacekeeping' in United Nations Peacekeeping 
in Trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia (Biermann and Vadset eds) 
(1998) 
Akehurst, M., 'Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the 
Organization of American States' (1967) 42 British Yearbook of International Law 175 
Alvarez, J., 'Judging the Security Council' (1996) 90 AIJL 1 
Amerasinghe, C., 'Liability to Third Parties of Member States of International 
Organisations: Practice, Principle and Judicial Precedent' (1991) 85 American Journal 
of International Law 259 
Annan, K 'The Quiet Revolution' (1998) 4 Global Governance 123 
Aolain, F., 'The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis' 
(1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 957 
Arangio-Ruiz, G., 'The "Federal Analogy" and UN Charter Interpretation: A Crucial 
Issue' ( 1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 1 
Aust, A., Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000) 
Barnes, S., 'The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies' (2001) 
95 American Journal of International Law 86 
Beato, A., 'Newly Independent and Separating States' Succession to Treaties: 
Considerations of the Hybrid Dependency of the Republics of the Former Soviet Union' 
( 1994) 9 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 525 
Beauvais, J, 'Benevolent Depotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor' 
(2001) 33 New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 1101 
112 
Bibliography 
Beemelmans, H., 'State Succession in International Law: Remarks on Recent Theory 
and Statepraxis' (1997) 15 Boston University International Law Journal71 
Bell, C., Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) 
Berdal, M., 'The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold 
War' (1996) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 71 
Berdal, M. and Leifer, M., 'Cambodia' in The new interventionism, 1991-1994 (Mayall 
ed) (1996) 
Betts, W., Carlson, S. and Gisvold, G., 'The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration 
of Kosovo and the lessons learned in efforts to establish a judiciary and rule of law' 
(200 1) 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 3 71 
Blokker, N., 'Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security 
Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the Able and Willing" (2000) 
11 European Journal of International Law 541 
Blum, Y., 'Current Developments: UN Membership of the 'New' Yugoslavia: 
Continuity or Break?' ( 1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 830 
Bathe, M. and Marauhn, T., 'UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, 
Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration' in 
Kosovo and the International Community (Tomuschat eds) (2002) 
Boutris-Ghali, B., 'Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century' in 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Otunnu and Doyle eds) (1998) 
Bowett, D., 'Judicial and Political Functions of the Security Council and the 
International Court of Justice' in The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Fox 
ed) (1997) 
Bradley, 'ASIL Insights: US Not to Ratify ICC Treaty', May 2002 available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights.htm 
Brand, M., 'Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of 
UNMIK Legislation' (2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 461-488 
Brand, M., 'Effective human rights protection when the UN "becomes the state": lessons 
from UNMIK' in The United Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies 
(White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003) 
113 
Bibliography 
Bratt, D., 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations' in The United 
Nations, Peace and Force, (Pugh ed) (1997) 
Brownlie, I., Principles of International Law, Fifth edition ( 1998) 
Campbell, A. 'The Limits of the Powers of International Organisations' (1983) 32 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 523 
Campbell, G., The Road to Kosovo- A Balkan Diary (2000) 
Caron, D., 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council' (1993) 
87 American Journal of International Law 551 
Cassesse, A, ed United Nations Peace-Keeping: Legal Essays (1978) 
Cerone, J., 'Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo' ASIL Insights 
October 2000, accessed at www.asil.org/insights 
Cerone, J., 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo' 
(200 1) 12 European Journal of International Law 469 
Chandler, D 'Imperialism may be out, but aggressive wars and colonial protectorates are 
back' The Guardian 14 April 2002 
Charney, J., 'Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 34 
Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law455 
Chopra, J., Peace Maintenance: The evolution of international political authority (1999) 
Chopra, J., 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor' (2000) 42(3) Survival27 
Chowdhury, Rule of Law in State of Emergency: The Paris Minimum Standards of 
Human Rights in a State of Emergency ( 1989) 
Ciobanu, D, 'The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-Keeping Operations' 
in United Nations Peace-Keeping: Legal Essays (Cassesse ed) (1978) 
Cooper, R., 'The New Liberal Imperialism', extract printed in The Guardian, 7 April 
2002, full version available at www.fpc.org.uk 
Cousens, E., 'Building Peace in Bosnia', in Peacebuilding as Politics (Cousens and 
Kumar eds) (2001) 
Crawford, J., The Creation of States in International Law (1979) 
Crawford, J., 'The Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution' in The Changing 
Constitution of the United Nations (Foxed) (1997) 
114 
Bibliography 
D' Angelo, D., 'The Check on International Peace and Security Maintenance: The 
International Court of Justice and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions' 
(2000) 23 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 561 
Doyle, M., UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (1995) 
Doyle, M., 'Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power' in Peacebuilding as 
Politics (Cousens and Kumar eds) (2000) 
Durch, W., 'UN Temporary Executive Authority' in Evolution of UN Peacekeeping 
(Durch ed) (1993) 
Duursma, JC, 'Justifying NATO's use of force in Kosovo?' (1999) 12Leiden Journal of 
International Law 287 
Engers, J., 'The United Nations Travel and Identity Document for Namibians' (1971) 65 
American Journal of International Law 571 
Epps, V., 'Self-Determination after Kosovo and East Timor' (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 445 
Fink, J, 'From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the Mandate for the 
Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security' (1995) 19 Maryland 
Journal of International Law and Trade 1 
Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Conflict: The International System for Protecting Human 
Rights during States of Emergency ( 1994) 
Fortna, V., 'United Nations Transition Assistance Group' m Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping (Durch ed) (0 
Franck, T., 'Legitimacy in the International System' (1988) 82 American Journal of 
International Law 705 
Franck, T., 'The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN 
Legality?' (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 519 
Franck, T., 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 American 
Journal of International Law 46 
Frank, T., 'The United Nations as Guarantor of International Peace and Security: Past, 
Present and Future' in The United Nations at Age Fifty - A Legal Perspective 
(Tomuschat ed) (1995) 
115 
Bibliography 
Franck, T., 'A Holistic Approach to Building Peace' in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 
for the New Century (Otunnu and Doyle eds) (1998) 
Gaillard, E. and Pingel-Lenuzza, 1., 'International Organisations and Immunity from 
Jurisdiction: To restrict or to bypass' (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1-15 
Gaga, G., 'Use of Force made or authorized by the United Nations' in in The United 
Nations at Age Fifty- A Legal Perspective {Tomuschat ed) ( 1995) 
Gardam, J., 'Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action' (1996) 
17 Michigan Journal of International Law 285 
Gill, T., 'Legal and some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council 
to exercise its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' (1995) XXVI 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33 
Gordon, R., 'Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship' (1995) 28 Cornell International 
Law Journal301 
Gowlland-Debbas, V., 'Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State 
Responsibility' (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 
Gowlland-Debbas, V., 'The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and 
the Security Council in the light of the Lockerbiecase' (1994) 88 AIJL 643 
Gowlland-Debbas V., 'The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives 
in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance', (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 361 
Grant, T., 'Territorial Status, Recognition and Statehood: Some Aspects of the Genocide 
Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia)' (1997) 33 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 305 
Grant, T., 'Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations Might Have Addressed 
Kosovo' ( 1999) 28 The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 9 
Gray, G., 'Regional Arrangements and the United Nations Collective Security System', 
in The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (Foxed) (1997) 
Greenwood, Christopher 'The United Nations as Guarantor of International peace and 
security: Past, present and future- A United Kingdom view' in The United Nations at 
Age Fifty- A Legal Perspective (Tomuschat ed) (1995) 
116 
Bibliography 
Griffen, M .. and Jones, B., 'Building Peace through Transitional Authority: New 
Directions, Major Challenges' (2001) 7(4) International Peacekeeping 75 
Gross, 0., ' 'Once More unto the Breach': The Systematic Failure of Applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies' (1998) 23 Yale 
Journal of International Law 437 
Hampson, F., 'Can Peacebuilding Work?' (1997) 30 Cornell International Law Journal 
701 
Hartman, J., 'Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies' (1981) 22 
Harvard International Law Journal 1 
Helman, G. and Ratner, S., 'Saving Failed States' (1992-3) Foreign Policy Winter 3 
Henkin, L, 'Kosovo and the Law of 'humanitarian intervention" (1999) 93 American 
Journal of International Law 828 
Herdegen, M., 'The Constitutionalization of the UN Security System' (1994) 27 
Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law 135 
Herman, L., 'The Legal Status of Namibia and of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia' (1975) The Canadian Year Book of International Law 306 
Higgins, R., 'Derogations under Human Rights Treaties' (1976-7) 48 BybiL 281 
Iyer, V., 'States of Emergency- Moderating their Effects on Human Rights' (1999) 22 
Dalhousie Law Journal125 
Jan, A., 'Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace?' in Peacebuilding as 
Politics (Cousens and Kumar eds) (2001) 
Judah, T., Kosovo: War and Revenge (2000) 
Kelly, M., 'The UN, Security and Human Rights: Achieving the Winning Balance' in 
The United Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, 
D. eds) (forthcoming 2003) 
Kelsen H The Law ofthe United Nations (1950) 
Kelsen, H., 'Is the North Atlantic Treaty A Regional Arrangement?' (1951) 45American 
Journal of International Law 162 
King, F., 'Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of Limits on the 
Security Council's Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter' (1996) 10 Emory 
International Law Review 509 
117 
Bibliography 
Kirgis, F., 'The Security Council's First Fifty Years' (1995) 89 American Journal of 
International Law 506 
Kirgis, F., 'Security Council Governance of Postconflict Societies: A Plea for Good 
Faith and Informed Decision Making' (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 
579 
Kondoch, B., 'Human Rights Law and UN Peace Operations in Post-Conflict Situations' 
in The United Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and 
Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003) 
Korhonen, 0., 'International Governance m Post-Conflict Situations' (2001) 14(3) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 495 
Kourula, E., 'Peace Keeping and Regional Arrangements' in United Nations Peace-
Keeping: Legal Essays (Cassesse ed) (1978) 
Ktihne, W., ' The United Nations, Fragmenting States, and the Need for Enlarged 
Peacekeeping' in The United Nations at Age Fifty- A Legal Perspective (Tomuschat ed) 
(1995) 
Lee, R., 'The Historical Evolution of the United Nations in Global Conflict: Creating, 
Defining and Expanding the Role of the United Nations: United Nations Peacekeeping: 
Development and Prospects' (1995) 28 Cornell International LawJournal619 
Lewis, I. and Mayall, J., 'Somalia' in The new interventionism, 1991-1994 (Mayall ed) 
(1996 
Lillich, R., 'Current Developments: The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights 
Norms in a State of Emergency' ( 1985) 79 American Journal of International Law 1073 
Lorenz, F., 'The Rule of Law in Kosovo: Problems and Prospects' (2000) 11 Criminal 
Law Forum 127 
Lush, C., 'The Territorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Recent Case Law' (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 897 
Lynch, 'Austria is said to aid flight of suspect: UN Officials Assail Thwarting of Probe' 
The Washington Post 6 March 2002 
Macdonald, R St J 'Changing Relations between the International Court of Justice and 
the Security Council of the United Nations' (1993) The Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law 1 
118 
Bibliography 
Macdonald, R. St. J. 'Derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights' (1997) 36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 225 
Makinda, S., 'Somalia: Lessons from the UN Experience' in Peacekeeping and 
Peacemaking: towards effective intervention in post-Cold War conflicts (Woodhouse 
and Dando eds) (1998) 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo (1998) 
Martenczuk, B., 'The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: 
What Lessons from Lockerbie?' ( 1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 517 
Matheson, M., 'United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies' 95 American 
Journal of International Law 76 (2001) 
McGoldrick, D., 'The Development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) After the Helsinki 1992 Conference' (1993) 42 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 411 
McWhinney, E., 'The International Court as Emerging Constitutional Court and the Co-
ordinate UN Institutions (Especially the Security Council): Implications of the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie' ( 1992) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 261 
Meron, T., 'Note and Comment: On the Inadequate reach of Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law and the need for a new instrument' (1983) 77 American Journal of 
International Law 589 
Meron, T., Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989) 
Meron, T., 'A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards' (1991) 85 American 
Journal of International Law 375 
Meron, T., 'Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties' (1995) 89 American Journal of 
International Law 78 
Meyer, 'OSCE Missions of Long Duration- Evaluating a Multifunctional Instrument of 
Peacekeeping' (2000) 6 (2/3) International Peacekeeping 77 
Miller, L., 'Recent Developments in East Timor: East Timor, Collective Action, and 
Global Order' (2000) 14 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal89 
Mole, N., 'Who Guards the Guards- the Rule of Law in Kosovo' (2001) 3 European 
Human Rights Law Review 280 
119 
Bibliography 
Montaldo, R., 'International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International 
Organisations' (1970) 44 British Yearbook of International Law 111 
Mullerson, R., 'The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former 
USSR and Yugoslavia' (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly473 
Norton-Taylor, 'Forces fear war crimes threat' The Guardian 7 March 2001 
Nortin-Taylor, 'Tories urge block on war crimes court' The Guardian 8 March 2001 
Neuhold, H, 'Collective Security after 'Operation Allied Force" (2000) 4 Max Planck 
Yearbook of International Law 73 
O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (1956) 
O'Neill, W., Kosovo: An unfinished peace (2001) 
Oraa, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (1992) 
Otunnu, 0. and Doyle, M. (eds) Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century 
(1998) 
Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments 
concerning situations known as State of Siege or Emergency (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15) 
Quigley, J., 'Israel's forty-five year emergency: Are there time limits to derogations 
from Human Rights obligations?' (1994) 15 Michigan Journal of International Law 491 
Quigley, J., 'The Privatization of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to 
Multilateralism' ( 1996) 1 7 Michigan Journal of International Law 249 
Ratner, S., 'The Cambodian Settlement Agreements'(1993) 87 American Journal of 
International Law 1 
Reif, L., 'Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection' (2000) 13 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal1 
Reisman, M., 'The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations' (1993) 87 American 
Journal of International Law 83 
Ringelheim, J., 'The Legal Status of Kosovo' in Kosovo 1999-2000: The Intractable 
Peace, Research paper produced by the European University Institute, available at 
www.iue.it 
120 
Bibliography 
Roberts, A., 'Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organization: The Case 
of the Former Yugoslavia' in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century 
(Otunnu and Doyle eds) (1998) 
Roberts, K., 'Second-guessing the Security Council: The International Court of Justice 
and its Powers of Judicial Review' (1995) 7 Pace International Law Review 281 
Rose, M., Fighting for Peace. Bosnia 1994 (1998) 
Rothert, M., 'UN Intervention in East Timor' (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 257 
Ruffert, M., 'The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the International 
Community' (200 1) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 613 
Sapiro, M., 'Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political 
Transformation' ( 1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 631 
Sapiro, M., 'The OSCE: an Essential Component of European Security',ASIL Insights 
March 1997, available at www .asil.org/insights 
Sarooshi, D., The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The 
Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (1999) 
Sarooshi, D., 'The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs' 
( 1996) 67 British Yearbook of International Law 413 
Schachter, 0., 'Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations' in Law and Force in the New International Order (Fisler-Damrosch and 
Scheffer eds) ( 1991) 
Seyersted, F., 'United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems' (1961) 37 British 
Yearbook of International Law 351 
Seyersted, F., United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War ( 1966) 
Shaw, M., International Law, Fourth Edition (1997) 
Shelton, D., 'Reparations for Victims of International Crimes' in International Crimes, 
Peace and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (Shelton ed) 
(2000) 
Simma, B., 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects' (1999) 10European 
Journal of International Law 1 
Smith, 'Rule of Law is Elusive in Kosovo' Washington Post 29 July 2001 
121 
Bibliography 
Stahn, C., 'The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East Timor: 
A First Analysis' (200 1) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 105 
Stahn, C., 'Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations 
Constitutional Framework for Self-Government' (200 1) 14(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 531 
Stahn, C 'International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, 
Developments and Challenges Ahead' (2001) 61 ZaoRV105 
Stein, T., 'Kosovo and the International Community. The Attribution of Possible 
Internationally Wrongful Acts: The Responsibility of NATO or of its Member States?' 
in Kosovo and the International Community (Tomuschat ed) (2002) 
Strohmeyer, H., 'Building a New Judiciary for East Timor: Challenges of a Fledging 
Nation' (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 11 
Strohmeyer, H., 'Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 
46 
Strohmeyer, H., 'Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of 
Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor' (2001) 25 Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs Journal1 07 
Thayer, 'The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The Restoration of 
Sovereignty' in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: towards effective intervention in post-
Cold War conflicts (Woodhouse and Dando eds) (1998). 
United Nations Department of Public Information The Blue Helmets: A Review of 
United Nations Peace-keeping Third Edition (1996) 
United Nations Department of Public Information Blue Book Series, Volume II, The 
United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995 (1995) 
Verdirame, G., 'Compliance with Human Rights in UN Operations' (2002) 2(2)Human 
Rights Law Review 265 
Villani, U., 'The Security Council's Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional 
Organizations' (2002) 6 Ma:x Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 535 
Warbrick, C., 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of 
Terrorism' (1983) 32 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 82 
122 
Bibliography 
Ward, B., 'The failure to protect minorities in Post-War Kosovo' Helsinki Monitor 2000 
no 1 37 
Watson, G., 'Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court' (1993) 34(1) 
Harvard International Law Journall 
Weller, M., 'The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo' (1999) 75 International Affairs 
211 
White, E., 'Reconstructing Kosovo: The Ethnic Dimension' in Kosovo: Lessons Learned 
for International Cooperative Security (Spillman and Krause eds) (2000) 
White, N., Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the maintenance of international 
peace and security ( 1993) 
White, N. and Ulgen, 6., 'The Security Council and the Decentralised Military Option: 
Constitutionality and Function' (1997) Netherlands International Law Review 378 
White, N., 'The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues' in The UN, 
Peace and Force (Pugh ed) (1997) 
White, N. and Klaasen, D., 'The UN and the Protection of Human Rights in Post-
Conflict Situations' in The United Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies 
(White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) (forthcoming 2003) 
White, R 'Tackling Political Disputes Through Individual Applications' (1998) 1 
European Human Rights Law Review 61 
Wilde, R., 'Why and How UNHCR Governance of 'Development' Refugee Camps 
Should be Subject to International Human Rights Law' (1998) 1 Yale Human Rights end 
Development Law Journal! 07 
Wilde, R., 'From Bosnia to Kosovo and East Timor: The Changing Role of the United 
Nations in the Administration of Territory' (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 467 
Wilde, R., 'The Complex Role of the Legal Advisor when International Organizations 
Administer Territory' ASIL Proceedings 2001251 
Wilde, R., 'From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International 
Territorial Administration' (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 583 
Wilde, R., 'Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and East Timor' (2001) 7 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law455 
123 
Bibliography 
Wilde, R., 'International territorial administration and human rights' in The United 
Nations, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Societies (White, N. and Klaasen, D. eds) 
(forthcoming 2003) 
Williams, P., 'The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia: Do they continue if force?' (1994) 23 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 1 
Williams, S., and Shah, S., 'Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting 
States' (2002) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 775 
Williamson, E. and Os born, J., 'A US Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related 
issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia' (1993) 33 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 261 
Wood, 'Amnesty and UN staff accuse Kosovo war crimes tribunal of ethnic bias' The 
Guardian 20 June 2001 
Wood, 'Kosovo's love affair with Nato keeps tempers down' The Guardian 4 December 
2000 
Wood, 'Paratroopers charged with Kosovo killing' The Guardian 4 December 2000. 
Wouters, J. and Naert, F., 'How Effective is the European Security Architecture? 
Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo' (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 540 
Zimmermann, A. and Stahn, C., 'Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or 
Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo' (200 1) 
70(4) Nordic Journal of International Law 423 
124 
